Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations

Authors Elena Grigorieva, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf Müller, Dries Vermeulen



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Author Details

Elena Grigorieva
P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Rudolf Müller
Dries Vermeulen

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Elena Grigorieva, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf Müller, and Dries Vermeulen. Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-9, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)
https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.7

Abstract

We show that, when bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium in an ex post individually rational query auction can only be ex post efficient when the running time of the auction is infinite for almost all realizations of valuations of the bidders. In contrast we show that, when we allow for inefficient allocations with arbitrarily small probability, there is a query auction (to be more specific, a bisection auction) that attains this level of approximate efficiency in equilibrium, while additionally the running time of the auction in equilibrium is finite for all realizations of valuations.
Keywords
  • Query auctions
  • ex post equilibrium
  • efficiency

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