Simulation-based analysis of E2E voting systems

Authors Olivier de Marneffe, Olivier Pereira, Jean-Jacques Quisquater



PDF
Thumbnail PDF

File

DagSemProc.07311.8.pdf
  • Filesize: 241 kB
  • 14 pages

Document Identifiers

Author Details

Olivier de Marneffe
Olivier Pereira
Jean-Jacques Quisquater

Cite AsGet BibTex

Olivier de Marneffe, Olivier Pereira, and Jean-Jacques Quisquater. Simulation-based analysis of E2E voting systems. In Frontiers of Electronic Voting. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7311, pp. 1-14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2008)
https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.8

Abstract

End-to-end auditable voting systems are expected to guarantee very interesting, and often sophisticated security properties, including correctness, privacy, fairness, receipt-freeness, dots However, for many well-known protocols, these properties have never been analyzed in a systematic way. In this paper, we investigate the use of techniques from the simulation-based security tradition for the analysis of these protocols, through a case-study on the ThreeBallot protocol. Our analysis shows that the ThreeBallot protocol fails to emulate some natural voting functionality, reflecting the lack of election fairness guarantee from this protocol. Guided by the reasons that make our security proof fail, we propose a simple variant of the ThreeBallot protocol and show that this variant emulates our functionality.
Keywords
  • UC framework
  • simulatability
  • security proof
  • ThreeBallot

Metrics

  • Access Statistics
  • Total Accesses (updated on a weekly basis)
    0
    PDF Downloads
Questions / Remarks / Feedback
X

Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing


Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail