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When quoting this document, please refer to the following
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2015.222
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-52249
URL: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2015/5224/
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Centonze, Paolina ; Pistoia, Marco ; Tripp, Omer

Access-rights Analysis in the Presence of Subjects

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Abstract

Modern software development and run-time environments, such as Java and the Microsoft .NET Common Language Runtime (CLR), have adopted a declarative form of access control. Permissions are granted to code providers, and during execution, the platform verifies compatibility between the permissions required by a security-sensitive operation and those granted to the executing code. While convenient, configuring the access-control policy of a program is not easy. If a code component is not granted sufficient permissions, authorization failures may occur. Thus, security administrators tend to define overly permissive policies, which violate the Principle of Least Privilege (PLP). A considerable body of research has been devoted to building program-analysis tools for computing the optimal policy for a program. However, Java and the CLR also allow executing code under the authority of a subject (user or service), and no program-analysis solution has addressed the challenges of determining the policy of a program in the presence of subjects. This paper introduces Subject Access Rights Analysis (SARA), a novel analysis algorithm for statically computing the permissions required by subjects at run time. We have applied SARA to 348 libraries in IBM WebSphere Application Server - a commercial enterprise application server written in Java that consists of >2 million lines of code and is required to support the Java permission- and subject-based security model. SARA detected 263 PLP violations, 219 cases of policies with missing permissions, and 29 bugs that led code to be unnecessarily executed under the authority of a subject. SARA corrected all these vulnerabilities automatically, and additionally synthesized fresh policies for all the libraries, with a false-positive rate of 5% and an average running time of 103 seconds per library. SARA also implements mechanisms for mitigating the risk of false negatives due to reflection and native code; according to a thorough result evaluation based on testing, no false negative was detected. SARA enabled IBM WebSphere Application Server to receive the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Assurance Level 4 certification.

BibTeX - Entry

@InProceedings{centonze_et_al:LIPIcs:2015:5224,
  author =	{Paolina Centonze and Marco Pistoia and Omer Tripp},
  title =	{{Access-rights Analysis in the Presence of Subjects}},
  booktitle =	{29th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2015)},
  pages =	{222--246},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-86-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2015},
  volume =	{37},
  editor =	{John Tang Boyland},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2015/5224},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-52249},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2015.222},
  annote =	{Keywords: Static Analysis, Security, Access Control}
}

Keywords: Static Analysis, Security, Access Control
Seminar: 29th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2015)
Issue Date: 2015
Date of publication: 26.06.2015


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