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URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11514
URL: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1151/
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Wolfstetter, Elmar ; Giebe, Thomas

License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers

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Abstract

This paper revisits the licensing of a non--drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed--fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariffs. The key features are that royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the option to sign a royalty contract. Remarkably, combining royalties for winners and losers makes the integer constraint concerning the number of licenses irrelevant.

BibTeX - Entry

@InProceedings{wolfstetter_et_al:DSP:2007:1151,
  author =	{Elmar Wolfstetter and Thomas Giebe},
  title =	{License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  year =	{2007},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M{\"u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz },
  number =	{07271},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  publisher =	{Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum f{\"u}r Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1151},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions, Patents, Licensing}
}

Keywords: Auctions, Patents, Licensing
Seminar: 07271 - Computational Social Systems and the Internet
Issue Date: 2007
Date of publication: 02.10.2007

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