7 Search Results for "Zwicker, William S."


Document
Almost Envy-Free Allocations with Connected Bundles

Authors: Vittorio Bilò, Ioannis Caragiannis, Michele Flammini, Ayumi Igarashi, Gianpiero Monaco, Dominik Peters, Cosimo Vinci, and William S. Zwicker

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 124, 10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2019)


Abstract
We study the existence of allocations of indivisible goods that are envy-free up to one good (EF1), under the additional constraint that each bundle needs to be connected in an underlying item graph G. When the items are arranged in a path, we show that EF1 allocations are guaranteed to exist for arbitrary monotonic utility functions over bundles, provided that either there are at most four agents, or there are any number of agents but they all have identical utility functions. Our existence proofs are based on classical arguments from the divisible cake-cutting setting, and involve discrete analogues of cut-and-choose, of Stromquist's moving-knife protocol, and of the Su-Simmons argument based on Sperner's lemma. Sperner's lemma can also be used to show that on a path, an EF2 allocation exists for any number of agents. Except for the results using Sperner's lemma, all of our procedures can be implemented by efficient algorithms. Our positive results for paths imply the existence of connected EF1 or EF2 allocations whenever G is traceable, i.e., contains a Hamiltonian path. For the case of two agents, we completely characterize the class of graphs G that guarantee the existence of EF1 allocations as the class of graphs whose biconnected components are arranged in a path. This class is strictly larger than the class of traceable graphs; one can check in linear time whether a graph belongs to this class, and if so return an EF1 allocation.

Cite as

Vittorio Bilò, Ioannis Caragiannis, Michele Flammini, Ayumi Igarashi, Gianpiero Monaco, Dominik Peters, Cosimo Vinci, and William S. Zwicker. Almost Envy-Free Allocations with Connected Bundles. In 10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 124, pp. 14:1-14:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)


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@InProceedings{bilo_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.14,
  author =	{Bil\`{o}, Vittorio and Caragiannis, Ioannis and Flammini, Michele and Igarashi, Ayumi and Monaco, Gianpiero and Peters, Dominik and Vinci, Cosimo and Zwicker, William S.},
  title =	{{Almost Envy-Free Allocations with Connected Bundles}},
  booktitle =	{10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2019)},
  pages =	{14:1--14:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-095-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{124},
  editor =	{Blum, Avrim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.14},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-101078},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.14},
  annote =	{Keywords: Envy-free Division, Cake-cutting, Resource Allocation, Algorithmic Game Theory}
}
Document
10101 Abstracts Collection – Computational Foundations of Social Choice

Authors: Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-Francois Laslier, and William S. Zwicker

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, Computational Foundations of Social Choice (2010)


Abstract
From March 7 to March 12, 2010, the Dagstuhl Seminar 10101 ``Computational Foundations of Social Choice '' was held in Schloss Dagstuhl~--~Leibniz Center for Informatics. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.

Cite as

Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-Francois Laslier, and William S. Zwicker. 10101 Abstracts Collection – Computational Foundations of Social Choice. In Computational Foundations of Social Choice. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, pp. 1-18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)


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@InProceedings{brandt_et_al:DagSemProc.10101.1,
  author =	{Brandt, Felix and Conitzer, Vincent and Hemaspaandra, Lane A. and Laslier, Jean-Francois and Zwicker, William S.},
  title =	{{10101 Abstracts Collection – Computational Foundations of Social Choice}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Foundations of Social Choice},
  pages =	{1--18},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{10101},
  editor =	{Felix Brandt and Vincent Conitzer and Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jean-Francois Laslier and William S. Zwicker},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-25644},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Social Choice Theory, Voting, Fair Division, Algorithms, Computational Complexity, Multiagent Systems}
}
Document
10101 Executive Summary – Computational Foundations of Social Choice

Authors: Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-Francois Laslier, and William S. Zwicker

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, Computational Foundations of Social Choice (2010)


Abstract
This seminar addressed some of the key issues in computational social choice, a novel interdisciplinary field of study at the interface of social choice theory and computer science. Computational social choice is concerned with the application of computational techniques to the study of social choice mechanisms, such as voting rules and fair division protocols, as well as with the integration of social choice paradigms into computing. The seminar brought together many of the most active researchers in the field and focussed the research community currently forming around these important and exciting topics.

Cite as

Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-Francois Laslier, and William S. Zwicker. 10101 Executive Summary – Computational Foundations of Social Choice. In Computational Foundations of Social Choice. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, pp. 1-2, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)


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@InProceedings{brandt_et_al:DagSemProc.10101.2,
  author =	{Brandt, Felix and Conitzer, Vincent and Hemaspaandra, Lane A. and Laslier, Jean-Francois and Zwicker, William S.},
  title =	{{10101 Executive Summary – Computational Foundations of Social Choice}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Foundations of Social Choice},
  pages =	{1--2},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{10101},
  editor =	{Felix Brandt and Vincent Conitzer and Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jean-Francois Laslier and William S. Zwicker},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-25637},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Social Choice Theory, Voting, Fair Division, Algorithms, Computational Complexity, Multiagent Systems}
}
Document
False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms

Authors: Makoto Yokoo

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, Computational Foundations of Social Choice (2010)


Abstract
In Internet auctions, it is easy for a bidder to submit multiple bids under multiple identifiers (e.g., multiple e-mail addresses). If only one good is sold, a bidder cannot make any additional profit by using multiple bids. However, in combinatorial auctions, where multiple goods are sold simultaneously, submitting multiple bids under fictitious names can be profitable. A bid made under a fictitious name is called a {em false-name bid}. In this talk, I describe the summary of existing works and open problems on false-name bids.

