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DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2009.2330
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-23304
URL: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/2330/

Paul, Soumya ; Simon, Sunil

Nash Equilibrium in Generalised Muller Games

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Abstract

We suggest that extending Muller games with preference ordering for players is a natural way to reason about unbounded duration games. In this context, we look at the standard solution concept of Nash equilibrium for non-zero sum games. We show that Nash equilibria always exists for such generalised Muller games on finite graphs and present a procedure to compute an equilibrium strategy profile. We also give a procedure to compute a subgame perfect equilibrium when it exists in such games.

BibTeX - Entry

@InProceedings{paul_et_al:LIPIcs:2009:2330,
  author =	{Soumya Paul and Sunil Simon},
  title =	{{Nash Equilibrium in Generalised Muller Games}},
  booktitle =	{IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science},
  pages =	{335--346},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-13-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2009},
  volume =	{4},
  editor =	{Ravi Kannan and K. Narayan Kumar},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/2330},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-23304},
  doi =		{http://dx.doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2009.2330},
  annote =	{Keywords: Infinite games on graphs, Muller games, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium}
}

Keywords: Infinite games on graphs, Muller games, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium
Seminar: IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science
Issue date: 2009
Date of publication: 14.12.2009


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