22 Search Results for "Weinhardt, Christof"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.1
06461 Abstracts Collection – Negotiation and Market Engineering

Authors: Nicholas R. Jennings, Gregory Kersten, Axel Ockenfels, and Christof Weinhardt

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007)

Abstract
From 12.11.06 to 17.11.06, the Dagstuhl Seminar 06461 ``Negotiation and Market Engineering'' was held in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.
Cite as

Nicholas R. Jennings, Gregory Kersten, Axel Ockenfels, and Christof Weinhardt. 06461 Abstracts Collection – Negotiation and Market Engineering. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{jennings_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.1,
  author =	{Jennings, Nicholas R. and Kersten, Gregory and Ockenfels, Axel and Weinhardt, Christof},
  title =	{{06461 Abstracts Collection – Negotiation and Market Engineering}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--14},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-10117},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Negotiations, Auctions, Decision Support Systems, Software Agents, Testbedding Markets}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.8
Designing Reverse Auctions for B-2-B Procurement – Evidence from the German Industry

Authors: Tilman Eichstädt

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007)

Abstract
For a long time on-line reverse auctions have been proposed as an effective tool to improve the performance of corporate procurement. Five years after the end of the Internet and e-business hype, reverse auctions have become a standard procurement tool for large corporations. However, it has not been assessed as yet to what extent users actively apply the findings of auction theory to improve the design of reverse auctions. Based on a representative survey of companies using procurement auctions in Germany, the following paper reveals which auction designs are used in practice and to what extent more complex and sophisticated auction designs are adopted. By comparing the empirical results with the concepts of auction theory it is shown which levers can be pulled to improve the design of an auction. For auctions with many bidders, hybrid auctions seem to be promising as they can reasonably combine the benefits of different standard auction models. For auctions with only a few bidders, Dutch auctions might be superior to English auctions as they can create additional uncertainty and induce risk-averse bidders to bid more aggressively. In practice, however, it is very common that companies use different variations of the English auction such as rank or best/not best auctions rather than Dutch or hybrid auctions. Here it seems that framing effects rather than game-theoretic factors play an important role.
Cite as

Tilman Eichstädt. Designing Reverse Auctions for B-2-B Procurement – Evidence from the German Industry. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-9, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{eichstadt:DagSemProc.06461.8,
  author =	{Eichst\"{a}dt, Tilman},
  title =	{{Designing Reverse Auctions for B-2-B Procurement – Evidence from the German Industry}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--9},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9944},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions, auction design, procurement, hybrid auctions, framing effects,}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.2
06461 Executive Summary – Negotiation and Market Engineering

Authors: Nicholas R. Jennings, Gregory Kersten, Axel Ockenfels, and Christof Weinhardt

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007)

Abstract
This executive summary sketches the overall theme of the seminar held from November 12 to 17, 2006, at Schloss Dagstuhl.
Cite as

Nicholas R. Jennings, Gregory Kersten, Axel Ockenfels, and Christof Weinhardt. 06461 Executive Summary – Negotiation and Market Engineering. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-2, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{jennings_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.2,
  author =	{Jennings, Nicholas R. and Kersten, Gregory and Ockenfels, Axel and Weinhardt, Christof},
  title =	{{06461 Executive Summary – Negotiation and Market Engineering}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--2},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-10101},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Negotiations, Auctions, Decision Support Systems, Software Agents, Testbedding Markets}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.3
A Bayesian Reputation System for Virtual Organizations

Authors: Jochen Haller

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007)

Abstract
Virtual Organizations (VOs) are an emerging business model in today’s Internet economy. Increased specialization and focusing on an organization’s core competencies requires such novel models to address business opportunities. In a VO, a set of sovereign, geographically dispersed organizations temporarily pool their resources to jointly address a business opportunity. A VO follows a phased lifecycle where speed is an essential requirement, especially in the initial identification and formation phases that deal with potential VO partner identification and selection. For instance a business opportunity in the form of a government issued tender in the collaborative engineering application domain to upgrade a passenger plane needs to be swiftly answered within a defined deadline. VO management tasks such as VO formation, partner selection and dismissal are duties of the VO manager role, in collaborative engineering typically performed by a system’s integrator. The VO manager’s final decision making which potential partners are invited to join the VO is crucial with respect to entire VO’s success. The possibility of a VO partner performing badly during the VO’s operational phase or announcing bankruptcy endangers the investment taken in integrating their processes and infrastructure for the purpose of the VO. A reputation system can provide additional decision support besides the a priori knowledge from quotations and bidding to avoid events such as VO partner replacement by helping to choose reliable partners in the first place. To achieve this, reputation, an objective trust measure, should be aggregated from multiple independent trust sources, inherently characterizing an organization’s reliability, so-called Trust Indicators (TIs). Such TIs can provide measurable trust values about an organization from heterogeneous domains, e.g. timely delivery of service, organizational stability or environmental risks due to building locations. To allow for the desired predictions of an organization’s future performance, a stochastic modeling approach is chosen. The talk will present: 1) a taxonomy of TIs for VO environments 2) a stochastic model to maintain TIs and their aggregation using Bayes networks 3) the inclusion of other subjective measures such as feedback
Cite as

