3 Search Results for "Chen, Jing"


Document
Non-Cooperative Rational Interactive Proofs

Authors: Jing Chen, Samuel McCauley, and Shikha Singh

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 144, 27th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2019)


Abstract
Interactive-proof games model the scenario where an honest party interacts with powerful but strategic provers, to elicit from them the correct answer to a computational question. Interactive proofs are increasingly used as a framework to design protocols for computation outsourcing. Existing interactive-proof games largely fall into two categories: either as games of cooperation such as multi-prover interactive proofs and cooperative rational proofs, where the provers work together as a team; or as games of conflict such as refereed games, where the provers directly compete with each other in a zero-sum game. Neither of these extremes truly capture the strategic nature of service providers in outsourcing applications. How to design and analyze non-cooperative interactive proofs is an important open problem. In this paper, we introduce a mechanism-design approach to define a multi-prover interactive-proof model in which the provers are rational and non-cooperative - they act to maximize their expected utility given others' strategies. We define a strong notion of backwards induction as our solution concept to analyze the resulting extensive-form game with imperfect information. We fully characterize the complexity of our proof system under different utility gap guarantees. (At a high level, a utility gap of u means that the protocol is robust against provers that may not care about a utility loss of 1/u.) We show, for example, that the power of non-cooperative rational interactive proofs with a polynomial utility gap is exactly equal to the complexity class P^{NEXP}.

Cite as

Jing Chen, Samuel McCauley, and Shikha Singh. Non-Cooperative Rational Interactive Proofs. In 27th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 144, pp. 29:1-29:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)


Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{chen_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2019.29,
  author =	{Chen, Jing and McCauley, Samuel and Singh, Shikha},
  title =	{{Non-Cooperative Rational Interactive Proofs}},
  booktitle =	{27th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2019)},
  pages =	{29:1--29:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-124-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{144},
  editor =	{Bender, Michael A. and Svensson, Ola and Herman, Grzegorz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2019.29},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-111508},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2019.29},
  annote =	{Keywords: non-cooperative game theory, extensive-form games with imperfect information, refined sequential equilibrium, rational proofs, interactive proofs}
}
Document
Brief Announcement
Brief Announcement: Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries

Authors: Jing Chen, Bo Li, Yingkai Li, and Pinyan Lu

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 107, 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018)


Abstract
Generating good revenue is one of the most important problems in Bayesian auction design, and many (approximately) optimal dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) Bayesian mechanisms have been constructed for various auction settings. However, most existing studies do not consider the complexity for the seller to carry out the mechanism. It is assumed that the seller knows "each single bit" of the distributions and is able to optimize perfectly based on the entire distributions. Unfortunately this is a strong assumption and may not hold in reality: for example, when the value distributions have exponentially large supports or do not have succinct representations. In this work we consider, for the first time, the query complexity of Bayesian mechanisms. We only allow the seller to have limited oracle accesses to the players' value distributions, via quantile queries and value queries. For a large class of auction settings, we prove logarithmic lower-bounds for the query complexity for any DSIC Bayesian mechanism to be of any constant approximation to the optimal revenue. For single-item auctions and multi-item auctions with unit-demand or additive valuation functions, we prove tight upper-bounds via efficient query schemes, without requiring the distributions to be regular or have monotone hazard rate. Thus, in those auction settings the seller needs to access much less than the full distributions in order to achieve approximately optimal revenue.

Cite as

Jing Chen, Bo Li, Yingkai Li, and Pinyan Lu. Brief Announcement: Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries. In 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 107, pp. 108:1-108:4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018)


Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{chen_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.108,
  author =	{Chen, Jing and Li, Bo and Li, Yingkai and Lu, Pinyan},
  title =	{{Brief Announcement: Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries}},
  booktitle =	{45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018)},
  pages =	{108:1--108:4},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-076-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2018},
  volume =	{107},
  editor =	{Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Kaklamanis, Christos and Marx, D\'{a}niel and Sannella, Donald},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.108},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-91124},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.108},
  annote =	{Keywords: The complexity of Bayesian mechanisms, quantile queries, value queries}
}
Document
Efficient Approximations for the Online Dispersion Problem

Authors: Jing Chen, Bo Li, and Yingkai Li

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 80, 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017)


Abstract
The dispersion problem has been widely studied in computational geometry and facility location, and is closely related to the packing problem. The goal is to locate n points (e.g., facilities or persons) in a k-dimensional polytope, so that they are far away from each other and from the boundary of the polytope. In many real-world scenarios however, the points arrive and depart at different times, and decisions must be made without knowing future events. Therefore we study, for the first time in the literature, the online dispersion problem in Euclidean space. There are two natural objectives when time is involved: the all-time worst-case (ATWC) problem tries to maximize the minimum distance that ever appears at any time; and the cumulative distance (CD) problem tries to maximize the integral of the minimum distance throughout the whole time interval. Interestingly, the online problems are highly non-trivial even on a segment. For cumulative distance, this remains the case even when the problem is time-dependent but offline, with all the arriving and departure times given in advance. For the online ATWC problem on a segment, we construct a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm which is (2ln2+epsilon)-competitive, where epsilon>0 can be arbitrarily small and the algorithm's running time is polynomial in 1/epsilon. We show this algorithm is actually optimal. For the same problem in a square, we provide a 1.591-competitive algorithm and a 1.183 lower-bound. Furthermore, for arbitrary k-dimensional polytopes with k>=2, we provide a 2/(1-epsilon)-competitive algorithm and a 7/6 lower-bound. All our lower-bounds come from the structure of the online problems and hold even when computational complexity is not a concern. Interestingly, for the offline CD problem in arbitrary k-dimensional polytopes, we provide a polynomial-time black-box reduction to the online ATWC problem, and the resulting competitive ratio increases by a factor of at most 2. Our techniques also apply to online dispersion problems with different boundary conditions.

Cite as

Jing Chen, Bo Li, and Yingkai Li. Efficient Approximations for the Online Dispersion Problem. In 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 80, pp. 11:1-11:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2017)


Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{chen_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.11,
  author =	{Chen, Jing and Li, Bo and Li, Yingkai},
  title =	{{Efficient Approximations for the Online Dispersion Problem}},
  booktitle =	{44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017)},
  pages =	{11:1--11:15},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-041-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2017},
  volume =	{80},
  editor =	{Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Indyk, Piotr and Kuhn, Fabian and Muscholl, Anca},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.11},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-74002},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.11},
  annote =	{Keywords: dispersion, online algorithms, geometric optimization, packing, competitive algorithms}
}
  • Refine by Author
  • 3 Chen, Jing
  • 2 Li, Bo
  • 2 Li, Yingkai
  • 1 Lu, Pinyan
  • 1 McCauley, Samuel
  • Show More...

  • Refine by Classification
  • 2 Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
  • 1 Theory of computation → Computational complexity and cryptography
  • 1 Theory of computation → Interactive proof systems

  • Refine by Keyword
  • 1 The complexity of Bayesian mechanisms
  • 1 competitive algorithms
  • 1 dispersion
  • 1 extensive-form games with imperfect information
  • 1 geometric optimization
  • Show More...

  • Refine by Type
  • 3 document

  • Refine by Publication Year
  • 1 2017
  • 1 2018
  • 1 2019

Questions / Remarks / Feedback
X

Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing


Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail