License
When quoting this document, please refer to the following
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2019.46
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-111677
URL: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2019/11167/
Go to the corresponding LIPIcs Volume Portal


Ferraioli, Diodato ; Meier, Adrian ; Penna, Paolo ; Ventre, Carmine

Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling

pdf-format:
LIPIcs-ESA-2019-46.pdf (0.5 MB)


Abstract

Catering to the incentives of people with limited rationality is a challenging research direction that requires novel paradigms to design mechanisms and approximation algorithms. Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms have recently emerged as the concept of interest to this research agenda. However, the majority of the literature in the area has either highlighted the shortcomings of OSP or focused on the "right" definition rather than on the construction of these mechanisms. We here give the first set of tight results on the approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms for scheduling related machines. By extending the well-known cycle monotonicity technique, we are able to concentrate on the algorithmic component of OSP mechanisms and provide some novel paradigms for their design.

BibTeX - Entry

@InProceedings{ferraioli_et_al:LIPIcs:2019:11167,
  author =	{Diodato Ferraioli and Adrian Meier and Paolo Penna and Carmine Ventre},
  title =	{{Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling}},
  booktitle =	{27th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2019)},
  pages =	{46:1--46:15},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-124-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{144},
  editor =	{Michael A. Bender and Ola Svensson and Grzegorz Herman},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2019/11167},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-111677},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2019.46},
  annote =	{Keywords: Bounded Rationality, Extensive-form Mechanisms, Approximate Mechanism Design}
}

Keywords: Bounded Rationality, Extensive-form Mechanisms, Approximate Mechanism Design
Seminar: 27th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2019)
Issue Date: 2019
Date of publication: 06.09.2019


DROPS-Home | Imprint | Privacy Published by LZI