Jochen Haller. A Bayesian Reputation System for Virtual Organizations. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-8, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{haller:DagSemProc.06461.3,
  author =	{Haller, Jochen},
  title =	{{A Bayesian Reputation System for Virtual Organizations}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--8},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9995},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Reputation system, bayes network, trust management, virtual organisations}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.4
A Comparison Between Mechanisms for Sequential Compute Resource Auctions

Authors: Andrew Byde

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007)

Abstract
This paper describes simulations designed to test the relative efficiency of two di®erent sequential auction mechanisms for allocating compute resources between users in a shared data-center. Specifically we model the environment of a data center dedicated to CGI rendering in which animators delegate responsibility for acquiring adequate compute resources to bidding agents that automously bid on their behalf. For each of two possible auction types we apply a genetic algorithm to a broad class of bidding strategies to determine a near-optimal bidding strategy for a specified auction type, and use statistics of the performance of these strategies to determine the most suitable auction type for this domain.
Cite as

Andrew Byde. A Comparison Between Mechanisms for Sequential Compute Resource Auctions. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-5, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{byde:DagSemProc.06461.4,
  author =	{Byde, Andrew},
  title =	{{A Comparison Between Mechanisms for Sequential Compute Resource Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--5},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9914},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auction resource allocation}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.5
A Decision Support System for Market Mechanisms Choice in e-Procurement

Authors: Carsten Block

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007)

Abstract
Since the rise of the Internet electronic markets have become an important component of e-procurement by bringing together demand and supply. E-markets are meeting venues for component suppliers and purchasers, who use exchange mechanisms to electronically support the procurement process. Exchange mechanisms can be conceived as market institutions providing sets of rules, which determine the functioning of the market and the permissible actions such as bidding deadlines, non-disclosure rules or bid-revocation constraints. In nowadays procurement landscape, mechanisms vary from electronic procurement catalogues, where requests and offers are publicly announced, to e-negotiations , where the participants bargain over the conditions of a trade using electronic message exchange and / or decision support platforms, to auctions, where one or two sides automate the process during which participants from the other side compete against each other (Kersten, Neumann, Vahidov, & Chen, 2006). The variety of procurement solutions already suggests that there is no single best solution for all imaginable sourcing activities. Instead, some mechanisms like e.g. an auction might be advantageous in certain situations while others are not (and vice versa). In this paper we present a knowledge-based system (KMS) aimed at supporting procurement staff in their decision making on which mechanism to choose best for a specific sourcing scenario.
Cite as

Carsten Block. A Decision Support System for Market Mechanisms Choice in e-Procurement. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{block:DagSemProc.06461.5,
  author =	{Block, Carsten},
  title =	{{A Decision Support System for Market Mechanisms Choice in e-Procurement}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--4},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9891},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Negotiation, electronic auction, e-auction, decision support, DSS, strategic sourcing, SRM, procurement, knowledge base, expert system}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.6
Adopting Agent-Based Situated Decision Support Framework for Managing One-to-many Negotiations with Multiple Potential Agreements

Authors: Rustam Vahidov

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007)

Abstract
Much effort has been spent in the design and evaluation of agent solutions to automate one-to-one negotiations. Recently, researchers have been expanding the agent-based models to address bi-lateral negotiations as well. In this work our interest is in one-to-many negotiations involving multiple potential agreements. This may involve selling products or services to customers through deal-making. The work aims at applying the framework for situated decision support developed recently to this problem. The major components of situated decision support system include sensors, effectors, manager, and active user interface. We illustrate the approach through simulations for the case used previously in our agent-assisted negotiation experiments.
Cite as

Rustam Vahidov. Adopting Agent-Based Situated Decision Support Framework for Managing One-to-many Negotiations with Multiple Potential Agreements. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-5, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{vahidov:DagSemProc.06461.6,
  author =	{Vahidov, Rustam},
  title =	{{Adopting Agent-Based Situated Decision Support Framework for Managing One-to-many Negotiations with Multiple Potential Agreements}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--5},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9870},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Agent technology, one-to-many negotiations, situated decision support}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.7
Decentralization and Mechanism Design for Online Machine Scheduling

Authors: Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller, and Marc Uetz

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007)

Abstract
We study the online version of the classical parallel machine scheduling problem to minimize the total weighted completion time from a new perspective: We assume that the data of each job, namely its release date $r_j$, its processing time $p_j$ and its weight $w_j$ is only known to the job itself, but not to the system. Furthermore, we assume a decentralized setting where jobs choose the machine on which they want to be processed themselves. We study this problem from the perspective of algorithmic mechanism design. We introduce the concept of a myopic best response equilibrium, a concept weaker than the dominant strategy equilibrium, but appropriate for online problems. We present a polynomial time, online scheduling mechanism that, assuming rational behavior of jobs, results in an equilibrium schedule that is 3.281-competitive. The mechanism deploys an online payment scheme that induces rational jobs to truthfully report their private data. We also show that the underlying local scheduling policy cannot be extended to a mechanism where truthful reports constitute a dominant strategy equilibrium.
Cite as

Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller, and Marc Uetz. Decentralization and Mechanism Design for Online Machine Scheduling. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{heydenreich_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.7,
  author =	{Heydenreich, Birgit and M\"{u}ller, Rudolf and Uetz, Marc},
  title =	{{Decentralization and Mechanism Design for Online Machine Scheduling}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--4},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-10030},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: Scheduling, mechanism design, online algorithms}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.9
Engineering Grid Markets

Authors: Dirk Neumann

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007)

Abstract
Grids denote a promising concept to pool computer resources for joint computations. Facing increasingly more complex and demanding resources, Grids are deemed the solution to those problems by a more efficient and flexible usage of already existing resources. From a technical perspective Grid middleware have made significant progress. While in former implementations it was only possible to share idle resources (e.g. using Condor), new Grid middleware allow advance reservation of resources that are once committed not usable locally for the committed time (e.g. GRAM in Globus Toolkit 4.0). Advance reservation thus allows the sharing of not only idle resources but of all designated resources. The contribution of this paper is threefold. Firstly, this paper derives a requirement list stemming from Grid applications that need to be fulfilled by the market-based Grid. Secondly, the paper compares related work with the above requirements. Thirdly, and most importantly, this paper provides a fully-fledged market mechanism that is tailored to the use in service-oriented Grids.
Cite as

Dirk Neumann. Engineering Grid Markets. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{neumann:DagSemProc.06461.9,
  author =	{Neumann, Dirk},
  title =	{{Engineering Grid Markets}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--13},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-10042},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: Market Engineering, Grid Computing, Combinatorial Exchange}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.10
Experimental research on bilateral negotiations

Authors: Jesus Rios, Stefan Strecker, JinBeak Kim, Simone Ludwig, and Eva Chen

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007)

Abstract
Research on bilateral negotiations
Cite as

Jesus Rios, Stefan Strecker, JinBeak Kim, Simone Ludwig, and Eva Chen. Experimental research on bilateral negotiations. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-2, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{rios_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.10,
  author =	{Rios, Jesus and Strecker, Stefan and Kim, JinBeak and Ludwig, Simone and Chen, Eva},
  title =	{{Experimental research on bilateral negotiations}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--2},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.10},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-10063},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.10},
  annote =	{Keywords: Negotiations, decision support}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.11
MACE: A Multi-Attribute Combinatorial Exchange

Authors: Björn Schnizler

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007)

Abstract
The Grid is a promising technology for providing access to distributed high-end computational capabilities. Thus, computational tasks can be performed spontaneously by other resources in the Grid that are not under the user's control. However, one of the key problems in the Grid is deciding which jobs are to be allocated to which resources at what time. In this context, the use of market mechanisms for scheduling and allocating Grid resources is a promising approach toward solving these problems. This paper proposes an auction mechanism for allocating and scheduling computer resources such as processors or storage space which have multiple quality attributes. The mechanism is evaluated according to its economic and computational performance as well as its practical applicability by means of a simulation.
Cite as

Björn Schnizler. MACE: A Multi-Attribute Combinatorial Exchange. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-2, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{schnizler:DagSemProc.06461.11,
  author =	{Schnizler, Bj\"{o}rn},
  title =	{{MACE: A Multi-Attribute Combinatorial Exchange}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--2},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.11},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-10095},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.11},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions and Bidding, Integer Programming, Combinatorial Exchange, Market Engineering, Grid}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.12
Market Engineering: An Interdisciplinary Research Challenge

Authors: Christof Weinhardt and Henner Gimpel

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007)

Abstract
Market engineering is making markets work. Markets are information processing and information producing information systems which mediate allocation of resources within or between organizations. Setting up and operating a market in a way that it works effectively and efficiently is an art and a science. This paper outlines challenges in this interdisciplinary field of research and presents frameworks for assessing markets.
Cite as

Christof Weinhardt and Henner Gimpel. Market Engineering: An Interdisciplinary Research Challenge. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{weinhardt_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.12,
  author =	{Weinhardt, Christof and Gimpel, Henner},
  title =	{{Market Engineering: An Interdisciplinary Research Challenge}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--15},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9880},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: Markets, Auctions, Negotiations, Economic Engineering, Market Engineering}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.13
Negotiation Fever: Loss Aversion in Multi-Issue Negotiations

Authors: Henner Gimpel

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007)

Abstract
Negotiating parties oftentimes do not reach mutually beneficial agreements. A considerable body of research on negotiation analysis compiled a set of so called common biases in negotiations that systematically affect the cognition and behavior of negotiators and thereby influence agreements. The present work adds an additional effect, the attachment effect. This effect biases decision makers in bilateral multi-issue negotiations and influences their preferences via reference points---negotiators get caught in a kind of negotiation fever.
Cite as

Henner Gimpel. Negotiation Fever: Loss Aversion in Multi-Issue Negotiations. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{gimpel:DagSemProc.06461.13,
  author =	{Gimpel, Henner},
  title =	{{Negotiation Fever: Loss Aversion in Multi-Issue Negotiations}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--4},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.13},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9982},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.13},
  annote =	{Keywords: Negotiation Analysis, Consumer Preferences, Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics, Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.14
Negotiation or Auction? The NorA project

Authors: Eva Chen, Bo Yu, and Klaus Kolitz

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007)

Abstract
Negotiation or Auction? The NorA project
Cite as

Eva Chen, Bo Yu, and Klaus Kolitz. Negotiation or Auction? The NorA project. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-3, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{chen_et_al:DagSemProc.06461.14,
  author =	{Chen, Eva and Yu, Bo and Kolitz, Klaus},
  title =	{{Negotiation or Auction? The NorA project}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--3},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.14},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9928},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.14},
  annote =	{Keywords: Negotiation, auction, mechanism, and markets}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.15
Nonlinear Transaction Pricing in the Securities Trading Value Chain

Authors: Matthias Burghardt

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, Negotiation and Market Engineering (2007)

Abstract
Most of the research on transaction costs in the market microstructure literature focuses on implicit transaction costs. Research on the design of price schedules for explicit transaction fees is rare. This paper analyzes and classifies different price schedules and discusses their application to the market transaction business. The discussion highlights design issues and the need for a structured approach for price schedule design in the context of market engineering. In order to get some insights into customer order behavior, we conduct a trading experiment where participants trade virtual stocks on an electronic platform within a time period of three weeks. During three weeks, participants face transaction fees of different types. Order frequency and volume is measured and related to the price schedule in place. We find that both variables are influenced by transaction fees. We also try to identify price elasticities for groups with different income and use this information for a structured approach towards a nonlinear price schedule design.
Cite as

Matthias Burghardt. Nonlinear Transaction Pricing in the Securities Trading Value Chain. In Negotiation and Market Engineering. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 6461, pp. 1-15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{burghardt:DagSemProc.06461.15,
  author =	{Burghardt, Matthias},
  title =	{{Nonlinear Transaction Pricing in the Securities Trading Value Chain}},
  booktitle =	{Negotiation and Market Engineering},
  pages =	{1--15},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{6461},
  editor =	{Nick Jennings and Gregory Kersten and Axel Ockenfels and Christof Weinhardt},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.15},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-9904},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.06461.15},
  annote =	{Keywords: Nonlinear Pricing, Securities Trading, Exchanges, Transaction Fee Experiment}
}
  • Refine by Author
  • 4 Jennings, Nicholas R.
  • 4 Weinhardt, Christof
  • 3 Chen, Eva
  • 3 Kersten, Gregory
  • 3 Ockenfels, Axel
  • Show More...

  • Refine by Classification

  • Refine by Keyword
  • 5 Auctions
  • 4 Market Engineering
  • 4 Negotiations
  • 2 Combinatorial Exchange
  • 2 Decision Support Systems
  • Show More...

  • Refine by Type
  • 22 document

  • Refine by Publication Year
  • 22 2007

Questions / Remarks / Feedback
X

Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing


Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail
© 2023-2024 Schloss Dagstuhl – LZI GmbH Imprint Privacy Contact