Abstract
A (randomized, anonymous) voting rule maps any multiset of total orders of
(aka. votes over) a fixed set of alternatives to a probability distribution over these alternatives. A voting rule f is neutral if it treats all alternatives symmetrically. It satisfies participation if no voter ever benefits from not casting her vote. It is falsenameproof if no voter ever benefits from casting additional (potentially different)
votes. It is anonymityproof if it satisfies participation and it is falsenameproof. We
show that the class of anonymityproof neutral voting rules consists exactly of the
rules of the following form. With some probability kf in [0, 1], the rule chooses an
alternative at random. With probability 1kf , the rule first draws a pair of alternatives
at random. If every vote prefers the same alternative between the two (and there
is at least one vote), then the rule chooses that alternative. Otherwise, the rule flips a
fair coin to decide between the two alternatives.
BibTeX  Entry
@InProceedings{conitzer:DSP:2007:1165,
author = {Vincent Conitzer},
title = {AnonymityProof Voting Rules},
booktitle = {Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
year = {2007},
editor = {Peter Cramton and Rudolf M{\"u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz },
number = {07271},
series = {Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings},
ISSN = {18624405},
publisher = {Internationales Begegnungs und Forschungszentrum f{\"u}r Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1165},
annote = {Keywords: Mechanism design, social choice, falsenameproofness, verifying identities, combinatorial auctions}
}
Keywords: 

Mechanism design, social choice, falsenameproofness, verifying identities, combinatorial auctions 
Seminar: 

07271  Computational Social Systems and the Internet 
Issue Date: 

2007 
Date of publication: 

02.10.2007 