3 Search Results for "De Canni�re, Christophe"


Document
Decentralization in Open Quorum Systems: Limitative Results for Ripple and Stellar

Authors: Andrea Bracciali, Davide Grossi, and Ronald de Haan

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 82, 2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020)


Abstract
Decentralisation is one of the promises introduced by blockchain technologies: fair and secure interaction amongst peers with no dominant positions, single points of failure or censorship. Decentralisation, however, appears difficult to be formally defined, possibly a continuum property of systems that can be more or less decentralised, or can tend to decentralisation in their lifetime. In this paper we focus on decentralisation in quorum-based approaches to open (permissionless) consensus as illustrated in influential protocols such as the Ripple and Stellar protocols. Drawing from game theory and computational complexity, we establish limiting results concerning the decentralisation vs. safety trade-off in Ripple and Stellar, and we propose a novel methodology to formalise and quantitatively analyse decentralisation in this type of blockchains.

Cite as

Andrea Bracciali, Davide Grossi, and Ronald de Haan. Decentralization in Open Quorum Systems: Limitative Results for Ripple and Stellar. In 2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 82, pp. 5:1-5:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)


Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{bracciali_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.5,
  author =	{Bracciali, Andrea and Grossi, Davide and de Haan, Ronald},
  title =	{{Decentralization in Open Quorum Systems: Limitative Results for Ripple and Stellar}},
  booktitle =	{2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020)},
  pages =	{5:1--5:20},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-157-3},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{82},
  editor =	{Anceaume, Emmanuelle and Bisi\`{e}re, Christophe and Bouvard, Matthieu and Bramas, Quentin and Casamatta, Catherine},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-135277},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, decentralization, game theory, computational complexity}
}
Document
Short Paper
Revisiting the Liquidity/Risk Trade-Off with Smart Contracts (Short Paper)

Authors: Vincent Danos, Jean Krivine, and Julien Prat

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 82, 2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020)


Abstract
Real-time financial settlements constrain traders to have the cash on hand before they can enter a trade [Khapko and Zoican, 2017]. This prevents short-selling and ultimately impedes liquidity. We propose a novel trading protocol which relaxes the cash constraint, and manages chains of deferred payments. Traders can buy without paying first, and can re-sell while still withholding payments. Trades naturally arrange in chains which contract when deals are closed and extend when new ones open. Default risk is handled by reversing trades. In this short note we propose a class of novel financial instruments for zero-risk and zero-collateral intermediation. The central idea is that bilateral trades can be chained into trade lines. The ownership of an underlying asset becomes distributed among traders with positions in the trade line. The trading protocol determines who ends up owning that asset and the overall payoffs of the participants. Counterparty risk is avoided because the asset itself serves as a collateral for the entire chain of trades. The protocol can be readily implemented as a smart contract on a blockchain. Additional examples, proofs, protocol variants, and game-theoretic properties related to the order-sensitivity of the games defined by trade lines can be found in the extended version of this note [Danos et al., 2019]. Therein, one can also find the definition and game-theoretic analysis of standard trade-lines with applications to trust-less zero-collateral intermediation.

Cite as

Vincent Danos, Jean Krivine, and Julien Prat. Revisiting the Liquidity/Risk Trade-Off with Smart Contracts (Short Paper). In 2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 82, pp. 10:1-10:5, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)


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@InProceedings{danos_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.10,
  author =	{Danos, Vincent and Krivine, Jean and Prat, Julien},
  title =	{{Revisiting the Liquidity/Risk Trade-Off with Smart Contracts}},
  booktitle =	{2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020)},
  pages =	{10:1--10:5},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-157-3},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{82},
  editor =	{Anceaume, Emmanuelle and Bisi\`{e}re, Christophe and Bouvard, Matthieu and Bramas, Quentin and Casamatta, Catherine},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.10},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-135325},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.10},
  annote =	{Keywords: Electronic trading, Smart contracts, Static analysis}
}
Document
The Lane hash function

Authors: Sebastiaan Indesteege, Elena Andreeva, Christophe De Cannière, Orr Dunkelman, Emilia Käsper, Svetla Nikova, Bart Preneel, and Elmar Tischhauser

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9031, Symmetric Cryptography (2009)


Abstract
We propose the cryptographic hash function Lane as a candidate for the SHA-3 competition organised by NIST. Lane is an iterated hash function supporting multiple digest sizes. Components of the AES block cipher are reused as building blocks. Lane aims to be secure, easy to understand, elegant and flexible in implementation.

Cite as

Sebastiaan Indesteege, Elena Andreeva, Christophe De Cannière, Orr Dunkelman, Emilia Käsper, Svetla Nikova, Bart Preneel, and Elmar Tischhauser. The Lane hash function. In Symmetric Cryptography. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9031, pp. 1-14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009)


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@InProceedings{indesteege_et_al:DagSemProc.09031.16,
  author =	{Indesteege, Sebastiaan and Andreeva, Elena and De Canni\`{e}re, Christophe and Dunkelman, Orr and K\"{a}sper, Emilia and Nikova, Svetla and Preneel, Bart and Tischhauser, Elmar},
  title =	{{The Lane hash function}},
  booktitle =	{Symmetric Cryptography},
  pages =	{1--14},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2009},
  volume =	{9031},
  editor =	{Helena Handschuh and Stefan Lucks and Bart Preneel and Phillip Rogaway},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09031.16},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-19523},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.09031.16},
  annote =	{Keywords: Lane, SHA-3 candidate, hash function}
}
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