22 Search Results for "Tardos, Eva"


Document
Randomness and Fairness in Two-Sided Matching with Limited Interviews

Authors: Hedyeh Beyhaghi and Éva Tardos

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 185, 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021)


Abstract
We study the outcome in a matching market where both sides have limited ability to consider options. For example, in the national residency matching program, doctors are limited to apply to a small set of hospitals, and hospitals are limited by the time required to interview candidates. Our main findings are the following: (1) In markets where jobs can only consider a limited number of candidates for interview, it increases the size of the resulting matching if the system has a limit on the number of applications a candidate can send. (2) The fair system of all applicants being allowed to apply to the exact same number of positions maximizes the expected size of the matching. More particularly, starting from an integer k as the number of applications, the matching size decreases as a few applicants are allowed to apply to one additional position (and then increases again as they are all allowed to apply to k+1). Although it seems natural to expect that the size of the matching would be a monotone increasing and concave function in the number of applications, our results show that neither is true. These results hold even in a market where a-priori all jobs and all candidates are equally likely to be good, and the judgments of different employers and candidates are independent. Our main technical contribution is computing the expected size of the matching found via the deferred acceptance algorithm as a function of the number of interviews and applications in a market where preferences are uniform and independent. Through simulations we confirm that these findings extend to markets where rankings become correlated after the interviews.

Cite as

Hedyeh Beyhaghi and Éva Tardos. Randomness and Fairness in Two-Sided Matching with Limited Interviews. In 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 185, pp. 74:1-74:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)


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@InProceedings{beyhaghi_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.74,
  author =	{Beyhaghi, Hedyeh and Tardos, \'{E}va},
  title =	{{Randomness and Fairness in Two-Sided Matching with Limited Interviews}},
  booktitle =	{12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021)},
  pages =	{74:1--74:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-177-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{185},
  editor =	{Lee, James R.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.74},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-136139},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.74},
  annote =	{Keywords: Matching with Short Lists, Stable Matching, Balls in Bins Problem}
}
Document
Interface of Computation, Game Theory, and Economics (Dagstuhl Seminar 13161)

Authors: Sergiu Hart, Éva Tardos, and Bernhard von Stengel

Published in: Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 3, Issue 4 (2013)


Abstract
This report documents the program and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 13161 "Interface of Computation, Game Theory, and Economics". The workshop was strongly interdisciplinary, on the leading edge of current topics generally connected to algorithmic game theory: Mechanism design and auctions, interactions in networks, social models, and dynamics and equilibrium in games and markets. We summarize these topics, give the talk abstracts, and comment on experiences related to the organization of the workshop.

Cite as

Sergiu Hart, Éva Tardos, and Bernhard von Stengel. Interface of Computation, Game Theory, and Economics (Dagstuhl Seminar 13161). In Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 3, Issue 4, pp. 69-90, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2013)


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@Article{hart_et_al:DagRep.3.4.69,
  author =	{Hart, Sergiu and Tardos, \'{E}va and von Stengel, Bernhard},
  title =	{{Interface of Computation, Game Theory, and Economics (Dagstuhl Seminar 13161)}},
  pages =	{69--90},
  journal =	{Dagstuhl Reports},
  ISSN =	{2192-5283},
  year =	{2013},
  volume =	{3},
  number =	{4},
  editor =	{Hart, Sergiu and Tardos, \'{E}va and von Stengel, Bernhard},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagRep.3.4.69},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-41341},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagRep.3.4.69},
  annote =	{Keywords: Algorithmic Game Theory, Economics, Internet, Nash Equilibrium, Mechanism Design, Auctions}
}
Document
07471 Abstracts Collection – Equilibrium Computation

Authors: P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Marcin Jurdzinski, Peter Bro Miltersen, Eva Tardos, and Bernhard von Stengel

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7471, Equilibrium Computation (2008)


Abstract
From 18 to 23 November 2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07471 ``Equilibrium Computation'' was held in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.

Cite as

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Marcin Jurdzinski, Peter Bro Miltersen, Eva Tardos, and Bernhard von Stengel. 07471 Abstracts Collection – Equilibrium Computation. In Equilibrium Computation. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7471, pp. 1-15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2008)


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@InProceedings{herings_et_al:DagSemProc.07471.1,
  author =	{Herings, P. Jean-Jacques and Jurdzinski, Marcin and Bro Miltersen, Peter and Tardos, Eva and von Stengel, Bernhard},
  title =	{{07471 Abstracts Collection – Equilibrium Computation}},
  booktitle =	{Equilibrium Computation},
  pages =	{1--15},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2008},
  volume =	{7471},
  editor =	{P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Marcin Jurdzinski and Peter Bro Miltersen and Eva Tardos and Bernhard von Stengel},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07471.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-15286},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07471.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Equilibrium, algorithm, polynomial time, game theory, economics}
}
Document
Equilibrium Tracing in Bimatrix Games

Authors: Anne Balthasar

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7471, Equilibrium Computation (2008)


Abstract
We analyze the relations of the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm, the Lemke-Howson algorithm and the global Newton method introduced by Govindan and Wilson. It is known that the global Newton method encompasses the Lemke-Howson algorithm; we prove that it also comprises the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm, and more generally, the linear tracing procedure, as a special case. This will lead us to a discussion of traceability of equilibria of index +1. We answer negatively the open question of whether, generically, the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm is flexible enough to trace all equilibria of index +1.

Cite as

Anne Balthasar. Equilibrium Tracing in Bimatrix Games. In Equilibrium Computation. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7471, pp. 1-14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2008)


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@InProceedings{balthasar:DagSemProc.07471.2,
  author =	{Balthasar, Anne},
  title =	{{Equilibrium Tracing in Bimatrix Games}},
  booktitle =	{Equilibrium Computation},
  pages =	{1--14},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2008},
  volume =	{7471},
  editor =	{P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Marcin Jurdzinski and Peter Bro Miltersen and Eva Tardos and Bernhard von Stengel},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07471.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-15265},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07471.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Bimatrix games, Equilibrium computation, Homotopy methods, Index}
}
Document
Homotopy Methods to Compute Equilibria in Game Theory

Authors: P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Ronald Peeters

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7471, Equilibrium Computation (2008)


Abstract
This paper presents a survey of the use of homotopy methods in game theory. Homotopies allow for a robust computation of game-theoretic equilibria and their refinements. Homotopies are also suitable to compute equilibria that are selected by various selection theories. We present the relevant techniques underlying homotopy algorithms. We give detailed expositions of the Lemke-Howson algorithm and the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm to compute Nash equilibria in 2-person games, and the Herings-van den Elzen, Herings-Peeters, and McKelvey-Palfrey algorithms to compute Nash equilibria in general $n$-person games. We explain how the main ideas can be extended to compute equilibria in extensive form and dynamic games, and how homotopies can be used to compute all Nash equilibria.

Cite as

P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Ronald Peeters. Homotopy Methods to Compute Equilibria in Game Theory. In Equilibrium Computation. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7471, pp. 1-40, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2008)


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@InProceedings{herings_et_al:DagSemProc.07471.3,
  author =	{Herings, P. Jean-Jacques and Peeters, Ronald},
  title =	{{Homotopy Methods to Compute Equilibria in Game Theory}},
  booktitle =	{Equilibrium Computation},
  pages =	{1--40},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2008},
  volume =	{7471},
  editor =	{P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Marcin Jurdzinski and Peter Bro Miltersen and Eva Tardos and Bernhard von Stengel},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07471.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-15257},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07471.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Homotopy, Equilibrium computation, Non-cooperative games, Nash Equilibrium}
}
Document
Simple Stochastic Games, Parity Games, Mean Payoff Games and Discounted Payoff Games are all LP-Type Problems

Authors: Nir Halman

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7471, Equilibrium Computation (2008)


Abstract
We show that a Simple Stochastic Game (SSG) can be formulated as an LP-type problem. Using this formulation, and the known algorithm of Sharir and Welzl for LP-type problems, we obtain the first strongly subexponential solution for SSGs (a strongly subexponential algorithm has only been known for binary SSGs). Using known reductions between various games, we achieve the first trongly subexponential solutions for Discounted and Mean Payoff Games. We also give alternative simple proofs for the best known upper bounds for Parity Games and binary SSGs. To the best of our knowledge, the LP-type framework has been used so far only in order to yield linear or close to linear time algorithms for various problems in computational geometry and location theory. Our approach demonstrates the applicability of the LP-type framework in other fields, and for achieving subexponential algorithms. This work has been published in Algorithmica, volume 49 (September 2007), pages 37-50

Cite as

Nir Halman. Simple Stochastic Games, Parity Games, Mean Payoff Games and Discounted Payoff Games are all LP-Type Problems. In Equilibrium Computation. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7471, pp. 1-2, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2008)


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@InProceedings{halman:DagSemProc.07471.4,
  author =	{Halman, Nir},
  title =	{{Simple Stochastic Games, Parity Games, Mean Payoff Games and Discounted Payoff Games are all LP-Type Problems}},
  booktitle =	{Equilibrium Computation},
  pages =	{1--2},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2008},
  volume =	{7471},
  editor =	{P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Marcin Jurdzinski and Peter Bro Miltersen and Eva Tardos and Bernhard von Stengel},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07471.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-15274},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07471.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Subexponential algorithm, LP-type framework}
}
Document
07271 Abstracts Collection – Computational Social Systems and the Internet

Authors: Peter Cramton, Rudolf Müller, Eva Tardos, and Moshe Tennenholtz

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)


Abstract
From 01.07. to 06.07.2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07271 ``Computational Social Systems and the Internet'' was held in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.

Cite as

Peter Cramton, Rudolf Müller, Eva Tardos, and Moshe Tennenholtz. 07271 Abstracts Collection – Computational Social Systems and the Internet. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)


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@InProceedings{cramton_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.1,
  author =	{Cramton, Peter and M\"{u}ller, Rudolf and Tardos, Eva and Tennenholtz, Moshe},
  title =	{{07271 Abstracts Collection – Computational Social Systems and the Internet }},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--25},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11666},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism Design, Combinatorial Auctions, Social Choice Theory, Behavioral Economics, Computational Game Theory, Social Networks}
}
Document
07271 Summary – Computational Social Systems and the Internet

Authors: Peter Cramton, Rudolf Müller, Eva Tardos, and Moshe Tennenholtz

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)


Abstract
The seminar "Computational Social Systems and the Internet" facilitated a very fruitful interaction between economists and computer scientists, which intensified the understanding of the other disciplines' tool sets. The seminar helped to pave the way to a unified theory of social systems on the Internet that takes into account both the economic and the computational issues---and their deep interaction.

Cite as

Peter Cramton, Rudolf Müller, Eva Tardos, and Moshe Tennenholtz. 07271 Summary – Computational Social Systems and the Internet. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)


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@InProceedings{cramton_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.2,
  author =	{Cramton, Peter and M\"{u}ller, Rudolf and Tardos, Eva and Tennenholtz, Moshe},
  title =	{{07271 Summary – Computational Social Systems and the Internet }},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11642},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism Design, Combinatorial Auctions, Social Choice Theory, Behavioral Economics, Computational Game Theory, Social Networks}
}
Document
An Axiomatic Approach to Personalized Ranking Systems

Authors: Alon Altman and Moshe Tennenholtz

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)


Abstract
Personalized ranking systems and trust systems are an essential tool for collaboration in a multi-agent environment. In these systems, trust relations between many agents are aggregated to produce a personalized trust rating of the agents. In this paper we introduce the first extensive axiomatic study of this setting, and explore a wide array of well-known and new personalized ranking systems. We adapt several axioms (basic criteria) from the literature on global ranking systems to the context of personalized ranking systems, and fully classify the set of systems that satisfy all of these axioms. We further show that all these axioms are necessary for this result.

Cite as

Alon Altman and Moshe Tennenholtz. An Axiomatic Approach to Personalized Ranking Systems. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)


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@InProceedings{altman_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.3,
  author =	{Altman, Alon and Tennenholtz, Moshe},
  title =	{{An Axiomatic Approach to Personalized Ranking Systems}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--25},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11527},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Ranking systems, trust, axiomatization, incentives, mechanism design, game theory}
}
Document
Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules

Authors: Vincent Conitzer

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)


Abstract
A (randomized, anonymous) voting rule maps any multiset of total orders of (aka. votes over) a fixed set of alternatives to a probability distribution over these alternatives. A voting rule f is neutral if it treats all alternatives symmetrically. It satisfies participation if no voter ever benefits from not casting her vote. It is falsename-proof if no voter ever benefits from casting additional (potentially different) votes. It is anonymity-proof if it satisfies participation and it is false-name-proof. We show that the class of anonymity-proof neutral voting rules consists exactly of the rules of the following form. With some probability kf in [0, 1], the rule chooses an alternative at random. With probability 1-kf , the rule first draws a pair of alternatives at random. If every vote prefers the same alternative between the two (and there is at least one vote), then the rule chooses that alternative. Otherwise, the rule flips a fair coin to decide between the two alternatives.

Cite as

Vincent Conitzer. Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)


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@InProceedings{conitzer:DagSemProc.07271.4,
  author =	{Conitzer, Vincent},
  title =	{{Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--15},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11658},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism design, social choice, false-name-proofness, verifying identities, combinatorial auctions}
}
Document
Auction Design with Avoidable Fixed Costs: An Experimental Approach

Authors: Wedad Elmaghraby and Nathan Larson

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)


Abstract
Advances in information technology and computational power have opened the doors for auctioneers to explore a range of auction formats by considering varying degrees of bid expressivity and different payment rule, e.g., single price vs. discriminatory prices. While it is clear that one can design more complicated auctions, it is still not clear if should do so and which auction parameters have the greatest impact on the performance on cost and efficiency. The purpose of this paper is to gain some insight into this question, via analytical and experimental methods.

Cite as

Wedad Elmaghraby and Nathan Larson. Auction Design with Avoidable Fixed Costs: An Experimental Approach. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)


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@InProceedings{elmaghraby_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.5,
  author =	{Elmaghraby, Wedad and Larson, Nathan},
  title =	{{Auction Design with Avoidable Fixed Costs: An Experimental Approach}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11579},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions, Experimental, Procurement, Synergies, Asymmetric Bidders}
}
Document
Incentive Compatible Regression Learning

Authors: Ofer Dekel, Felix Fischer, and Ariel D. Procaccia

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)


Abstract
We initiate the study of incentives in a general machine learning framework. We focus on a game theoretic regression learning setting where private information is elicited from multiple agents, which are interested in different distributions over the sample space. This conflict potentially gives rise to untruthfulness on the part of the agents. In the restricted but important case when distributions are degenerate, and under mild assumptions, we show that agents are motivated to tell the truth. In a more general setting, we study the power and limitations of mechanisms without payments. We finally establish that, in the general setting, the VCG mechanism goes a long way in guaranteeing truthfulness and efficiency.

Cite as

Ofer Dekel, Felix Fischer, and Ariel D. Procaccia. Incentive Compatible Regression Learning. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)


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@InProceedings{dekel_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.6,
  author =	{Dekel, Ofer and Fischer, Felix and Procaccia, Ariel D.},
  title =	{{Incentive Compatible Regression Learning}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11622},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Machine learning, regression, mechanism design}
}
Document
Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations

Authors: Elena Grigorieva, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf Müller, and Dries Vermeulen

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)


Abstract
We show that, when bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium in an ex post individually rational query auction can only be ex post efficient when the running time of the auction is infinite for almost all realizations of valuations of the bidders. In contrast we show that, when we allow for inefficient allocations with arbitrarily small probability, there is a query auction (to be more specific, a bisection auction) that attains this level of approximate efficiency in equilibrium, while additionally the running time of the auction in equilibrium is finite for all realizations of valuations.

Cite as

Elena Grigorieva, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf Müller, and Dries Vermeulen. Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-9, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)


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@InProceedings{grigorieva_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.7,
  author =	{Grigorieva, Elena and Herings, P. Jean-Jacques and M\"{u}ller, Rudolf and Vermeulen, Dries},
  title =	{{Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--9},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11616},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: Query auctions, ex post equilibrium, efficiency}
}
Document
Item Pricing for Revenue Maximization in Combinatorial Auctions

Authors: Maria-Florina Balcan

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)


Abstract
Consider the problem of a retailer with various goods for sale, attempting to set prices to maximize revenue. If customers have separate valuations over the different goods, and these are known to the retailer, then the goods can be priced separately and the problem is not so difficult. However, when customers have valuations over sets of items, this becomes a combinatorial auction problem, and the problem becomes computationally hard even when valuations are fully known in advance. In this talk we present some simple randomized algorithms and mechanisms for a number of interesting cases of this problem, both in the limited and unlimited supply setting. This talk is based on joint work with Avrim Blum and Yishay Mansour.

Cite as

Maria-Florina Balcan. Item Pricing for Revenue Maximization in Combinatorial Auctions. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-2, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)


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@InProceedings{balcan:DagSemProc.07271.8,
  author =	{Balcan, Maria-Florina},
  title =	{{Item Pricing for Revenue Maximization in Combinatorial Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--2},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11534},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Item Pricing, Revenue Maximizing, Combinatorial Auctions}
}
Document
License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers

Authors: Elmar Wolfstetter and Thomas Giebe

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)


Abstract
This paper revisits the licensing of a non--drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed--fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariffs. The key features are that royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the option to sign a royalty contract. Remarkably, combining royalties for winners and losers makes the integer constraint concerning the number of licenses irrelevant.

Cite as

Elmar Wolfstetter and Thomas Giebe. License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)


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@InProceedings{wolfstetter_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.9,
  author =	{Wolfstetter, Elmar and Giebe, Thomas},
  title =	{{License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11514},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions, Patents, Licensing}
}
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