14 Search Results for "Kiayias, Aggelos"

Volume

OASIcs, Volume 110

4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Tokenomics 2022, December 12-13, 2022, Paris, France

Editors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Aggelos Kiayias, and Marianne Verdier

Document
Complete Volume
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022
OASIcs, Volume 110, Tokenomics 2022, Complete Volume

Authors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Aggelos Kiayias, and Marianne Verdier

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
OASIcs, Volume 110, Tokenomics 2022, Complete Volume
Cite as

4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 1-82, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@Proceedings{amoussouguenou_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022,
  title =	{{OASIcs, Volume 110, Tokenomics 2022, Complete Volume}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{1--82},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184169},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022},
  annote =	{Keywords: OASIcs, Volume 110, Tokenomics 2022, Complete Volume}
}
Document
Front Matter
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.0
Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization

Authors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Aggelos Kiayias, and Marianne Verdier

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization
Cite as

4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 0:i-0:xii, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{amoussouguenou_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.0,
  author =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  title =	{{Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{0:i--0:xii},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.0},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184172},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.0},
  annote =	{Keywords: Front Matter, Table of Contents, Preface, Conference Organization}
}
Document
Invited Talk
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.1
Algorithmic Game Theory and Blockchains (Invited Talk)

Authors: Elias Koutsoupias

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
Algorithmic game theory has developed into a mature field over the past three decades. However, the emergence of blockchains has raised new fundamental questions at the intersection of computer science, economics, and game theory.
Cite as

Elias Koutsoupias. Algorithmic Game Theory and Blockchains (Invited Talk). In 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 1:1-1:2, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{koutsoupias:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.1,
  author =	{Koutsoupias, Elias},
  title =	{{Algorithmic Game Theory and Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{1:1--1:2},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184180},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchains, Mining games, Reward sharing schemes, Distributed game theory}
}
Document
Invited Talk
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.2
How Blockchain Tokens Are Changing Platform Economics (Invited Talk)

Authors: Hanna Halaburda

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
Blockchain technologies are technologies inspired by Bitcoin, which emerged in 2008. Since then, many cryptocurrencies, altcoins, and other blockchain applications have emerged. For example, Ethereum introduced smart contracts, and with them came tokens, fungible tokens, non-fungible tokens, decentralized finance (DeFi), and decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs). All these technologies can be grouped under the umbrella term "blockchain technologies." Each new generation of blockchain technology promises decentralization, disintermediation, a level playing field for entry, and improved value creation and distribution. However, it is essential to examine to what extent and under what conditions blockchain technologies deliver on these promises. It turns out that sometimes they do, and sometimes they do not. This distinction is essential to apply blockchain technologies effectively for large-scale practical applications. I focus here on blockchain-based cryptographic tokens and their impact on platform economics. Blockchain-based tokens, in conjunction with smart contracts, allow for new design choices in platforms. Therefore, I explore how these new design choices may help solve old problems in platform economics.
Cite as

Hanna Halaburda. How Blockchain Tokens Are Changing Platform Economics (Invited Talk). In 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 2:1-2:7, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{halaburda:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.2,
  author =	{Halaburda, Hanna},
  title =	{{How Blockchain Tokens Are Changing Platform Economics}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{2:1--2:7},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184196},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: blockchain, token, platform economics}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.3
1DLT: Rapid Deployment of Secure and Efficient EVM-Based Blockchains

Authors: Simone Bottoni, Anwitaman Datta, Federico Franzoni, Emanuele Ragnoli, Roberto Ripamonti, Christian Rondanini, Gokhan Sagirlar, and Alberto Trombetta

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
Limited scalability and transaction costs are some of the critical issues that hamper a wider adoption of distributed ledger technologies (DLTs). That is particularly true for the Ethereum [Wood, 2014] blockchain, which, so far, has been the ecosystem with the highest adoption rate. Several solutions have been attempted in the last few years, most of which adopt the approach to offload transactions from the blockchain mainnet, a.k.a. Level 1 (L1), to a separate network. Such solutions are collectively known as Level 2 (L2) systems. While improving scalability, the adoption of L2 introduces additional drawbacks: users have to trust that the L2 system has correctly performed transactions or, conversely, high computational power is required to prove transactions’ correctness. In addition, significant technical knowledge is needed to set up and manage such an L2 system. To tackle such limitations, we propose 1DLT: a novel system that enables rapid deployment of an Ethereum Virtual Machine based (EVM-based) blockchain that overcomes those drawbacks.
Cite as

Simone Bottoni, Anwitaman Datta, Federico Franzoni, Emanuele Ragnoli, Roberto Ripamonti, Christian Rondanini, Gokhan Sagirlar, and Alberto Trombetta. 1DLT: Rapid Deployment of Secure and Efficient EVM-Based Blockchains. In 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 3:1-3:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{bottoni_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.3,
  author =	{Bottoni, Simone and Datta, Anwitaman and Franzoni, Federico and Ragnoli, Emanuele and Ripamonti, Roberto and Rondanini, Christian and Sagirlar, Gokhan and Trombetta, Alberto},
  title =	{{1DLT: Rapid Deployment of Secure and Efficient EVM-Based Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{3:1--3:15},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184209},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, EVM, Layer Two, Scalability, Network Fees}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.4
Consistency of Automated Market Makers

Authors: Vincent Danos and Weijia Wang

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
Decentralised Finance has popularised Automated Market Makers (AMMs), but surprisingly little research has been done on their consistency. Can a single attacker extract risk-free revenue from an AMM, regardless of price or other users' behaviour? In this paper, we investigate the consistency of a large class of AMMs, including the most widely used ones, and show that consistency holds.
Cite as

Vincent Danos and Weijia Wang. Consistency of Automated Market Makers. In 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 4:1-4:12, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{danos_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.4,
  author =	{Danos, Vincent and Wang, Weijia},
  title =	{{Consistency of Automated Market Makers}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{4:1--4:12},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184217},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Automated Market Makers, Decentralised Finance}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.5
Interest Rate Rules in Decentralized Finance: Evidence from Compound

Authors: Amit Chaudhary, Roman Kozhan, and Ganesh Viswanath-Natraj

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
We study the fundamentals of interest rate rules on the decentralized finance protocol Compound. Interest rates are set by the governance of the protocol, and are based on the utilization of an asset: which is the ratio of a cryptocurrency that is borrowed to its total supply in the protocol. We discuss factors that determine the slope parameters of interest rate rules. Slope parameters are typically higher for more volatile cryptocurrencies. We argue liquidation risk can explain the cross-sectional variation in interest rate rules. We also draw parallels between these rules to the demand for loanable funds in traditional money markets.
Cite as

Amit Chaudhary, Roman Kozhan, and Ganesh Viswanath-Natraj. Interest Rate Rules in Decentralized Finance: Evidence from Compound. In 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 5:1-5:6, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{chaudhary_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.5,
  author =	{Chaudhary, Amit and Kozhan, Roman and Viswanath-Natraj, Ganesh},
  title =	{{Interest Rate Rules in Decentralized Finance: Evidence from Compound}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{5:1--5:6},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184226},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Cryptocurrency, decentralized finance lending protocols, monetary policy, stablecoins, governance token}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.6
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) Protection on a DAG

Authors: Dahlia Malkhi and Pawel Szalachowski

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
Many cryptocurrency platforms are vulnerable to Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) attacks [Daian et al., 2020], where a malicious consensus leader can inject transactions or change the order of user transactions to maximize its profit. A promising line of research in MEV mitigation is to enhance the Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) consensus core of blockchains by new functionalities, like hiding transaction contents, such that malicious parties cannot analyze and exploit them until they are ordered. An orthogonal line of research demonstrates excellent performance for BFT protocols designed around Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG). They provide high throughput by keeping high network utilization, decoupling transactions' dissemination from their metadata ordering, and encoding consensus logic efficiently over a DAG representing a causal ordering of disseminated messages. This paper explains how to combine these two advances. It introduces a DAG-based protocol called Fino, that integrates MEV-resistance features into DAG-based BFT without delaying the steady spreading of transactions by the DAG transport and with zero message overhead. The scheme operates without complex secret share verifiability or recoverability, and avoids costly threshold encryption.
Cite as

Dahlia Malkhi and Pawel Szalachowski. Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) Protection on a DAG. In 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 6:1-6:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{malkhi_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.6,
  author =	{Malkhi, Dahlia and Szalachowski, Pawel},
  title =	{{Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) Protection on a DAG}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{6:1--6:17},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184231},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: DAG, MEV, consensus, BFT}
}
Document
Extended Abstract
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7
Commit-Reveal Schemes Against Front-Running Attacks (Extended Abstract)

Authors: Andrea Canidio and Vincent Danos

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
We provide a game-theoretic analysis of the problem of front-running attacks. We use it to study a simple commit-reveal protocol and discuss its properties. This protocol has costs because it requires two messages and imposes a delay. However, we show that it prevents the most severe front-running attacks ("bad MEV") while preserving legitimate competition between users, guaranteeing that the earliest transaction in a block belongs to the honest user who values it the most ("good MEV").
Cite as

Andrea Canidio and Vincent Danos. Commit-Reveal Schemes Against Front-Running Attacks (Extended Abstract). In 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, pp. 7:1-7:5, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{canidio_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7,
  author =	{Canidio, Andrea and Danos, Vincent},
  title =	{{Commit-Reveal Schemes Against Front-Running Attacks}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{7:1--7:5},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184241},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: Front running, Game theory, MEV, Transactions reordering, commit-reveal}
}
Document
Extended Abstract
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.8
The Demand for Programmable Payments: Extended Abstract (Extended Abstract)

Authors: Charles M. Kahn and Maarten R.C. van Oordt

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 110, 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)

Abstract
In [Kahn and Van Oordt, 2022], we examine the desirability of programmable payments, arrangements in which transfers are automatically executed conditional upon preset objective criteria. We study optimal payment arrangements in a continuous-time framework where a buyer and a seller of a service interact. We stack the cards in favor of programmable payments by considering an environment where neither agent has any legal recourse if the other fails to deliver upon their promises. We identify scenarios where programmable payments could improve economic outcomes and scenarios where they cannot. Direct payments increase the surplus by avoiding the liquidity cost of locking-up funds in a programmable payment arrangement until the moment where the conditions are satisfied to release those funds to the payee. Programmable payments will be desirable, and may in fact be the only viable payment arrangement, in situations where economic relationships are of a short duration. Nonetheless, there is a limit to the length of the arrangement a single programmable payment can support, because eventually the additional liquidity cost of locking up more funds for a longer period starts to exceed the additional surplus generated from extending the length of the arrangement. For longer periods multiple payments are necessary. Sufficiently long optimal chain-of-payments arrangements always start with direct payments because of the lower liquidity costs. Only towards the end of a relationship do the parties switch to the use of programmable payments. Moreover, the optimum for infinitely long payment arrangements consists of direct payments only. These results suggest that programmable payments are unlikely to become the new "standard" for all payment arrangements. Many have argued that technological developments in the payments space will lead to an explosion of so-called micro-payments. Our results suggest a more complex relationship between transactions cost and the number of payments. Lower transaction costs increase the number of payments for the extensive margin in the sense of increasing the set of potential buyer-seller pairs where transaction costs are no longer prohibitively expensive. For the intensive margin, that is, within buyer-seller pairs, we find the opposite effect: lower transaction costs are associated with fewer payments, as trust becomes easier to achieve.
Cite as

Charles M. Kahn and Maarten R.C. van Oordt. The Demand for Programmable Payments: Extended Abstract (Extended Abstract). In 4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 110, p. 8:1, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{kahn_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.8,
  author =	{Kahn, Charles M. and Oordt, Maarten R.C. van},
  title =	{{The Demand for Programmable Payments: Extended Abstract}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022)},
  pages =	{8:1--8:1},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-274-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{110},
  editor =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Kiayias, Aggelos and Verdier, Marianne},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-184255},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Electronic payment, smart contracts, programmable payment}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.3
A Puff of Steem: Security Analysis of Decentralized Content Curation

Authors: Aggelos Kiayias, Benjamin Livshits, Andrés Monteoliva Mosteiro, and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 71, International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)

Abstract
Decentralized content curation is the process through which uploaded posts are ranked and filtered based exclusively on users' feedback. Platforms such as the blockchain-based Steemit employ this type of curation while providing monetary incentives to promote the visibility of high quality posts according to the perception of the participants. Despite the wide adoption of the platform very little is known regarding its performance and resilience characteristics. In this work, we provide a formal model for decentralized content curation that identifies salient complexity and game-theoretic measures of performance and resilience to selfish participants. Armed with our model, we provide a first analysis of Steemit identifying the conditions under which the system can be expected to correctly converge to curation while we demonstrate its susceptibility to selfish participant behaviour. We validate our theoretical results with system simulations in various scenarios.
Cite as

Aggelos Kiayias, Benjamin Livshits, Andrés Monteoliva Mosteiro, and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos. A Puff of Steem: Security Analysis of Decentralized Content Curation. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 3:1-3:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{kiayias_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.3,
  author =	{Kiayias, Aggelos and Livshits, Benjamin and Monteoliva Mosteiro, Andr\'{e}s and Thyfronitis Litos, Orfeas Stefanos},
  title =	{{A Puff of Steem: Security Analysis of Decentralized Content Curation}},
  booktitle =	{International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
  pages =	{3:1--3:21},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-108-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{71},
  editor =	{Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119675},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: blockchain, content curation, decentralized, voting}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.7
Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach

Authors: Dimitris Karakostas, Aggelos Kiayias, Christos Nasikas, and Dionysis Zindros

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 71, International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)

