Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik GmbH Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik GmbH scholarly article en Heydenreich, Birgit; Müller, Rudolf; Uetz, Marc; Vohra, Rakesh License
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URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11581

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On Revenue Equivalence in Truthful Mechanisms



The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results about revenue equivalence are immediate consequences.

BibTeX - Entry

  author =	{Birgit Heydenreich and Rudolf M{\"u}ller and Marc Uetz and Rakesh Vohra},
  title =	{On Revenue Equivalence in Truthful Mechanisms},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  year =	{2007},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M{\"u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz },
  number =	{07271},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  publisher =	{Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum f{\"u}r Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism Design, Revenue Equivalence, Graph Theory}

Keywords: Mechanism Design, Revenue Equivalence, Graph Theory
Seminar: 07271 - Computational Social Systems and the Internet
Related Scholarly Article:
Issue date: 2007
Date of publication: 2007

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