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URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-22296
URL: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/2229/
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Broersen, Jan M.

Deontic Epistemic stit Logic Distinguishing Modes of `Mens Rea'

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Abstract

Most juridical systems contain the principle that an act is only unlaw- ful if the agent conducting the act has a `guilty mind' (`mens rea'). Dif- ferent law systems distinguish different modes of mens rea. For instance, American law distinguishes between `knowingly' performing a criminal act, `recklessness', `strict liability', etc. I will show we can formalize several of these categories. The formalism I use is a complete stit-logic featuring operators for stit-actions taking effect in `next' states, S5-knowledge op- erators and SDL-type obligation operators. The different modes of `mens rea' correspond to the violation conditions of different types of obligation definable in the logic.

BibTeX - Entry

@InProceedings{broersen:DSP:2009:2229,
  author =	{Jan M. Broersen},
  title =	{Deontic Epistemic stit Logic Distinguishing Modes of `Mens Rea'},
  booktitle =	{Information processing, rational belief change and social interaction},
  year =	{2009},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and Hans Rott},
  number =	{09351},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, Germany},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/2229},
  annote =	{Keywords: Product update, agency, stit theory, knowingly doing}
}

Keywords: Product update, agency, stit theory, knowingly doing
Seminar: 09351 - Information processing, rational belief change and social interaction
Issue Date: 2009
Date of publication: 04.11.2009

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