Abstract
Since the invention of Bitcoin one decade ago, numerous cryptocurrencies have sprung into existence. Among these, proof-of-work is the most common mechanism for achieving consensus, whilst a number of coins have adopted "ASIC-resistance" as a desirable property, claiming to be more "egalitarian," where egalitarianism refers to the power of each coin to participate in the creation of new coins. While proof-of-work consensus dominates the space, several new cryptocurrencies employ alternative consensus, such as proof-of-stake in which block minting opportunities are based on monetary ownership. A core criticism of proof-of-stake revolves around it being less egalitarian by making the rich richer, as opposed to proof-of-work in which everyone can contribute equally according to their computational power. In this paper, we give the first quantitative definition of a cryptocurrency’s egalitarianism. Based on our definition, we measure the egalitarianism of popular cryptocurrencies that (may or may not) employ ASIC-resistance, among them Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, and Monero. Our simulations show, as expected, that ASIC-resistance increases a cryptocurrency’s egalitarianism. We also measure the egalitarianism of a stake-based protocol, Ouroboros, and a hybrid proof-of-stake/proof-of-work cryptocurrency, Decred. We show that stake-based cryptocurrencies, under correctly selected parameters, can be perfectly egalitarian, perhaps contradicting folklore belief.
Cite as

Dimitris Karakostas, Aggelos Kiayias, Christos Nasikas, and Dionysis Zindros. Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 7:1-7:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{karakostas_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.7,
  author =	{Karakostas, Dimitris and Kiayias, Aggelos and Nasikas, Christos and Zindros, Dionysis},
  title =	{{Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach}},
  booktitle =	{International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
  pages =	{7:1--7:21},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-108-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{71},
  editor =	{Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119715},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: blockchain, egalitarianism, cryptocurrency, economics, proof-of-work, proof-of-stake}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.08491.5
Sound and Fine-grain Specification of Ideal Functionalities

Authors: Juan Garay, Aggelos Kiayias, and Hong-Sheng Zhou

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 8491, Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security (2009)

Abstract
Nowadays it is widely accepted to formulate the security of a protocol carrying out a given task via the "trusted-party paradigm," where the protocol execution is compared with an ideal process where the outputs are computed by a trusted party that sees all the inputs. A protocol is said to securely carry out a given task if running the protocol with a realistic adversary amounts to "emulating" the ideal process with the appropriate trusted party. In the Universal Composability (UC) framework the program run by the trusted party is called an ideal functionality. While this simulation-based security formulation provides strong security guarantees, its usefulness is contingent on the properties and correct specification of the ideal functionality, which, as demonstrated in recent years by the coexistence of complex, multiple functionalities for the same task as well as by their "unstable" nature, does not seem to be an easy task. In this paper we address this problem, by introducing a general methodology for the sound specification of ideal functionalities. First, we introduce the class of canonical ideal functionalities for a cryptographic task, which unifies the syntactic specification of a large class of cryptographic tasks under the same basic template functionality. Furthermore, this representation enables the isolation of the individual properties of a cryptographic task as separate members of the corresponding class. By endowing the class of canonical functionalities with an algebraic structure we are able to combine basic functionalities to a single final canonical functionality for a given task. Effectively, this puts forth a bottom-up approach for the specification of ideal functionalities: first one defines a set of basic constituent functionalities for the task at hand, and then combines them into a single ideal functionality taking advantage of the algebraic structure. In our framework, the constituent functionalities of a task can be derived either directly or, following a translation strategy we introduce, from existing game-based definitions; such definitions have in many cases captured desired individual properties of cryptographic tasks, albeit in less adversarial settings than universal composition. Our translation methodology entails a sequence of steps that derive a corresponding canonical functionality given a game-based definition. In this way, we obtain a well-defined mapping of game-based security properties to their corresponding UC counterparts. Finally, we demonstrate the power of our approach by applying our methodology to a variety of basic cryptographic tasks, including commitments, digital signatures, zero-knowledge proofs, and oblivious transfer. While in some cases our derived canonical functionalities are equivalent to existing formulations, thus attesting to the validity of our approach, in others they differ, enabling us to "debug" previous definitions and pinpoint their shortcomings.
Cite as

Juan Garay, Aggelos Kiayias, and Hong-Sheng Zhou. Sound and Fine-grain Specification of Ideal Functionalities. In Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 8491, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009)

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@InProceedings{garay_et_al:DagSemProc.08491.5,
  author =	{Garay, Juan and Kiayias, Aggelos and Zhou, Hong-Sheng},
  title =	{{Sound and Fine-grain Specification of Ideal Functionalities}},
  booktitle =	{Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2009},
  volume =	{8491},
  editor =	{Ran Canetti and Shafi Goldwasser and G\"{u}nter M\"{u}ller and Rainer Steinwandt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.08491.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-18911},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.08491.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Security definitions, universal composability, cryptographic protocols, lattices and partial orders.}
}
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