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URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11592
URL: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1159/
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Larson, Kate

Reducing Costly Information Acquisition in Auctions

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07271.LarsonKate.ExtAbstract.1159.pdf (0.1 MB)


Abstract

Most auction research assumes that potential bidders have private information about their willingness to pay for an item. In reality, bidders often have to go through a costly information-gathering process in order to learn their valuations. Recent attempts at modelling this phenomena has brought to light complex strategic behavior arising from information-gathering, and has shown that traditional approaches to auction and mechanism design are not able to overcome it.

BibTeX - Entry

@InProceedings{larson:DSP:2007:1159,
  author =	{Kate Larson},
  title =	{Reducing Costly Information Acquisition in Auctions},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  year =	{2007},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M{\"u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz },
  number =	{07271},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  publisher =	{Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum f{\"u}r Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1159},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions, Information Gathering}
}

Keywords: Auctions, Information Gathering
Seminar: 07271 - Computational Social Systems and the Internet
Issue Date: 2007
Date of publication: 02.10.2007


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