Computationally Complete Symbolic Attacker in Action

Authors Gergei Bana, Pedro Adao, Hideki Sakurada



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Author Details

Gergei Bana
Pedro Adao
Hideki Sakurada

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Gergei Bana, Pedro Adao, and Hideki Sakurada. Computationally Complete Symbolic Attacker in Action. In IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2012). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 18, pp. 546-560, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2012)
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2012.546

Abstract

We show that the recent technique of computationally complete symbolic attackers proposed by Bana and Comon-Lundh [POST 2012] for computationally sound verification of security protocols is powerful enough to verify actual protocols. In their work, Bana and Comon-Lundh presented only the general framework, but they did not introduce sufficiently many axioms to actually prove protocols. We present a set of axioms -- some generic axioms that are computationally sound for all PPT algorithms, and two specific axioms that are sound for CCA2 secure encryptions -- and illustrate the power of this technique by giving the first computationally sound verification (secrecy and authentication) via symbolic attackers of the NSL Protocol that does not need any further restrictive assumptions about the computational implementation. The axioms are entirely modular, not particular to the NSL protocol.
Keywords
  • Security Protocols
  • Symbolic Adversary
  • Computational Soundness

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