Cite as

Makoto Yokoo. False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms. In Computational Foundations of Social Choice. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, pp. 1-4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)


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@InProceedings{yokoo:DagSemProc.10101.3,
  author =	{Yokoo, Makoto},
  title =	{{False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Foundations of Social Choice},
  pages =	{1--4},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{10101},
  editor =	{Felix Brandt and Vincent Conitzer and Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jean-Francois Laslier and William S. Zwicker},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-25621},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Combinatorial auctions, mechanism design, false-name bids}
}
Document
Manipulability of Single Transferable Vote

Authors: Toby Walsh

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, Computational Foundations of Social Choice (2010)


Abstract
For many voting rules, it is NP-hard to compute a successful manipulation. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. We study empirically the cost of manipulating the single transferable vote (STV) rule. This was one of the first rules shown to be NP-hard to manipulate. It also appears to be one of the harder rules to manipulate since it involves multiple rounds and since, unlike many other rules, it is NP-hard for a single agent to manipulate without weights on the votes or uncertainty about how the other agents have voted. In almost every election in our experiments, it was easy to compute how a single agent could manipulate the election or to prove that manipulation by a single agent was impossible. It remains an interesting open question if manipulation by a coalition of agents is hard to compute in practice.

Cite as

Toby Walsh. Manipulability of Single Transferable Vote. In Computational Foundations of Social Choice. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, pp. 1-12, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)


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@InProceedings{walsh:DagSemProc.10101.4,
  author =	{Walsh, Toby},
  title =	{{Manipulability of Single Transferable Vote}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Foundations of Social Choice},
  pages =	{1--12},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{10101},
  editor =	{Felix Brandt and Vincent Conitzer and Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jean-Francois Laslier and William S. Zwicker},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-25585},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Computational social choice, manipulability, STV voting, NP-hardness}
}
Document
Nonmanipulable Selections from a Tournament

Authors: Alon Altman, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Moshe Tennenholtz

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, Computational Foundations of Social Choice (2010)


Abstract
A tournament is a binary dominance relation on a set of alternatives. Tournaments arise in many contexts that are relevant to AI, most notably in voting (as a method to aggregate the preferences of agents). There are many works that deal with choice rules that select a desirable alternative from a tournament, but very few of them deal directly with incentive issues, despite the fact that game-theoretic considerations are crucial with respect to systems populated by selfish agents. We deal with the problem of the manipulation of choice rules by considering two types of manipulation. We say that a choice rule is emph{monotonic} if an alternative cannot get itself selected by losing on purpose, and emph{pairwise nonmanipulable} if a pair of alternatives cannot make one of them the winner by reversing the outcome of the match between them. Our main result is a combinatorial construction of a choice rule that is monotonic, pairwise nonmanipulable, and onto the set of alternatives, for any number of alternatives besides three.

Cite as

Alon Altman, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Moshe Tennenholtz. Nonmanipulable Selections from a Tournament. In Computational Foundations of Social Choice. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, pp. 1-6, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)


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@InProceedings{altman_et_al:DagSemProc.10101.5,
  author =	{Altman, Alon and Procaccia, Ariel D. and Tennenholtz, Moshe},
  title =	{{Nonmanipulable Selections from a Tournament}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Foundations of Social Choice},
  pages =	{1--6},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{10101},
  editor =	{Felix Brandt and Vincent Conitzer and Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jean-Francois Laslier and William S. Zwicker},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-25607},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Tournament, manipulation}
}
Document
On the stability of a scoring rules set under the IAC

Authors: Vincent Merlin, Mostapha Diss, Ahmed Louichi, and Hatem Smaoui

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, Computational Foundations of Social Choice (2010)


Abstract
A society facing a choice problem has also to choose the voting rule itself from a set of different possible voting rules. In such situations, the consequentialism property allows us to induce voters' preferences on voting rules from preferences over alternatives. A voting rule employed to resolve the society's choice problem is self-selective if it chooses itself when it is also used in choosing the voting rule. A voting rules set is said to be stable if it contains at least one self-selective voting rule at each profile of preferences on voting rules. We consider in this paper a society which will make a choice from a set constituted by three alternatives {a, b, c} and a set of the three well-known scoring voting rules {Borda, Plurality, Antiplurality}. Under the Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption (IAC), we will derive a probability for the stability of this triplet of voting rules. We use Ehrhart polynomials in order to solve our problems. This method counts the number of lattice points inside a convex bounded polyhedron (polytope). We discuss briefly recent algorithmic solutions to this method and use it to determine the probability of stabillity of {Borda, Plurality, Antiplurality} set.

Cite as

Vincent Merlin, Mostapha Diss, Ahmed Louichi, and Hatem Smaoui. On the stability of a scoring rules set under the IAC. In Computational Foundations of Social Choice. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, pp. 1-14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)


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@InProceedings{merlin_et_al:DagSemProc.10101.6,
  author =	{Merlin, Vincent and Diss, Mostapha and Louichi, Ahmed and Smaoui, Hatem},
  title =	{{On the stability of a scoring rules set under the IAC}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Foundations of Social Choice},
  pages =	{1--14},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{10101},
  editor =	{Felix Brandt and Vincent Conitzer and Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jean-Francois Laslier and William S. Zwicker},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-25610},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Self-selectivity, Stability, Consequentialism, Ehrhart polynomials}
}
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