Verifiable Stream Computation and Arthur-Merlin Communication

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Abstract
In the setting of streaming interactive proofs (SIPs), a client (verifier) needs to compute a given function on a massive stream of data, arriving online, but is unable to store even a small fraction of the data. It outsources the processing to a third party service (prover), but is unwilling to blindly trust answers returned by this service. Thus, the service cannot simply supply the desired answer; it must convince the verifier of its correctness via a short interaction after the stream has been seen.

In this work we study “barely interactive” SIPs. Specifically, we show that two or three rounds of interaction suffice to solve several query problems – including Index, Median, Nearest Neighbor Search, Pattern Matching, and Range Counting – with polylogarithmic space and communication costs. Such efficiency with $O(1)$ rounds of interaction was thought to be impossible based on previous work.

On the other hand, we initiate a formal study of the limitations of constant-round SIPs by introducing a new hierarchy of communication models called Online Interactive Proofs (OIPs). The online nature of these models is analogous to the streaming restriction placed upon the verifier in an SIP. We give upper and lower bounds that (1) characterize, up to quadratic blowups, every finite level of the OIP hierarchy in terms of other well-known communication complexity classes, (2) separate the first four levels of the hierarchy, and (3) reveal that the hierarchy collapses to the fourth level. Our study of OIPs reveals marked contrasts and some parallels with the classic Turing Machine theory of interactive proofs, establishes limits on the power of existing techniques for developing constant-round SIPs, and provides a new characterization of (non-online) Arthur–Merlin communication in terms of an online model.

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1 Introduction

The surging popularity of commercial cloud computing services, and more generally outsourced computations, has revealed compelling new applications for the study of interactive proofs with highly restricted verifiers. Consider, e.g., a retailer (verifier) who lacks the resources to locally process a massive input (say, the set of all its transactions), but can access a powerful but untrusted cloud service provider (prover), who processes the input on the retailer’s behalf. The verifier must work within the confines of the restrictive data streaming paradigm, using
only a small amount of working memory. The prover must both answer queries about the input (say, “how many pairs of blue jeans have I ever sold?”), and prove that the answer is correct. We refer to this general scenario as verifiable data stream computation.

It is useful to look at this computational scenario as “data stream algorithms with access to a powerful (space-unlimited) prover.” As is well known, most interesting data streaming problems have no nontrivial (i.e., sublinear space) algorithms unless one allows approximation. For instance, given a stream $\sigma$ of tokens from the universe $[n] := \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$, which implicitly defines frequencies $f_j$ for each $j \in [n]$, some basic questions we can ask about $\sigma$ are the number of distinct tokens $F_0(\sigma)$, the $k$th frequency moment $F_k(\sigma) = \sum_{j=1}^n f_j^k$, the median of the collection of numbers in $\sigma$, and the very basic point queries where, given a specific $j \in [n]$ after $\sigma$ has been presented, we wish to know $f_j$. In each case, we would like an exact answer, not an estimate. With the trivial exception of $F_1(\sigma) = \sum_{j=1}^n f_j$ – which is just the length of $\sigma$ – not one of these questions can be answered by a (possibly randomized) streaming algorithm restricted to $o(n)$ space. However, with access to a powerful prover, things improve greatly: as shown in Chakrabarti et al. [9], point queries, median, and $F_k$ (for integral $k > 0$) can be computed exactly by a verifier using $O(\sqrt{n})$ space, while receiving $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$ bits of “help” from the prover.

Notably, the protocol achieving this $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$ cost (space plus amount of help) is non-interactive: the prover sends a single message to the verifier. Chakrabarti et al. [9] also showed that under this restriction their protocol is optimal: a cost of $\Omega(\sqrt{n})$ is required. In subsequent work, Cormode et al. [15] considered streaming interactive proofs (SIPs), where the verifier may engage in several rounds of interaction with the prover, seeking to minimize both the space used by the verifier and the total amount of communication. They gave SIPs with $2k - 1$ rounds of interaction following the verifier’s single pass over the input stream, achieving a cost of $\tilde{O}(n^{1/(k+1)})$ for the above problems. This generalizes the earlier set of results [9], which gave 1-round SIPs. Moreover, it achieves $O(\text{polylog } n)$ cost with $O(\log n / \log \log n)$ rounds of interaction. In recent work, Klauck and Prakash [24] further studied this kind of computation and generalized the 1-round lower bound, claiming that a $(2k - 1)$-round SIP must cost $\Omega(n^{1/(k+1)})$, even for very basic point queries.

However, we identify an implicit assumption in the Klauck–Prakash lower bound argument: it applies only to protocols in which the verifier’s messages to the prover are independent of the input. This happened to hold in all previous SIPs, which are ultimately descended from the sum-check protocol of Lund et al. [27]. Furthermore, this assumption is harmless in the classical theory of interactive proofs where public-coin protocols can simulate private-coin ones with just a polynomial blowup in cost [16]. However, these simulation results fail subtly in the streaming setting, and we show that this failure is intrinsic by giving a number of new upper bounds.

### 1.1 New Results: Exponentially Improved Constant-Round SIPs

We start by showing that even two-round SIPs are exponentially more powerful than previously believed, on certain problems. For now we state our results informally, using the $\tilde{O}$-notation to suppress “lower order” factors. We give formal theorem statements later in the paper, after all definitions are in place.

**Result 1.1 (Formalized in Theorem 3.1).** There is a two-round SIP with cost $\tilde{O}(\log n)$ for answering point queries on a stream over the universe $[n]$.

The SIP that achieves this upper bound is based on an abstract protocol that we call the polynomial evaluation protocol. Crucially, unlike the sum-check protocols used in previous
SIPs, it involves an interaction where the verifier’s message to the prover depends on part of the input; specifically, it depends on the query. Note that two rounds of interaction is likely unavoidable in practice even if verifiability is not a concern: one round may be required for the verifier to communicate the query to the prover, with a second round required for the prover to reply.

Adding a third round of interaction allows us to answer selection queries, of which an important special case is median-finding.

▶ Result 1.2 (Formalized in Theorem 3.7). There is a three-round SIP with cost $\tilde{O}(\log n)$ for determining the exact median of a stream of numbers from $[n]$.

We can in fact answer fairly complex queries with three rounds and polylogarithmic cost. For instance, given a data set presented as a stream of points from a metric space, we can answer exact nearest neighbor queries to the data set very efficiently, even in high dimensions. This is somewhat surprising, given that even the offline version of the problem seems to exhibit a curse of dimensionality.

▶ Result 1.3 (Formalized in Theorem 3.4). For data sets consisting of points from $[n]^d$ under a reasonable metric, such as the Manhattan distance $\ell_1^d$ or the Euclidean distance $\ell_2^d$, there is a three-round SIP with cost $\text{poly}(d, \log n)$ allowing exact nearest neighbor queries to the data set.

We also give similarly efficient two-round SIPs for other well-studied query problems, such as range counting queries (Theorem 3.6), where a stream of data points is followed by a query range and the goal is to determine the number of points in the range that appeared in the stream, and pattern matching queries (Theorem 3.8), where a streamed text is followed by a (short) query pattern.

Next, we work towards a detailed understanding of the subtleties of SIPs that caused the aforementioned Klauck–Prakash lower bound [24] not to apply. Our study naturally leads into communication complexity, in particular to Arthur–Merlin communication, which we discuss next.

1.2 The Connection to Arthur–Merlin Communication

Like almost all previous lower bounds for data stream computations, prior SIP lower bounds [9, 24] use reductions from problems in communication complexity. To model the prover in an SIP, the appropriate setting is Arthur–Merlin communication, which we now introduce.

Suppose Alice holds an input $x \in \mathcal{X}$, Bob holds $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, and they wish to compute $f(x, y)$ for some Boolean function $f : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y} \to \{0, 1\}$, using random coins and settling for some constant probability of error. Say this costs $R(f)$ bits of communication. Can an omniscient but untrusted Merlin, who knows $(x, y)$, convince “Arthur” (defined as Alice and Bob together) that $f(x, y) = 1$, keeping the overall communication within $o(R(f))$? For several interesting functions $f$ the answer is “Yes” and this is the general subject of Arthur–Merlin communication complexity, first considered in seminal work by Babai, Frankl, and Simon [5].

The one-pass streaming restriction on the verifier in an SIP is modeled by requiring that Alice not receive any communication from either Bob or Merlin. Thus the Alice–Bob communication is one-way, though Bob and Merlin may interact arbitrarily. We refer to this restricted communication setting as online Arthur–Merlin communication. It should be clear that a $k$-round SIP with cost $C$ can be simulated by an online Arthur–Merlin communication...
of cost $C$ where Bob and Merlin interact for $k$ rounds. Thus, lower bounds on SIPs would follow from corresponding communication lower bounds in the online Arthur–Merlin setting.

At this point let us recall that the classical Turing-Machine-based theory of interactive proofs considers two different models of interaction between prover and verifier, corresponding to the complexity classes $\text{IP}_{\text{TM}}$, where the verifier is allowed private randomness, and $\text{AM}_{\text{TM}}$, where he may only use public randomness. Recall the following classic results about such interactive proofs.

- **Equivalence of private and public coins.** Goldwasser and Sipser [16] proved that a $k$-round private coin interactive proof (à la $\text{IP}_{\text{TM}}$) can be simulated (with a polynomial blowup in complexity) by a $(k + 2)$-round public coin one (à la $\text{AM}_{\text{TM}}$). Thus, in the resulting protocol, the verifier can perform his interaction with the prover before even looking at the input!

- **Round reduction.** Babai and Moran [6] proved that a $(k + 1)$-round interactive proof can be simulated by a $k$-round interactive proof with a polynomial blowup in the verifier's complexity. Thus, a two-round (verifier→prover→verifier) interactive proof is just as powerful as any constant-round one.

Interestingly, as we shall show in this work, neither of these phenomena holds for the online communication complexity analogs of $\text{IP}_{\text{TM}}$ and $\text{AM}_{\text{TM}}$. (Recall that “online” means that Alice does not receive any communication from either Bob or Merlin.) This point appears to have been missed in the Klauck–Prakash proof [24], which works in a “public coin” setting and thus applies only to a restricted class of SIPs. The new SIPs we design in this work correspond to a “private coin” setting, which allows the aforementioned exponential improvements.

Clearly there are nuances in online Arthur–Merlin communication complexity that do not arise in classical interactive proofs. In particular, we seek a better understanding of the precise role of rounds and of private randomness in the communication setting. This is the goal of our next batch of results.

### 1.3 New Results: Complexity Classes for Arthur–Merlin Communication

As noted above, we can think of $\text{AM}_{\text{TM}}$ as a restricted interactive proof model where the verifier must interact with the prover before looking at his input. We can then define a hierarchy of analogous communication complexity models called $\text{OMA}^k$ (Online Merlin–Arthur), where Bob interacts with Merlin in $k$ rounds without looking at his input, and then Alice communicates with Bob one-way. We defer precise definitions to Section 4. The aforementioned Klauck–Prakash lower bound essentially says the following:

**Proposition 1.4** (Klauck and Prakash [24]). *The index problem – where Alice gets $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, Bob gets $j \in [n]$ and Bob must output $x_j$ with high probability – requires $\Omega(n^{1/(k+1)})$ cost in the $\text{OMA}^{2k}$ model.*

We can also define a parallel hierarchy $\text{OIP}^k$ (Online Interactive Proof) of communication analogs of $\text{IP}_{\text{TM}}$. We now hit another subtlety. We could require the Bob–Merlin interaction to happen before the Alice→Bob communication; this is how we shall define $\text{OIP}^k$. Alternatively, we could swap the order, so that Bob’s messages to Merlin could depend on Alice’s input as well; we shall call the resulting (more powerful) model $\text{OIP}^{k+}$. 

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1 Throughout this paper, we use the subscript “$\text{TM}$” to denote a Turing-machine-based complexity class, to resolve the notation clash with the analogous communication complexity classes.
These communication models correspond to SIPs as follows. Every SIP designed prior to this work falls into a restricted setting where the verifier’s messages are independent of the input, so it can be simulated by an \( \text{OMA}^k \) protocol with \( k \) being the number of rounds of interaction in the SIP. The SIPs we design in this work apply to “query problems” with the data set appearing before the query, and our verifier messages depend only on the query. Thus our SIPs are naturally simulable by \( \text{OIP}^k \) protocols. Finally, a general SIP, where verifier messages can depend on the entire input stream, is simulable by an \( \text{OIP}^k + \) protocol.

Following Babai et al. [5], given a communication model \( C \), we define a corresponding complexity class, also denoted \( C \), consisting of all problems that have polylogarithmic cost protocols in the model \( C \). We now have three parallel hierarchies of communication complexity classes: \( \text{OMA}^k \), \( \text{OIP}^k \), and \( \text{OIP}^k + \). For our next batch of results, we prove several inclusion and separation results relating these newly defined classes to each other and to well-studied classes from earlier work in communication complexity.

**Result 1.5** (Formalized over several theorems in Section 5). The following complexity class inclusions and separations, given in Figure 1, hold.

![Figure 1](image-url)

Notice that there are several two-way inclusions (i.e., equalities) amongst these communication complexity classes. It is worth noting that with one exception (namely \( \text{OIP}^4 = \text{OIP}^1 + \)) none of these equalities is trivial. For instance, consider the switch from the model \( R^{2,B} \) to the model \( \text{OIP}^2 \): Bob loses the ability to send Alice a message before hearing from her, but gains access to Merlin. It is not a priori clear that this switch in models will result in a complexity class that is even comparable to \( R^{2,B} \), and nontrivial simulation arguments (Theorems 5.3 and 5.6) are required to prove that \( R^{2,B} = \text{OIP}^2 \).

Many of our simulations incur some blowup in cost. All such blowups are at most quadratic, so polylogarithmic costs remain polylogarithmic.

The \( \text{OMA} \) and \( \text{OIP} \) hierarchies behave quite differently from the classical \( \text{AM}_{TM} \) and \( \text{IP}_{TM} \):

- In contrast to the Goldwasser–Sipser private-by-public-coin theorem, the class \( \text{OIP}^4 \) is strictly more powerful than \( \text{OMA}^k \) (in fact, even \( \text{OIP}^2 \not\subseteq \text{OMA}^k \)), for every constant \( k \).
- In contrast to the Babai–Moran round reduction theorem, there are exactly four distinct levels (not two) in the \( \text{OIP}^k \) hierarchy, for constant \( k \).
In the course of proving the separation results in Figure 1, we obtain concrete lower bounds for explicit functions that are of interest in their own right. Let us highlight one of these.

Result 1.6 (Formalized in Corollary 5.9). The set disjointness problem \( \text{disj} \) – where Alice and Bob each get a subset of \([n]\) and must decide whether they are disjoint – requires \( \Omega(n^{1/3}) \) cost in the \( \text{OIP}^3 \) model and thus does not belong to the class \( \text{OIP}^3 \). This lower bound is tight up to a logarithmic factor.

This has implications for SIPs. We noted that all SIPs designed thus far (including the new ones in this work) are simulable in the weaker \( \text{OIP} \) models. By a standard reduction [4] from \( \text{disj} \) to the frequency moments problem \( F_k \), it follows that unlike what we achieved for point queries and median queries, based on currently known techniques, we cannot get a polylogarithmic cost three-round SIP for \( F_k \) \((k \neq 1)\).

Removing the qualifier “based on currently known techniques” above would require a similar lower bound for \( \text{OIP}^3 \). Unfortunately, at present we are unable to prove any nontrivial lower bounds on \( \text{OIP}^2 \), and doing so appears to be a rather difficult problem. Indeed, this inability is what led us to study the weaker \( \text{OIP} \) model. Yet, because the \( \text{OIP} \) models are online, the separation results in Figure 1 still morally capture the primary way in which SIPs, due to their streaming/online nature, differ from classical interactive proofs.

Finally, our result \( \text{AM} = \text{OIP}^4 \) gives a novel characterization of \( \text{AM} \) in terms of online communication. This is surprising because online models, where no one talks to Alice, might be expected to be too weak to capture \( \text{AM} \). Proving lower bounds on \( \text{AM} \) is a longstanding and notoriously hard problem in communication complexity [26, 22, 23]. We believe our new characterization of \( \text{AM} \) is of independent interest, and may prove useful in establishing non-trivial \( \text{AM} \) lower bounds.

### 1.4 Related Work

#### 1.4.1 Stream Computation

Early theoretical work on verifiable stream computation focused on non-interactive protocols, as in the annotated data streams model of Chakrabarti et al. [9]. In our language, that model corresponds to 1-round SIPs. Work in this model has established optimal protocols for several problems including frequency moments and frequent items [9]: linear algebraic problems such as matrix rank [24]; and graph problems like shortest \( s-t \) path [14]. Many of these protocols have subsequently been optimized for streams whose length is much smaller than the universe size [8]. More recent protocols, such as the Arthur–Merlin streaming protocols of Gur and Raz [19, 8] are “barely interactive” in the sense that the prover and the verifier may exchange a constant number of messages. Meanwhile, the fully general streaming interactive proof (SIP) model of Cormode et al. [15, 13] permits “many” rounds of interaction. Cormode, Thaler, and Yi [15] showed that several general \( \text{IP}_{\text{TM}} \) protocols can be simulated in this model. These include the powerful, general-purpose protocol of Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum [18]. Given any problem in \( \text{NC}_{\text{TM}} \), the resulting protocol requires only polylogarithmic space and communication while using polylogarithmic rounds of verifier–prover interaction. Refinements and implementations of these protocols [36, 13, 35] have demonstrated scalability and the practicality of this line of work.

Algebraic techniques lie at the core of almost all nontrivial protocols in the above models. Specifically, a number of 1-round SIPs are inspired by the Aaronson–Wigderson \( \text{MA} \) communication protocol for \( \text{disj} \) [2], which is in turn inspired by the classic sum-check
protocol of Lund et al. [27]. The sum-check protocol is also the inspiration for the way
that all previous multi-round SIPs make use of interaction. The aforementioned protocol of
Goldwasser et al. [18] also builds upon the sum-check protocol.

The algorithmic results outlined in Section 1.1 have a rather different algebraic idea at
their core. They are based on the aforementioned polynomial evaluation protocol, which is
obtained by adapting a result of Raz [33] about IP/rpolyTM to a streaming setting; see the
discussion at the start of Section 2.1.

Early work on interactive proofs studied space-bounded verifiers (see the survey by
Condon [12]), but many protocols developed in this line of work require the verifier to
store the input, and therefore do not address verifiable stream computation, as we do here.
Goldwasser et al. [17] studied interactive proofs with verifiers in the complexity class NC0TM.
Interestingly, they showed that private randomness is necessary to obtain interactive proofs
with verifiers in NC0TM, unless the language in question is already in NC0TM. This is analogous
to our finding that constant-round “public coin” SIPs (where the verifier’s messages do not
depend on the input) are exponentially weaker than general constant-round SIPs.

1.4.2 Computationally Sound Protocols

Protocols for verifiable stream computation have also been studied in the cryptography
community [10, 32, 34]. These works only require soundness to hold against cheating
provers that run in polynomial time. In exchange for this weaker security guarantee, these
protocols can achieve properties that are impossible in the information-theoretic setting we
consider. For example, they typically achieve reusability, allowing the verifier to use the
same randomness to answer many queries. In contrast, our protocols only support “one-shot”
queries, because they require the verifier to reveal secret randomness to the prover.

Chung et al. [10] combine the GKR protocol with fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)
to give reusable, non-interactive protocols of polylogarithmic cost for any problem in NC.
Papamanthou et al. [32] give improved protocols for a class of low-complexity queries
including point queries and range search: their protocols avoid the use of FHE, and allow
the prover to answer such queries in polylogarithmic time (a similar property was achieved
by Schröder and Schröder [34], but for a simpler class of queries, and with unidirectional
communication from the verifier to the prover on each stream update). In contrast, prior
work as well as our own requires the prover to spend time quasilinear in the size of the data
stream after receiving a query, even if the answer itself can be computed in sublinear time
(e.g., point queries, which can be solved with a single access to memory). We note however
that our most interesting protocols, such as those for nearest neighbor search and pattern
matching, are for problems that cannot be solved in sublinear time; hence, the quasilinear
time required by our protocols does not affect the prover’s runtime by more than logarithmic
factors.

1.4.3 Communication Complexity

Seminal work by Babai et al. [5] introduced and studied the communication analogs of the
major Turing Machine complexity classes, including P, NP, Σ2, Π2. They hinted at similar
analogies of MA and the AM hierarchy. Lokam [26] related the task of placing problems
outside of the communication class AM to notions of matrix rigidity. He also observed that
the communication complexity classes IP and AM behave similarly to their Turing Machine
counterparts. In particular, noted theorems such as IP = PSPACE, Toda’s Theorem, and
Babai and Moran’s round reduction results [6] all hold in the communication world (though not under online communication, as shown by this work).

Online (also known as one-round) randomized communication complexity was introduced in the mid-1990s and considered by Ablayev [3], Kremer, Nisan, and Ron [25], and Newman and Szegedy [29]. Aaronson [1] introduced online variants of Merlin–Arthur communication, in classical and quantum flavors. Aaronson and Wigderson [2] gave an online MA communication protocol for disj (more generally, for inner-product) with cost $O(\sqrt{n})$; this is nearly optimal, as shown by a lower bound of Klauck [22] that applies to general MA protocols. More recently, Klauck [23] performed a careful study of AM, MA, and its quantum analogue QMA. In particular, he gave a promise problem PAPPMP separating QMA from AM; we shall eventually show that PAPPMP separates OIP from OIP.

2 The SIP Model and the Polynomial Evaluation Protocol

In a data stream problem, the input $\sigma$ is a stream, or sequence, of tokens from some data universe $U$. The goal is to compute or approximate some function $g(\sigma)$, keeping space usage sublinear in the two key size parameters: (1) the length of $\sigma$, and (2) the size of the universe $|U|$. Practically speaking, we would also like to process each stream update (token arrival) quickly. All our data stream algorithms will be randomized, and we shall allow them to err with some small constant probability on each input stream. In the streaming interactive proofs (SIP) model, after processing $\sigma$, the algorithm (called the “verifier”) may engage in $k$ rounds of interaction with an oracle (the “prover”) who knows $\sigma$ and whose goal is to lead the verifier to output the correct answer $g(\sigma)$. The verifier, being distrustful, will output “$\perp$” (indicating “abort”) if he suspects the prover to be cheating.

All of the SIPs in this paper will work in the turnstile streaming model, where $\sigma$ can contain deletions of tokens from $U$, in addition to insertions. In this model it is best to think of the input as being a stream of integer updates to a vector $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n$. Initially $x = 0$, and an update is a tuple $(i, c) \in [n] \times \mathbb{Z}$, which has the effect of adding $c$ to the entry $x_i$. We will sometimes describe our algorithms as they apply to the vanilla streaming model, but it will be straightforward to extend them to the turnstile model.

We say that an SIP computes the function $g$ with completeness error $\varepsilon_c$ and soundness error $\varepsilon_s$ if for all inputs $x$ there exists a prover strategy that will cause the verifier to output $g(x)$ with probability at least $1 - \varepsilon_c$, and no prover strategy can cause the verifier to output a value outside $\{g(x), \perp\}$ with probability larger than $\varepsilon_s$. In designing SIPs, our goal will be to achieve $\varepsilon_c, \varepsilon_s \leq 1/3$; clearly the theory remains unchanged if we replace $1/3$ by another constant in $(0, 1/2)$. A SIP with $\varepsilon_c = 0$ is said to have perfect completeness. The total length of the verifier–prover interaction is the help cost. The space used by the streaming verifier is the space cost. The cost of an SIP is the sum of its help cost and its space cost. When designing SIP protocols we will also discuss the time complexities of the prover and the verifier. To keep things simple, we consider a model in which all arithmetic operations on a finite field of size $n^{O(1)}$ can be executed in unit time.

2.1 The Polynomial Evaluation Protocol

We shall present a two-round SIP for an abstract data stream problem called “polynomial evaluation,” where the input consists of a multivariate polynomial described implicitly, as a table of values, followed by a point at which the polynomial must be evaluated. Without space constraints, this problem simply amounts to interpolation followed by direct evaluation, but our goal is to obtain a protocol where the verifier uses space roughly logarithmic in the
size of the table of values, and is convinced by the prover about the correct answer after a similar amount of communication. For ease of presentation, we shall first consider a concrete special setting that is important in its own right: the INDEX problem. In this problem, the input is a stream of \( n \) data bits \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \), followed by a query index \( j \in [n] \). The goal is to output \( x_j \) with error at most 1/3.

With very different motivations from ours, Raz [33] gave an interactive proof protocol placing every language in \( \text{IP}_{TM/r\text{poly}} \), the class of languages that have interactive proofs with polynomial-time verifiers that take randomized advice, where the advice is kept secret from the prover. Our SIP for INDEX can be seen as an adaptation of Raz’s interactive proof to the streaming setting.

\begin{theorem}
The INDEX problem has a two-round SIP with cost \( O(\log n \log \log n) \), in which the verifier processes each stream token in \( O(\log n) \) time and the prover runs in total time \( O(n \log n) \).
\end{theorem}

\begin{proof}
Assume WLOG that \( n = 2^b \), for some integer \( b \). Identify each integer \( z \in [n] \) with a Boolean vector \( z = (z_1, \ldots, z_b) \in \{0, 1\}^b \) in some canonical way, such as by using the binary representation of \( z \). We can then view the data bits as a table of values for the Boolean function \( g_z : \{0, 1\}^b \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \) given by \( g_z(z) = x_z \), and thus for the multilinear \( b \)-variate polynomial \( \tilde{g}_z(Z_1, \ldots, Z_b) \) given by
\[
\tilde{g}_z(Z_1, \ldots, Z_b) = \sum_{z \in \{0, 1\}^b} g_z(z) \chi_z(Z_1, \ldots, Z_b), \quad \text{(1)}
\]
where \( \chi_u(Z_1, \ldots, Z_b) = \prod_{i=1}^{b} ((1 - u_i)(1 - Z_i) + u_i Z_i) \) \( \text{(2)} \)
is the indicator function of the vector \( u = (u_1, \ldots, u_b) \). We shall interpret \( \tilde{g}_z \) as a polynomial in \( F[Z_1, \ldots, Z_b] \) for a fixed “large enough” finite field \( F \). With this interpretation, \( \tilde{g}_z \) is called the multilinear extension of \( g_z \) to \( F \). We define a line in \( F^b \) to be the range of a nonconstant affine function from \( F \) to \( F^b \). Every line contains exactly \( |F| \) points. Given such a line, \( \ell \), we define its canonical restriction to be the degree-1 polynomial \( \lambda_\ell(W) \in F[W] \) such that \( \lambda_\ell(0) \) and \( \lambda_\ell(1) \) are, respectively, the lexicographically first and second points in \( \ell \). We define the canonical extension of a polynomial \( f(Z_1, \ldots, Z_b) \) to \( \ell \) to be the univariate polynomial \( f(\lambda_\ell(W)) \in F[W] \), whose degree is at most the total degree of \( f \).

Using the above notations and conventions, our two-round SIP for INDEX works as shown in Figure 2.

To analyze this protocol, first note that after reading all the data bits, the verifier would have computed \( Q = \tilde{g}_z(\mathbf{r}) \), by Eq. (1). Now the protocol is easily seen to have perfect completeness. Since \( \tilde{g}_z(Z_1, \ldots, Z_b) \) is multilinear, it follows that \( \deg(\tilde{g}_z(\lambda_\ell(W))) \leq b \), so the prover can always honestly choose \( h(W) = \tilde{g}_z(\lambda_\ell(W)) \). If he does so, then we will indeed have \( h(t) = \tilde{g}_z(\lambda_\ell(t)) = \tilde{g}_z(\mathbf{r}) = Q \), and the verifier’s check will pass. Finally, the verifier will output \( Q = \tilde{g}_z(\lambda_\ell(w)) = \tilde{g}_z(1) = x_j \), the correct answer to the INDEX instance.

Next, we analyze soundness. If the prover supplies a polynomial \( h(W) \neq \tilde{g}_z(\lambda_\ell(W)) \), then, since both polynomials have degree at most \( b \), they agree at at most \( b \) points in \( F \). From the prover’s perspective after he receives the verifier’s message, \( \mathbf{r} \) is uniformly distributed in \( \ell \setminus \{j\} \). Thus, \( \Pr[h(t) = Q] \leq b/(|F| - 1) \leq 1/3 \).

Now we consider this protocol’s costs. The verifier maintains the random point \( \mathbf{r} \in F^b \) and the running sum \( Q \in F \), using \( O(b \log |F|) \) space. He sends the prover \( \ell \), which is specified by two elements of \( F^b \), and receives a degree-\( b \) polynomial in \( F[W] \); both communications use at most \( O(b \log |F|) \) bits. Recalling that \( |F| \leq 6b + 2 \), we see that both space and communication costs are in \( O(b \log b) = O(\log n \log \log n) \).
It is possible for the prover to in fact perform each of these
soundness error bounded by $r$. Suppose this implicit description allows a streaming verifier to evaluate
the specific form of Eqs. (1) and (2) is not crucial either; all we used was that it allows
the univariate polynomial $\tilde{g}_z$ over a field $F$. Since $\tilde{g}_z$ has degree at most $b$, it suffices for the prover
to specify the evaluations of $\tilde{g}_z(\lambda(W))$ at $b + 1 = O(\log n)$ points. A direct application
of Eqs. (1) and (2) shows that each evaluation can be done in $O(n \log n)$ time, resulting
in a total runtime of $O(n \log^2 n)$. However, using now-standard memoization techniques
(see e.g. [36, Section 5.1]), it is possible for the prover to in fact perform each of these
evaluations in just $O(n)$ time, resulting in a total runtime of $O(n \log n)$. The verifier can
run in $O(b) = O(\log n)$ time per stream update, as each stream update $x_z$ only requires the
verifier to compute $\tilde{x}(r)$, and it follows from Eq. (2) that this can be done with $O(b)$ field
operations. When interacting with the prover, the verifier first needs to determine the line $\ell$
through $j$ and $r$, which he can do in $O(b) = O(\log n)$ time. To process the prover’s reply,
he must evaluate the polynomial $h$ at the points $t$ and $w$; these evaluations can be done in polylog $n$ time.

The above SIP protocol uses very little of the special structure of the INDEX problem. Let us abstract out its salient features, so as to handle the general problem described at the
start of this section. First, note the protocol treats the data set given by $(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ as an
implicit description of the polynomial $\tilde{g}_z$. Second, note that our soundness analysis did not
require multilinearity per se, only an upper bound on the total degree of $\tilde{g}_z$. Finally, note
that the specific form of Eqs. (1) and (2) is not crucial either; all we used was that it allows
the verifier an easy streaming computation. Thus, we obtain the following generic result.

\begin{algorithm}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Input:} Stream of data bits $(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ where $n = 2^b$, followed by index $j \in [n]$.
  \item \textbf{Goal:} Prover to convince Verifier to output the correct value of $x_j$.
  \item \textbf{Shared Agreement:} Finite field $\mathbb{F}$ with $3b + 1 \leq |\mathbb{F}| \leq 6b + 2$; bijective map $u \in [n] \leftrightarrow u \in \{0, 1\}^b$.
\end{itemize}

\textbf{Initialization:} Verifier picks $r \in_R \mathbb{F}^b$ uniformly at random, sets $Q \leftarrow 0$.
\textbf{Stream Processing:} Upon reading $x_z$, where $z \in [n]$, Verifier updates $Q \leftarrow Q + x_z \tilde{x}(r)$.
\textbf{Query Handling:} Upon reading the index $j$, Verifier interacts with Prover as follows:
\begin{enumerate}
  \item If $j = r$, Verifier outputs $Q$ as the answer. Otherwise, he sends Prover $\ell$, the unique line in $\mathbb{F}^b$ through $j$ and $r$.
  \item Prover sends Verifier a polynomial $h(W) \in \mathbb{F}[W]$ of degree at most $b$, claiming
    that it is the canonical restriction of the multilinear polynomial $\tilde{g}_z(Z_1, \ldots, Z_b)$ to
    the line $\ell$. That is, Prover claims that $h(W) \equiv \tilde{g}_z(\lambda(W))$.
  \item Let $w, t \in \mathbb{F}$ be such that $\lambda_t(w) = j$ and $\lambda_t(r) = r$. Verifier checks that $h(t) = Q$,
    aborting if not. If the check passes, Verifier outputs $h(w)$ as the answer.
\end{enumerate}
\end{algorithm}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2.png}
\caption{A Two-Round Streaming Interactive Proof (SIP) Protocol for the INDEX Problem}
\end{figure}

\begin{theorem}[Polynomial Evaluation Protocol] Suppose an input data stream implicitly
describes a $v$-variate polynomial $g$ of total degree $d$ over a field $\mathbb{F}$, followed by a point $j \in \mathbb{F}^v$.
Suppose this implicit description allows a streaming verifier to evaluate $g$ at a random
point $r \in_R \mathbb{F}^v$ using space $S$. Then the technique of the protocol in Figure 2 gives a two-
round SIP for computing $g(j)$, with the following properties: (1) perfect completeness; (2)
soundness error bounded by $d/(|\mathbb{F}| - 1)$; (3) space usage in $O(v \log |\mathbb{F}| + S)$; (4) help cost in
$O((d + v) \log |\mathbb{F}|)$. \end{theorem}

We shall refer to the abstract protocol given by Theorem 2.2 as the polynomial evaluation
protocol.
3 Constant-Round SIPs for Query Problems

We shall now apply the polynomial evaluation protocol to design SIPs proving the various upper bounds outlined in Section 1.1. The first application is immediate; later applications bring in additional ideas.

3.1 Point Queries.

In the PointQuery problem, the input is a stream in the turnstile model, updating an initially-zero vector \( x \in \mathbb{Z}^n \), followed by a query \( j \in [n] \). The goal is to output \( x_j \).

Theorem 3.1. Suppose the input to PointQuery is guaranteed to satisfy \( |x_i| \leq q \) at end of the data stream, for all entries of \( x \), where the bound \( q \) is known a priori. Then there is a two-round SIP for PointQuery with space and help costs in \( O(q \log(q + \log n)) \).

Proof. Assume WLOG that \( n = 2^b \) for an integer \( b \), and use a bijection \( u \in \mathbb{Z}^n \leftrightarrow u \in \{0,1\}^b \) as in Theorem 2.1. The vector \( x \) resulting from the updates defines a multilinear polynomial \( g_x(Z_1, \ldots, Z_b) \) by Eq. (1), where \( g_x(z) := x_z \). We can treat \( g_x \) as a polynomial over any field we like, but to solve our problem, we need to tell apart the \( 2q + 1 \) possible values taken on by the entries of \( x \) (recall that \( q \) is an upper bound on \( |x|_\infty \) at the end of the stream). For this it suffices to have char(\( F \)) \geq 2q + 1.

Applying the polynomial evaluation protocol is now straightforward. The verifier starts with \( r \in \mathbb{F}^b \) and \( Q = 0 \). Upon receiving an update indicating \( x_i \leftarrow x_i + c \), he updates \( Q \leftarrow Q + c \chi_i(r) \). The other details are as in Figure 2. The space and communication costs are both in \( O(b \log(\|F\|)) \) as before.

To ensure a soundness error of at most \( 1/3 \), we let \( |F| > 3b \) as before. This and the earlier condition on char(\( F \)) can both be satisfied by, e.g., taking \( \mathbb{F} = \mathbb{F}_p \), for a prime \( p > 3b + 2q \). This translates to cost bounds in \( O(q \log(q + \log n)) \), as claimed.

3.2 Nearest Neighbor Queries

Consider a “premetric” space \( (X, D) \) given by a finite ground set \( X \) and distance function \( D : X \times X \to \mathbb{R}^+ \) satisfying \( D(x, x) = 0 \) for all \( x \in X \). Let \( B_D(z, r) = \{ x \in X : D(x, z) \leq r \} \) denote the corresponding ball of radius \( r \) centered at \( z \in X \). In the NearestNeighbor problem, the input consists of a stream \( \langle x^{(1)}, \ldots, x^{(m)} \rangle \) of \( m \) points from \( X \), constituting the data set, followed by a query point \( z \in X \). The goal is to output \( x^* = \arg \min_{x^{(i)}} D(x^{(i)}, z) \), the nearest neighbor of \( z \) in the data set. We shall give highly efficient SIPs for this problem that handle rather general distance functions \( D \). To keep our statements of bounds simple, we shall impose the following structure on \( (X, D) \).

- We assume that \( X = [n]^d \). We think of \( d \) as the dimensionality of the data, and \( |n|^d \) as a very fine “grid” over the ambient space of possible points.
- For all \( x, y \in [n]^d \), \( D(x, y) \leq 1 \) is an integer multiple of a small parameter \( \varepsilon \geq 1/n^d \).

Overall, this amounts to assuming that our data set has polynomial spread: the ratio between the maximum and minimum distance. We proceed to give two SIPs for NearestNeighbor. Our basic SIP has cost roughly logarithmic in the stream length and the spread (and therefore

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This very general setting, which includes metric spaces as special cases, captures several important distance functions such as the Bregman divergences from information theory and machine learning that satisfy neither symmetry nor the triangle inequality.
linear in $d$ but only logarithmic in $n$). After we present it, we shall critique it and then give a more sophisticated SIP to handle its faults.

**Theorem 3.2.** Under the above assumptions on the premetric space $(X, D)$, the NearestNeighbor problem has a three-round SIP with cost $O(d \log n \log(m + \log(d \log n)))$.

**Proof.** Let $B = \{B_D(x, j) : x \in X, j \in \mathbb{Z}, 0 \leq j \leq 1/\varepsilon\}$ be the set of all balls of all radii between 0 and 1 (quantized at granularity $\varepsilon$). By our assumptions on the structure of $(X, D)$, we have $|B| \leq n^d/\varepsilon \leq n^{2d}$. The input stream $(x^{(1)}, \ldots, x^{(m)})$ defines a derived stream, consisting of updates to a vector $v$ indexed by the elements of $B$. We shall denote by $v[\beta]$ the entry of $v$ indexed by $\beta \in B$. The derived stream is defined as follows: the token $x^{(i)}$ increments $v[\beta]$ for every ball $\beta$ that contains $x^{(i)}$. The verifier runs the PointQuery protocol of Theorem 3.1 on this derived stream.

The verifier learns the query point $z$ at the end of the stream. The prover then supplies a point $y$ claimed to be a valid nearest neighbor (note that there may be more than one valid answer). To check this claim, it is sufficient for the verifier to check two properties:

1. that $y$ did appear in the stream, and
2. that the stream contained no point closer to $z$ than $y$. The first property holds iff $v[B_D(y, 0)] \neq 0$. The second property holds iff $v[B_D(z, D(y, z) - \varepsilon)] = 0$. Clearly, these two properties can be checked by two point queries over the derived stream.

Following the protocol of Theorem 3.1, the two point queries (executed in parallel) involve two more rounds between the verifier and the prover, for an overall three-round SIP. Since the entries of $v$ never exceed $m$, each PointQuery protocol requires space and help costs $O(d \log n \log(m + \log(d \log n)))$. $

While the protocol of Theorem 3.2 achieves very small space and help costs, the prover’s and verifier’s runtimes could be as high as $O(n^d)$, because processing a single stream token $x^{(i)}$ may require both parties to enumerate all balls containing $x^{(i)}$. Ultimately, this inefficiency is because the protocol assumes hardly anything about the nature of the distance function $D$ and, as a result, does not get to exploit any structural information about the balls in $B$.

To rectify this, we shall make the entirely reasonable assumption that the distance function $D$ is “efficiently computable” in the rather mild sense that membership in a ball generated by $D$ can be decided by a short (say, polynomial-length) formula. Accordingly, we shall express our bounds in terms of a parameter that captures this notion of efficient computation.

**Definition 3.3.** Suppose the distance function $D$ on $X$ satisfies the assumptions for Theorem 3.2. Let $\Phi_D : B \times X \to \{0, 1\}$ be the ball membership function for $D$, i.e., $\Phi_D(B_D(z, r), x) = 1 \iff x \in B_D(z, r)$. Think of $\Phi_D$ as a Boolean function of $(3d \log n)$-bit inputs. We define the formula size complexity of $D$, denoted $\text{fsize}(D)$, to be the length of the shortest de Morgan formula for $\Phi_D$.

Since addition and multiplication of $b$-bit integers can both be computed by Boolean circuits in depth $\log b$ (see, e.g., [31, 37]), they can be computed by Boolean formulae of size poly$(b)$. It follows that for many natural distance functions $D$, including the Euclidean, Hamming, $\ell_1$, and $\ell_\infty$ metrics (and in fact $\ell_p$ for all suitably “small” positive $p$), we have $\text{fsize}(D) = \text{poly}(d, \log n)$.

**Theorem 3.4.** Suppose the premetric space $(X, D)$ satisfies the assumptions made for Theorem 3.2. Then NearestNeighbor on $(X, D)$ has a three-round SIP, whose space and help costs are both at most $O(\text{fsize}(D) \log(m + \text{fsize}(D)))$, in which the verifier processes each
stream update in time $O(f\text{size}(D))$, and the prover runs in total time $m \cdot \text{poly}(f\text{size}(D))$. In particular, if $f\text{size}(D) = \text{poly}(d, \log n)$, as is the case for many natural distance functions $D$, then the space and help costs are both $\text{poly}(d, \log m, \log n)$, the verifier runs in time $\text{poly}(d, \log n)$ per stream update, and the prover runs in total time $m \cdot \text{poly}(d, \log n)$.

We defer a proof of Theorem 3.4 to the full version of the paper, but the high level idea that allows us to avoid the high runtimes of the previous protocol is as follows. Essentially, the SIP of Theorem 3.2 ran our polynomial evaluation protocol on a multilinear extension of the vector $v$ defined by the derived stream. That SIP took $v$ to be a completely arbitrary table of values. As a result, the verifier’s computation – evaluating the multilinear extension at a random point – became costly. The honest prover incurred similar costs. A closer examination of the nature of $v$ reveals that if $D$ is a “reasonable” distance function, then $v$ itself has plenty of structure. In particular, an appropriate higher degree extension of $v$ can in fact be evaluated much more efficiently (by both the verifier and the prover) than the above multilinear extension.

### 3.3 Range Counting Queries

Let $U$ be any data universe and $R \subseteq 2^U$ a set of ranges. In the RANGECOUNT problem, the data stream $\sigma = (x^{(1)}, \ldots, x^{(m)}, R^*)$ specifies a sequence of universe elements $x^{(i)} \in U$, followed by a query or target range $R^* \in R$. The goal is to output $|\{i : x^{(i)} \in R^*\}|$, i.e., the number of elements in the target range that appeared in the stream.

We easily obtain a two-round streaming interactive proof for the RANGECOUNT problem with cost bounded by $O(\log |R| \log(|R|m))$. The verifier simply runs a POINTQUERY on the derived stream $\sigma'$ defined to have data universe $R$. $\sigma'$ is obtained from $\sigma$ as follows: on each stream update $x^{(i)} \in U$, the verifier inserts into $\sigma'$ one copy of each range $R \in R$ such that $x^{(i)} \in R$. The range count problem is equivalent to a POINTQUERY on $\sigma'$, with the target item being $R^*$, and we obtain the following theorem.

**Theorem 3.5.** There is a two-round SIP with $O(|R| \log(|R|m))$ cost for RANGECOUNT.

In particular, for spaces of bounded shatter dimension $\rho$, $\log |R| = \rho \log m = O(\log m)$. The above protocol also implies a three-round SIP for the problem of linear classification, a core problem in machine learning. Just like the protocol for NEARESTNEIGHBOR invokes a two-round protocol for INDEX, an SIP for linear classification (find a hyperplane that separates red and blue points) verifies that the proposed hyperplane is empty of red points on one side and blue points on the other using the above two-round RANGECOUNT protocol.

The prover and verifier in the protocol of Theorem 3.5 may require time $\Omega(|R|)$ per stream update. This could be prohibitively large. However, we can obtain savings analogous to Theorem 3.4 if we make a mild “efficient computability” assumption on our ranges. Specifically, suppose there exists a $(\text{poly}(S))$-time uniform de Morgan formula $\Phi$ of length $S$ that takes as input a binary string representing a point $x^{(i)} \in U$, as well as the label of a range $R \in R$ and outputs a bit that is 1 if and only if $x^{(i)} \in R$. We then obtain the following more practical SIP.

**Theorem 3.6.** Suppose membership in ranges from $R$ can be decided by de Morgan formulas of length $S$ as above. Then there is a two-round SIP for RANGECOUNT on $R$, with costs at most $O(S \log(m + S))$, in which the verifier runs in time $O(S)$ per stream update, and the prover runs in total time $m \cdot \text{poly}(S)$.
3.4 Median and Selection Queries

We give a three-round SIP for selection, of which median is a special case. In the selection problem, defined over data universe $\mathcal{U} = [n]$, the data stream $\sigma = (x^{(1)}, \ldots, x^{(m)}, \rho)$ is a sequence of elements from $[n]$, followed by a desired rank $\rho \in [m]$. For $i \in [n]$, let $f_i := \{j : x^{(j)} = i\}$ denote the number of times element $i$ appears in the stream. Given a desired rank $\rho \in [m]$, the goal is to output an element $j \in [n]$ such that

$$\sum_{k<j} f_k < \rho \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{k>j} f_k \leq m - \rho.$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

MEDIAN is the special case of selection when $\rho = \lfloor m/2 \rfloor$.

Our three-round SIPS for selection essentially work by reducing to the RANGECOUNT problem, but an extra round is required for the prover to send the desired element $j$ to the verifier.

\textbf{Theorem 3.7.} There is a three-round SIP for selection with cost at most $O(\log n \log(m + \log n))$ in which the verifier runs in time $\text{poly}(\log n, \log m)$ per update, and the prover runs in total time $m \cdot \text{poly}(\log n, \log m)$.

The proof of Theorem 3.7 is deferred to the full version of the paper.

3.5 Pattern Matching Queries

In the pattern matching with wildcards problem, denoted PMW, we are given a stream $\sigma$ representing text $T = (t_1, \ldots, t_m) \in \{0, 1, *\}^m$ followed by a pattern $P = (p_1, \ldots, p_q) \in \{0, 1, *\}^q$. The wildcard symbol $*$ is interpreted as “don’t care”, and the pattern $P$ is said to occur at location $i$ in $T$ if, for every position $j$ in $P$, either $p_j = t_{i+j}$ or at least one of $p_j$ and $t_{i+j}$ is the wildcard symbol. The PMW problem is to determine the number of locations at which $P$ occurred in $T$. PATTERNMATCHING refers to the special case where “don’t care” symbols are not permitted. We focus on a binary alphabet; a larger alphabet $\mathcal{U}$ can be handled by replacing each character in $\mathcal{U}$ with its binary representation, growing the parameter $q$ by a factor of $\log |\mathcal{U}|$.

Pattern matching, both with and without wildcards, has been extensively studied within the algorithmic literature, with applications ranging from internet search to computational genetics (see e.g. [11, 20] and the references therein). Verifiable protocols for pattern matching enable searching in the cloud, and complements work on searching in encrypted data within the cloud (e.g. [7]). Cormode et al. [13] described and implemented an SIP for PMW that required roughly $\Theta(\log^2 m)$ rounds and had space help costs bounded by $\tilde{\Theta}(\log^2 m)$; Concretely, their implementation required well over 1,000 rounds, even for quite small streams (of length $2^{17}$). In stark contrast, our new protocol requires the optimal number of rounds: two.

\textbf{Theorem 3.8.} There is a 2-round SIP for PMW with space and help costs at most $O(q \log(q + m))$, in which the verifier runs in time $O(q)$ per stream update, and the prover runs in total time $m \cdot \text{poly}(q)$.

The proof of Theorem 3.8 is deferred to the full version of the paper. We remark that the PMW protocol of Theorem 3.8 can be run even if the verifier only knows an upper bound on the length $q$ of the pattern. This is because, for any $q' \leq q$, a pattern $P' \in \{0, 1, *\}^{q'}$ is equivalent to the pattern $P \in \{0, 1, *\}^q$ obtained from $P'$ by concatenating $q - q'$ wildcard symbols to $P'$.
4 Communication Protocols and Complexity Classes

We now turn to the study of communication complexity classes motivated by a desire to understand streaming interactive proofs (SIPs) from a complexity-theoretic viewpoint. In this section, we lay out the necessary definitions and terminology to rigorously discuss the notions outlined in Section 1.3. In the next section we prove the many parts of Result 1.5.

4.1 Definitions

Communication problems arise naturally out of data stream problems if we suppose Alice holds a prefix of the input stream, and Bob the remaining suffix. The primary goal of such reductions is to obtain space lower bounds on data stream algorithms, so we are free to split the stream at any place we like. For example, most data stream problems in Section 3 are query problems, where the input consists of a streamed data set, $S$, followed by a query, $q$, to apply to $S$. In this case, it would be natural to split the input by giving $S$ to Alice and $q$ to Bob. Communication problems that will play an important role in this paper include the index problem $\text{INDEX}: \{0,1\}^n \times [n] \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ where $[n] := \{1, \ldots, n\}$ and $\text{INDEX}(x,j) = x_j$, the set-intersection and set-disjointness problems $\text{INTER}, \text{DISJ}: \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ where $\text{INTER}(x,y) = \neg \text{DISJ}(x,y) = \bigvee_{i=1}^n (x_i \land y_i)$, and the median relation $\text{MED}: [n]^m \times [n]^m \rightarrow [n]$, where inputs $x,y \in [n]^m \times [n]^m$ are interpreted as two halves of a list of numbers, and the valid output(s) corresponds to the median(s) of the combined list.

4.1.1 Communication Complexity Classes

All our communication models provide random coins and allow two-sided error probability up to a constant; when unspecified, this constant defaults to $1/3$. Given a communication model $C$, we denote the corresponding complexity measure of a problem $f$ by $C(f)$. Following Babai et al. [5], we also denote by $C$ the corresponding complexity class, defined as the set of all functions $f : \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ such that $C(f) = (\log n)^{O(1)}$, i.e., functions that are “easy” in the model $C$.

We let $R^{[k,A]}$ denote the model of randomized communication complexity where Alice and Bob exchange $k \geq 1$ messages in total with Alice sending the first; $R^{[k,B]}$ is similar, except that Bob starts. In the $\text{MA}$ model, the super-player Merlin, who sees all of the input, broadcasts a message at the start, following which Alice and Bob run a (two-way, arbitrary-round) randomized “verification” protocol. The $\text{MA}^{[k,A]}$ and $\text{MA}^{[k,B]}$ models are restrictions of $\text{MA}$ where Merlin speaks only to Bob \footnote{Our definition breaks symmetry between Alice and Bob because our eventual goal is to study online protocols.} and the verification protocol following Merlin’s single message is restricted to lie in $R^{[k,A]}$ and $R^{[k,B]}$ respectively.

The $\text{MA}$ model (indeed, its restriction $\text{MA}^{[1,A]}$) allows us to simulate 1-round SIPs in an obvious way: Merlin sends Bob the prover’s message, and Alice sends Bob the verifier’s memory contents after it has processed her prefix of the stream. Notice that the order of the two messages is not important, modulo one crucial consideration: Alice must have a private channel to Bob and the random coins used to generate the message from Alice to Bob must be hidden coins, invisible to Merlin but shared between Alice and Bob (which is why we called them “hidden coins” rather than “private coins”).

The models $\text{OMA}^{[k]}$, $\text{OIP}^{[k]}$, and $\text{OIP}^{[k]}_+$, for $k \geq 1$, are obtained by extending $\text{MA}^{[1,A]}$ to simulate $k$-round SIP protocols. These communication models work as follows. In each
case, Alice and Bob first toss some hidden coins. Then, upon receiving the input, two things happen: (1) Merlin and Bob interact for \( k \) rounds, with Merlin sending the last message in the interaction, and (2) Alice sends Bob a message, randomized using the hidden coins. After these actions are completed, Bob produces an output in \( \{0, 1\} \). The differences between the three series of models are as follows.

- In OMA\(^k\), (1) happens before (2) and Bob must interact with Merlin before looking at his input. This is directly analogous to AM\(^k\); see the discussion in Section 1.2.
- In OIP\(^k\), (1) happens before (2) and Bob may look at his input before talking to Merlin.
- Finally, OIP\(^k\)+ is like OIP\(^k\) except that (2) happens before (1). Thus, Bob’s messages may depend on Alice’s actual message to Bob, not just on Bob’s input and the hidden coins.

In the AM model, the parties first choose a public random string, then Merlin broadcasts a message to Alice and Bob, who then run a deterministic communication protocol to arrive at a Boolean output. Since Merlin can in fact predict the exact transcript that Alice and Bob will generate following his message, we can assume without loss of generality that after Merlin’s message, Alice and Bob output one bit each indicating whether or not they accept Merlin’s prediction.

4.1.2 Cost and Value of Protocols

Let \( \mathcal{P} \) be a protocol in a model \( \mathcal{C} \) involving Merlin. For each input \( (x, y) \), \( \mathcal{P} \) defines a game between Merlin and Arthur (recall that Alice and Bob together constitute Arthur), wherein Merlin’s goal is to make Arthur output 1. We define the value \( V^\mathcal{P}(x, y) \) to be Merlin’s probability of winning this game with optimal play. Given a Boolean function \( f \), we say that \( \mathcal{P} \) computes \( f \) with soundness error \( \varepsilon_s \) and completeness error \( \varepsilon_c \) if, for all \( x, y \) we have

\[
    f(x, y) = 0 \Rightarrow V^\mathcal{P}(x, y) \leq \varepsilon_s, \quad \text{and} \quad f(x, y) = 1 \Rightarrow V^\mathcal{P}(x, y) \geq 1 - \varepsilon_c.
\]

When the above holds with \( \varepsilon_c = 0 \), we say that \( \mathcal{P} \) computes \( f \) with perfect completeness.

The verification cost of \( \mathcal{P} \), denoted \( vc(\mathcal{P}) \), is the (worst-case) number of bits sent by Alice plus the number of hidden coin tosses; its help cost \( hc(\mathcal{P}) \) is the number of bits communicated between Merlin and Bob; its communication cost \( cc(\mathcal{P}) = hc(\mathcal{P}) + vc(\mathcal{P}) \). For a problem \( f \), we define its complexity \( C(f) = \min \{ cc(\mathcal{Q}) : \mathcal{Q} \text{ is a } \mathcal{C} \text{ protocol that solves } f \} \) with \( \max \{ \varepsilon_s, \varepsilon_c \} \leq 1/3 \).

4.2 Relations Among Communication Complexity Classes

We prove a number of inclusion and separation results among our “new” communication complexity classes and relate them to previously studied classes. These are summarized in Figure 1, replicated below.

Our results shed light on the landscape of online communication complexity in general.

The simplest online communication model is \( R\^{1,A} \), a.k.a. one-way randomized communication. The result \( OIP\^{[1]} = OIP\^{[1]}+ = R\^{1,A} \) establishes that in the world of online communication, introducing the omniscient but untrusted Merlin into the model is not enough to obtain super-polynomial efficiency improvements, if interaction with Merlin is not permitted. The stronger result that \( OMA\^[k] = R\^[1,A] \) for all constants \( k > 0 \) (this is the full statement of Theorem 5.20) establishes that in the “public coin” setting, the addition of Merlin is not enough to obtain super-polynomial speedups even if interaction with Merlin is permitted.
The result that \( \text{OIP}[^2] = \text{R}[^2,B] \) (see Corollary 5.7) establishes that in the “hidden coin” setting, the addition of Merlin to the communication model can yield super-polynomial efficiency improvements, even if only the barest amount of interaction with Merlin is permitted. However, note that \( \text{R}[^2,B] \) is the simplest non-online communication model. Thus the combination of hidden coins and a minimal amount of interaction is enough to simulate only the simplest of the non-online communication protocols.

The result that \( \text{OIP}[^4] = \text{OIP}[^4]_+ = \text{AM} \) (see Corollary 5.14) shows that in the “hidden coin” setting, the addition of Merlin to the communication model permits the simulation even of non-online interactive proofs, as soon as four rounds of interaction with Merlin are permitted.

This in turn explains the somewhat puzzling result that the \( \text{OIP} \) and \( \text{OIP}_+ \) hierarchies collapse to the fourth level: both Goldwasser–Sipser [16] and Babai–Moran [6] break down in the \( \text{OIP} \) and \( \text{OIP}_+ \) worlds because their transformations do not preserve online-ness: they will turn an \( \text{OIP}[^2] \) protocol into a “public coin” one, but require Merlin to send a message to Alice. However, as soon as four rounds of interaction with Merlin are permitted, even online interactive proofs can simulate non-online ones. At this point, the phenomena of classical interactive proofs kick in, and the hierarchies collapse.

5 A Communication Complexity Zoo

We now study our central communication models \( \text{OIP}[^k] \) and \( \text{OIP}_+[^k] \), and prove the web of relationships given in Figure 3. Our results are of two types: (1) establishing separations or collapses between levels of the \( \text{OIP} \) and \( \text{OIP}_+ \) hierarchies, as the case may be, and (2) relating these hierarchies to other previously studied communication complexity classes. We shall first characterize every finite level of the \( \text{OIP} \) hierarchy (the vertical bidirectional arrows in Figure 3). Next, in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, we separate the first four levels of the hierarchy (the horizontal double-headed arrows in the figure). Finally, in Section 5.5, we separate the \( \text{OIP} \) and OMA hierarchies.

Throughout Section 5, \( f \) will denote an arbitrary communication problem given by a Boolean function \( f : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y} \to \{0, 1\} \), and \( n \) will parametrize its “instance size” up to a constant factor, i.e., we will have \( \log |\mathcal{X}| + \log |\mathcal{Y}| = \Theta(n) \). We shall use big-\( O \) and big-\( \Omega \) notation to hide constants independent of \( f \), \( |\mathcal{X}| \) and \( |\mathcal{Y}| \). We shall use the term “ordinary protocol” to mean a randomized communication protocol involving Alice and Bob alone (and no Merlin).
The first level of the hierarchy is easy to characterize.

\textbf{Theorem 5.1.} We have $\text{OMA}^{[1]} = \text{OIP}^{[1]} = \text{OIP}^{[1]}_+ = \text{MA}^{[1,A]} = R^{[1,A]}$.

\textbf{Proof.} The definitions immediately show that the first four classes are identical (syntactically) and include $R^{[1,A]}$, because one can always choose to ignore Merlin. The reverse inclusion $\text{MA}^{[1,A]} \subseteq R^{[1,A]}$ follows from previous work: Chakrabarti et al. [9] show that for all $f$ we have $R^{[1,A]}(f) = O\left(\text{MA}^{[1,A]}(f)^2\right)$. \hfill \blacktriangleup

\section{A Characterization of OIP$^{[2]}$}

The main goal of this subsection is to prove that $\text{OIP}^{[2]} = R^{[2,B]}$. We start with the following communication analog of Theorem 2.2, which was proven in a streaming setting.

\textbf{Lemma 5.2 (Polynomial Evaluation Protocol, Communication Version).} Suppose Alice holds a $v$-variate polynomial $g$ of total degree $d$ over a field $\mathbb{F}$, and Bob holds a point $j \in \mathbb{F}^v$. Assume $|\mathbb{F}| > 4d$. Then there is an $\text{OIP}^{[2]}$ protocol with communication cost $O((v + d) \cdot \log |\mathbb{F}|)$ for evaluating $g(j)$. In particular, $\text{OIP}^{[2]}(\text{INDEX}) = O(\log n \log \log n)$, so that INDEX is in $\text{OIP}^{[2]}$.

\textbf{Proof.} Using the notation established in the description of the polynomial agreement protocol of Section 2.1, we simply note that the hidden coins shared between Alice and Bob determine $r$. Bob can send Merlin (the canonical representation of) the line $\ell$ that passes through $j$ and $r$ without having to hear from Alice, since $\ell$ is determined entirely by $r$ and Bob’s input $j$. Merlin can send Bob the polynomial $h(W)$ claimed to equal $g$ restricted to the line $\ell$, and Alice can send Bob $g(r)$ within the stated cost bounds. Bob performs the same check as the verifier in Theorem 2.2, and the completeness and soundness analysis is unchanged. \hfill \blacktriangleup

The just-proved fact that $\text{INDEX} \in \text{OIP}^{[2]}$ is striking: combined with the well-known lower bound $R^{[1,A]}(\text{INDEX}) = \Omega(n)$, it shows that introducing Merlin into the picture while keeping the one-way restriction on the Alice/Bob communication lowers cost exponentially. It is now natural to ask whether $\text{OIP}^{[2]}$ allows such exponential savings for harder problems, such as $\text{DISJ}$. Our next result – a lower bound on $\text{OIP}^{[2]}$ complexity – implies that it does not.

\textbf{Theorem 5.3.} Let $\mathcal{P}$ be an $\text{OIP}^{[2]}$ protocol computing $f$. Then $\text{hc}(\mathcal{P}) \text{ VC}(\mathcal{P}) = \Omega(R^{[2,B]}(f))$. In particular, $\text{OIP}^{[2]}(f) = \Omega(R^{[2,B]}(f)^{1/2})$, which implies $\text{OIP}^{[2]} \subseteq R^{[2,B]}$.

\textbf{Proof.} After appropriate parallel repetition, we may assume that the soundness and completeness errors of $\mathcal{P}$ at most 1/12 each. In general, $\mathcal{P}$ takes the following shape: (1) hidden coins are tossed, generating random string $r$ according to distribution $\mathcal{D}$; (2) Bob sends Merlin a message $m_B = m_B(y, r)$; (3) Merlin responds with a message $m_M = m_M(x, y, m_B)$; (4) Alice sends Bob a message $m_A = m_A(x, r)$; (5) Bob outputs a bit given by a function $\text{out}^P(y, m_M, m_A)$.

Let $\mathcal{D}_m$ be $\mathcal{D}$ conditioned on the event \{m_B(y, r) = m\}. Note that the distribution $\mathcal{D}_m$ depends on both $y$ and $m$. Since Bob knows $y$, Bob can determine the distribution $\mathcal{D}_m$ for any value of $m$ (this is not, however, true for Alice, because Alice does not know $y$).

With this notational setup, we now describe (in Figure 4) a two-message ordinary protocol $\mathcal{Q}$ that we claim computes $f$.

To analyze this protocol, let us first define the weight $W_{x,y}(\overline{m})$ of a Bob-message $\overline{m}$ to be the probability that Merlin, playing optimally after receiving $\overline{m}$, convinces Bob to output 1. That is,

\begin{equation}
W_{x,y}(\overline{m}) = \max_{m_M} \Pr_{r \sim \mathcal{D}_m} \left[ \text{out}^P(y, m_M, m_A(x, r)) = 1 \right].
\end{equation}
1. Bob samples \( r \sim \mathcal{D} \), computes \( m_B(y, r) \), then sends Alice i.i.d. samples \( r^{(1)}, \ldots, r^{(h)} \sim \mathcal{D} \), where \( h = 36(\text{hc}(\mathcal{P}) + 4) \).
2. Alice sends Bob \( m_A(x, r^{(1)}), \ldots, m_A(x, r^{(h)}) \).
3. Bob outputs 1 iff \( \exists m_M : |\{i \in [h] : \text{out}^P(y, m_M, m_A(x, r^{(i)})) = 1\}| > h/2 \).

**Figure 4** The \( \mathsf{R}^{2[B]} \) protocol \( \mathcal{Q} \), which simulates the \( \mathsf{OIP}^{[2]} \) protocol \( \mathcal{P} \).

Then, with \( \mathbf{m} \sim m_B(y, \mathcal{D}) \), the expected weight \( \mathbf{E}_{\mathbf{m}}[W_{x,y}(\mathbf{m})] \) is at least 11/12 when \( f(x, y) = 1 \) and at most 1/12 when \( f(x, y) = 0 \).

**Correctness on 1-inputs:** Fix \( (x, y) \in f^{-1}(1) \). We shall proceed assuming that the specific Bob-message \( \mathbf{m} \) chosen in Step 1 of \( \mathcal{Q} \) satisfies \( W_{x,y}(\mathbf{m}) > 2/3 = 1 - 4(1/12) \); by Markov’s inequality, this fails to happen with probability at most 1/4. Studying Eq. (5) tell us that there exists a specific Merlin-message \( m_M^* \) such that \( \Pr[\text{out}^P(y, m_M^*, m_A(x, r)) = 1] > 2/3 \). Therefore, according to the strategy in Steps 2 and 3, the size of the set \( \{i \in [h] : \text{out}^P(y, m_M^*, m_A(x, r^{(i)})) = 1\} \) is a sum of \( h \) i.i.d. indicators and exceeds \( 2h/3 \) in expectation. By standard Chernoff bounds (e.g., [28, Theorem 4.4]), the probability that Bob outputs 0 is \( 2^{-\Omega(h)} \). Thus, overall, the probability that \( \mathcal{Q} \) outputs 0 on input \( (x, y) \) is at most \( 1/4 + 2^{-\Omega(h)} < 1/3 \).

**Correctness on 0-inputs:** Fix \( (x, y) \in f^{-1}(0) \). We shall proceed assuming that the specific Bob-message \( \mathbf{m} \) chosen in Step 1 of \( \mathcal{Q} \) satisfies \( W_{x,y}(\mathbf{m}) < 1/3 \); by Markov’s inequality, this fails to happen with probability at most 1/4. For each specific Merlin-message \( m_M \), define

\[
\text{size}(m_M) = \left| \{i \in [h] : \text{out}^P(y, m_M, m_A(x, r^{(i)})) = 1\} \right|.
\]

Then \( \text{size}(m_M) \) is a sum of \( h \) i.i.d. indicators and has expectation below \( h/3 \). By standard Chernoff bounds, \( \Pr[\text{size}(m_M) > h/2] \leq e^{-h/36} \). By a union bound over all possible Merlin-messages \( m_M \), the probability that Bob outputs 1 is at most \( 2^h \text{hc}(\mathcal{P}) e^{-h/36} < 2^{-4} \), using our choice of \( h \). Adding in the 1/4 from our Markov argument earlier, the overall probability that \( \mathcal{Q} \) outputs 1 on input \( (x, y) \) is at most \( 1/4 + 2^{-4} < 1/3 \).

**Communication Cost:** By definition of the \( \mathsf{OIP}^{[2]} \) model, we have \( |r| \leq \text{vc}(\mathcal{P}) \) and \( |m_A| \leq \text{vc}(\mathcal{P}) \). Thus, each of the two messages in \( \mathcal{Q} \) costs at most \( h \cdot \text{vc}(\mathcal{P}) = O(\text{hc}(\mathcal{P}) \text{vc}(\mathcal{P})) \) bits.

The above proof exploits a key property of \( \mathsf{OIP}^{[2]} \) protocols: Bob can sample from the conditional distribution \( \mathcal{D}_{\mathbf{m}} \). This is possible because \( m_B = m_B(y, r) \) is independent of Alice’s message \( m_A \), a property not satisfied in the stronger \( \mathsf{OIP}^{[2]}_+ \) model. This explains why Theorem 5.3 does not apply to \( \mathsf{OIP}^{[2]}_+ \), and indeed we shall later give an exponential separation between \( \mathsf{OIP}^{[2]}_+ \) and \( \mathsf{OIP}^{[2]}_+ \) in Corollary 5.19.

Theorem 5.3 implies a number of lower bounds for specific problems. We begin with \( \text{DISJ} \).

**Corollary 5.4.** We have \( \Omega(n^{1/2}) \leq \mathsf{OIP}^{[2]}_+(\text{DISJ}) \leq O(n^{1/2} \log n) \). In particular, \( \text{DISJ} \notin \mathsf{OIP}^{[2]}_+ \).

**Proof.** For the lower bound, we combine Theorem 5.3 with the fact that \( R^{[2,B]}(\text{DISJ}) \geq R(\text{DISJ}) = \Omega(n) \), the last step being a celebrated lower bound [21]. The upper bound follows from the Aaronson–Wigderson protocol [2] for \( \text{DISJ} \), which is in fact an \( \mathsf{MA}^{[1,A]} \) protocol.
We remark that we may replace \textsc{disj} in Corollary 5.4 with $\textsc{ip2}$, the “inner product mod 2” function. Indeed, the Aaronson–Wigderson protocol also applies to $\textsc{ip2}$, and $R(\textsc{ip2}) = \Omega(n)$.

Recall that $\text{med}$ is a relation on inputs in $[n]^m \times [n]^m$. Corollary 5.5 below establishes a lower bound of $\Omega(m^{1/4})$ on the cost of any $\text{OIP}^{[2]}$ protocol for $\text{med}$ (the proof is deferred to the full version of the paper). This justifies our use of three rounds in the polylogarithmic cost $\text{SIP}$ for median we gave in Theorem 3.7, as it implies that any 2-round $\text{SIP}$ for median based on known techniques must have polynomial cost.

\textbf{Corollary 5.5.} We have $\Omega(m^{1/4}) \leq \text{OIP}^{[2]}(\text{med}) \leq O(m^{1/2} \log^{3/2} n)$.

We have now seen that up to polynomial (specifically, quadratic) blowup, $\text{OIP}^{[2]}$ is no more powerful than ordinary $R^{[2,B]}$. We now show that up to another quadratic blowup this is in fact a characterization.

\textbf{Theorem 5.6.} For all $f$, we have $\text{OIP}^{[2]}(f) = O\left(R^{[2,B]}(f)^2\right)$. In particular, $\text{OIP}^{[2]} \supseteq R^{[2,B]}$.

\textbf{Proof.} Let $Q$ be an $R^{[2,B]}$ protocol for $f$ with cost $C$ and error at most $1/6$. Assume WLOG that $C \geq 5$ and that each of the two messages in $Q$ is a string in $\{0,1\}^C$. We shall treat Alice’s messages as elements of the field $F = \mathbb{F}_{2^C}$ via an agreed-upon bijection.

We design an $\text{OIP}^{[2]}$ protocol $P$ for $f$, based on $Q$. Given an input $(x,y)$, $P$ begins by choosing a (hidden) random string $r$ shared between Alice and Bob exactly as $Q$ would have. From now on, think of $x,y,r$ as fixed. This then fixes a message $m_B$ that Bob would have sent Alice in $Q$, as well as a function $m_A : \{0,1\}^C \to F$ specifying Alice’s response to each Bob-message. Let $\tilde{m}_A(Z_1, \ldots, Z_C) \in F[Z_1, \ldots, Z_C]$ be the multilinear extension of this function $m_A$. In $P$, Alice needs to send a message to Bob that allows him to determine $m_A(m_B) = \tilde{m}_A(m_B)$ with Merlin’s help. This is an instance of polynomial evaluation, so we solve it by applying the $\text{OIP}^{[2]}$ polynomial evaluation protocol (PEP) from Lemma 5.2.

The polynomial $\tilde{m}_A$ is $C$-variate and has total degree $C$. Therefore, PEP has communication cost $O(C \log |F|) = O(C^2)$, as does $P$. Next, PEP has perfect completeness, so an honest Merlin can cause $P$ to output 1 whenever the choice of $r$ would have caused $Q$ to output 1. Finally, PEP has soundness error at most $C/(|F|-1) = C/(2^C - 1) < 1/6$, so a dishonest Merlin can cause $P$ to differ in output from $Q$ with probability at most $1/6$. Using the error bound of $1/6$ on $Q$, we conclude that $P$ has completeness error at most $1/6$ and soundness error at most $1/6 + 1/6 = 1/3$.

\textbf{Corollary 5.7.} For all $f$, we have $\Omega\left(R^{[2,B]}(f)^{1/2}\right) \leq \text{OIP}^{[2]}(f) \leq O\left(R^{[2,B]}(f)^2\right)$. Thus, $\text{OIP}^{[2]} = R^{[2,B]}$.

\textbf{Proof.} Combine Theorems 5.3 and 5.6.

\textbf{5.2 A Characterization of $\text{OIP}^{[3]}$.}

The main goal of this subsection is to prove that $\text{OIP}^{[3]} = \text{MA}^{[2,B]}$. Theorem 5.8 below gives a lower bound that builds on the argument in Theorem 5.3 (the proof is deferred to the full version of the paper). Just as before, we can then derive a lower bound for the specific problem \textsc{disj}.

\textbf{Theorem 5.8.} Let $P$ be an $\text{OIP}^{[3]}$ protocol computing $f$. Then there is an $\text{MA}^{[2,B]}$ protocol $Q$ computing $f$ with $\text{hc}(Q) \leq \text{hc}(P)$ and $\text{vc}(Q) = O(\text{hc}(P) \text{vc}(P))$. In particular, $\text{OIP}^{[3]}(f) = \Omega\left(\text{MA}^{[2,B]}(f)^{1/2}\right)$, which implies $\text{OIP}^{[3]} \subseteq \text{MA}^{[2,B]}$. 

\textbf{Proof.}
Corollary 5.9. We have $\Omega(n^{1/3}) \leq \text{OIP}^{[3]}(\text{disj}) \leq O(n^{1/3} \log n)$. In particular, $\text{disj} \notin \text{OIP}^{[3]}$.

Proof. Klauck [22] proved that $\text{MA}(\text{disj}) = \Omega(n^{1/2})$. Applying Theorem 5.8 to this result gives the non-tight bound $\text{OIP}^{[3]}(\text{disj}) = \Omega(n^{1/4})$. But we observe that Klauck’s proof shows something stronger: namely, if an $\text{MA}$ protocol $Q$ computes $\text{disj}$, then $\text{hc}(Q) \text{vc}(Q) = \Omega(n)$. Combining Theorem 5.8 with this result, we conclude that if an $\text{OIP}^{[3]}$ protocol $P$ computes $\text{disj}$, then $\text{hc}(P)^2 \text{vc}(P) = \Omega(n)$, and therefore $\text{hc}(P) + \text{vc}(P) = \Omega(n^{1/3})$.

For the upper bound, we note that Aaronson and Wigderson [2] also gave an online $\text{MAMA}$ protocol for $\text{disj}$ of cost $O(n^{1/3} \log n)$. Every online $\text{MAMA}$ protocol admits a simulation in $\text{OIP}^{[3]}$.

As with Corollary 5.4, we may replace $\text{disj}$ in the above result with $\text{ip}$. Indeed, Klauck’s result [22] implies that $\text{MA}(\text{ip}) = \Omega(n^{1/2})$, and Aaronson and Wigderson’s $\text{MAMA}$ protocol also applies to $\text{ip}$.

As we did for the second level in the $\text{OIP}$ hierarchy, we give an upper bound that applies to the third level and gives a characterization that is tight up to a quadratic blowup.

Theorem 5.10. For all $f$, we have $\text{OIP}^{[3]}(f) = O\left(\text{MA}^{[2,B]}(f)^2\right)$. In particular, $\text{OIP}^{[3]} \supseteq \text{MA}^{[2,B]}$.

Proof sketch. We build on the argument in Theorem 5.6 exactly as the proof of Theorem 5.8 builds on Theorem 5.3. Given an $\text{MA}^{[2,B]}$ protocol $Q$ of cost $C$, the verification strategy used by Alice and Bob in $Q$ is an $\text{R}^{[2,B]}$ protocol of cost $C$, which we can replace with an $\text{OIP}^{[2]}$ protocol of cost $O(C^2)$, by Theorem 5.6. After this replacement we have an $\text{OIP}^{[3]}$ protocol. The remaining analysis is routine.

Corollary 5.11. For all $f$, $\Omega(\text{MA}^{[2,B]}(f)^{1/2}) \leq \text{OIP}^{[3]}(f) \leq O(\text{MA}^{[2,B]}(f)^2)$. Thus, $\text{OIP}^{[3]} = \text{MA}^{[2,B]}$.

Proof. Combine Theorems 5.8 and 5.10.

5.3 A Characterization of $\text{OIP}^{[4]}$ and Beyond

The fourth level of the $\text{OIP}$ hierarchy turns out to have surprising power. It can capture all of $\text{AM}$, a model that lies at the frontier of our current understanding of communication complexity classes in the sense that we do not know any nontrivial $\text{AM}$ lower bounds. Thanks to this surprising power, we can show that all constant-height levels of the $\text{OIP}$ hierarchy collapse to the fourth level.

Theorem 5.12. For all $f$, we have $\text{OIP}^{[4]}(f) = O(\text{AM}(f) \log \text{AM}(f))$. In particular, $\text{OIP}^{[4]} \supseteq \text{AM}$.

Proof. Suppose $\text{AM}(f) = C$. WLOG, there is a protocol $Q$ for $f$ with the following shape: Bob tosses coins to generate a random string $r$ and sends it to Merlin, who responds with a message $m$, where $|r| + |m| \leq C$. Bob then sends $(r, m)$ to Alice, who responds with a single bit, after which Bob announces the output.

The interaction between Bob and Alice is an $\text{R}^{[2,B]}$ protocol (in fact, it is deterministic) of cost $C$. Theorem 5.6 shows that it can be replaced with an $\text{OIP}^{[2]}$ protocol of cost $O(C^2)$. Performing this replacement gives us an $\text{OIP}^{[4]}$ protocol for $f$. The cost bound can be improved to $O(C \log C)$ by revisiting the analysis of the polynomial evaluation protocol used to prove Theorem 5.6 and using the fact that Alice’s message in $Q$ is just a single bit.
Theorem 5.13. For each $k > 0$, there exists a constant $c_k > 0$ such that for all $f$, $\text{OIP}^k(f) \geq \Omega(\text{AM}(f)^{c_k})$. In particular, for every constant $k$, we have $\text{OIP}^k \subseteq \text{AM}$.

Proof. Let $C = \text{OIP}^k(f)$ and let $\mathcal{P}$ be an $\text{OIP}^k$ protocol with cost $C$ that computes $f$. By definition, $\mathcal{P}$ uses a hidden random string and Merlin learns about this string only indirectly, from Bob’s computed messages. We apply the Goldwasser-Sipser set lower bound technique [16] to convert $\mathcal{P}$ into a protocol where all random coins are directly revealed. Specifically, we can convert $\mathcal{P}$ into an $\text{AMAM} \cdots \text{AM}$ protocol $\mathcal{P}'$, where $k + 3$ messages are sent in total: Merlin’s messages are broadcast and after his final message Alice sends a message to Bob, who announces the output. We have $cc(\mathcal{Q}') = O(C^{c_k})$ for some constant $a_k \geq 1$.

We apply Babai and Moran’s round elimination techniques [6] to turn $\mathcal{Q}'$ into a standard $\text{AM}$ protocol $\mathcal{Q}$ of cost at most $O(cc(\mathcal{Q}')^{b_k})$ for some constant $b_k \geq 1$. The result follows by taking $c_k = 1/(a_kb_k)$.

Corollary 5.14. For all $f$, $\Omega(\text{AM}(f)^{c_4}) \leq \text{OIP}^4(f) \leq O(\text{AM}(f) \log \text{AM}(f))$, where $c_4$ is the constant from Theorem 5.13. In particular, $\text{OIP}^4 = \text{AM}$, and in fact $\text{OIP}^k = \text{AM}$ for every constant $k \geq 4$.

Proof. Combine Theorems 5.13 and 5.12, noting that $\text{OIP}^k \subseteq \text{OIP}^k$ for every $k \geq 4$.

Here is an interesting point worth contemplating. On the one hand, our transformations in the proof of Theorem 5.13 perform round reduction at the expense of destroying online-ness: the final protocol $\mathcal{Q}$ is no longer online, i.e., we cannot require communications to go to Bob alone. On the other hand, the transformation in the proof of Theorem 5.12 “restores” online-ness at only a “slight” expense of requiring four rounds, whereas $\text{AM}$ uses only two. Overall, we have a collapse of the $\text{OIP}$ hierarchy to its fourth level.

We have also noted earlier that we (regretfully) do not yet know how to place a concrete problem outside $\text{OIP}^2$. Nevertheless, Theorems 5.12 and 5.13 together establish a weakness of $\text{OIP}^2$: up to polynomial factors this model is no more powerful than $\text{OIP}^4$.

5.4 Exponential Separations in Our Complexity Zoo

Among the first four levels of the $\text{OIP}$ hierarchy, we can now show that every pair of adjacent levels is exponentially separated. The next three results make this precise. Recall that $\text{INTER} = \neg \text{DISJ}$ is the set intersection problem.

Theorem 5.15. We have $\text{OIP}^1(\text{INDEX}) = \Omega(n^{1/2})$ whereas $\text{OIP}^2(\text{INDEX}) = O(\log n \log \log n)$.

Proof. Combine Theorems 5.1 and Lemma 5.2, and then the known results that $\text{MA}^1(f) = \Omega(R^{[1,A]}(f)^{1/2})$ for all $f$ [9] (see also Theorem 5.20 in Section 5.5), and that $R^{[1,A]}(\text{INDEX}) = \Omega(n)$ [3].

Theorem 5.16. We have $\text{OIP}^2(\text{INTER}) = \Omega(n^{1/2})$ whereas $\text{OIP}^3(\text{INTER}) = O(\log^2 n)$.

Proof. For the lower bound, use $R^{[2,B]}(\text{INTER}) \geq R(\text{INTER}) = R(\text{DISJ}) = \Omega(n)$ and then apply Theorem 5.3.

For the upper bound, note that $\text{INTER}$ has a nondeterministic protocol with cost $O(\log n)$, wherein Alice and Bob guess an element in the intersection of their respective sets and they verify membership. In particular this gives $\text{MA}^{[2,B]}(\text{INTER}) = O(\log n)$; in fact, Bob need not send anything to Alice in the $\text{MA}^{[2,B]}$ protocol. Now apply Theorem 5.10.
While we do not know of a total Boolean function that separates $\text{OIP}^{[3]}$ from $\text{OIP}^{[4]}$, we do know of a partial Boolean function whose $\text{OIP}^{[3]}$ communication complexity is exponentially larger than its $\text{OIP}^{[4]}$ communication complexity. Specifically, Klauck [23, Corollary 3] gives a promise problem he calls $\text{PAppMP}$ which has Quantum Merlin-Arthur (QMA) communication complexity $O(n^{1/6})$ and AM communication complexity $O(\log n)$. Since Theorem 5.8 shows that any $\text{OIP}^{[3]}$ protocol can be transformed into an equivalent $\text{MA}^{[2,3]}$ protocol with a quadratic blowup in cost, and $\text{MA}^{[2,3]}$ protocols are simply restricted versions of QMA protocols, Klauck’s lower bound on the QMA cost of $\text{PAppMP}$ implies that $\text{OIP}^{[3]}(\text{PAppMP}) = \Omega(n^{1/12})$.

Meanwhile, Theorem 5.12 shows that any AM communication protocol can be transformed into an equivalent $\text{OIP}^{[4]}$ protocol with a logarithmic blowup in costs. Thus, Klauck’s upper bound on the AM communication complexity of $\text{PAppMP}$ implies that $\text{OIP}^{[4]}(\text{PAppMP}) = O(\log n \log \log n)$.

\begin{theorem}
We have $\text{OIP}^{[3]}(\text{PAppMP}) = \Omega(n^{1/12})$ whereas $\text{OIP}^{[4]}(\text{PAppMP}) = O(\log n \log \log n)$.
\end{theorem}

Next, we show that, up to polynomial factors, $\text{OIP}^{[2]}_+$ is at least as powerful as $\text{R}^{[3,3,A]}$, the class of three-message randomized communication protocols in which Alice speaks first. This will enable us to exhibit an explicit function $f$ on domain $\{-1,1\}^n \times \{-1,1\}^n$ such that $\text{OIP}^{[2]}_+(f) = \Omega(\sqrt{n}/\log n)$, while $\text{OIP}^{[2]}(f) = O(\log^2 n)$.

\begin{theorem}
For all $f$, we have $\text{OIP}^{[2]}_+(f) = O(\text{R}^{[3,3,A]}(f)^2)$.
\end{theorem}

\begin{proof}
Let $Q$ be any three-message randomized communication protocol of cost $C$, with Alice speaking first. We show how to convert $Q$ into a $\text{OIP}^{[2]}_+$ protocol $P$ of cost $O(C^2)$.

We think of $Q$ as consisting of one message $m_A^{(1)}$ from Alice to Bob, followed by a two-message communication protocol $Q'$ in which Bob speaks first. Theorem 5.6 shows how to transform $Q'$ into an equivalent $\text{OIP}^{[2]}_+$ protocol $P'$ of cost $O(C^2)$ (note this $\text{OIP}^{[2]}_+$ protocol depends on $m_A^{(1)}$).

Thus, we obtain an $\text{OIP}^{[2]}_+$ protocol $P$ as follows. Alice’s message to Bob in $P$ consists of two parts. The first specifies $m_A^{(1)}$, and the second is the message she would have sent to Bob in $P'$. Bob, who learns $m_A^{(1)}$ from the first part of Alice’s message, now knows what $\text{OIP}^{[2]}$ protocol $P'$ to execute, and simply behaves the same as he would in $P'$.

Exponential separations between $\text{R}^{[3,3,A]}$ and $\text{R}^{[2,3,B]}$ are known. In particular, consider the $k$-step (bipartite) pointer jumping function $p_{J_k}$, which interprets each of Alice and Bob’s inputs as a list of $N = \Theta(n/\log n)$ pointers, a pointer being a $(\log N)$-bit integer. Each pointer in a player’s list is interpreted as pointing to (i.e., indexing) a pointer in the other player’s list. The goal is to follow these pointers, starting at the first pointer in Alice’s list, and output the $k$th pointer encountered. For example, if Alice’s input is $x = (00, 01, 10, 00)$ and Bob’s input is $y = (01, 10, 11, 00)$, then $p_{J_1}(x, y) = 01$, $p_{J_2}(x, y) = 01$, $p_{J_3}(x, y) = 10$, and so on. To turn $p_{J_k}$ into a Boolean function $\text{BP}p_{J_k}$, we take the parity of the $(\log N)$-bit output of $p_{J_k}$.

\begin{corollary}
We have $\text{OIP}^{[2]}_+(\text{BP}p_{J_2}) = \Omega(\sqrt{n}/\log n)$, while $\text{OIP}^{[2]}_+(\text{BP}p_{J_2}) = O(\log^2 n)$.
\end{corollary}

\begin{proof}
Nisan and Wigderson [30] showed that $\text{R}^{[k,B]}(\text{BP}p_{J_k}) = \Omega(N/k^2 - k \log N)$. In particular, any two-message randomized communication protocol in which Bob speaks first has cost $\Omega(N)$. Hence, Theorem 5.3 implies that $\text{OIP}^{[2]}_+(\text{BP}p_{J_2}) = \Omega(\sqrt{n}/\log n)$.
To prove the upper bound on $\text{OIP}^2_+(\text{BP}_{L_2})$, note that there is a trivial three-message protocol for $p_{L_2}$ (and hence for $\text{BP}_{L_2}$) of cost $O(\log n)$ in which Alice speaks first. Now apply Theorem 5.18.

5.5 An Exponential Separation Between $\text{OIP}^2$ and $\text{OMA}^k$

Theorem 5.20 establishes that for any function $f$, $\text{OMA}^{2k}(f) = \Omega(R^{[1,1]}(f)1/(k+1))$. An essentially identical lower bound was proven by Klauck and Prakash for a closely related (though not identical) communication model; the full version of the paper provides a detailed proof for completeness, and in the process identifies the crucial details of the communication model that enable the lower bound to hold.

\textbf{Theorem 5.20.} For any function $f$ and constant $k$, $\text{OMA}^{2k}(f) = \Omega(R^{[1,1]}(f)1/(k+1))$.

The main property of the $\text{OMA}^k$ communication model exploited in our proof of Theorem 5.20 is the following: in any $\text{OMA}^k$ protocol $P$, for all $i \leq k$, Alice can determine Bob’s $i$th message to Merlin in $P$ on her own. In particular, the same lower bound would apply to any variant of online Arthur-Merlin communication models in which Bob’s messages to Merlin must be independent of his input $y$. This is the intuitive reason why the $\text{OIP}^2$ model is exponentially more powerful than the $\text{OMA}^k$ model for any constant $k$: in the $\text{OIP}^2$ model, Bob’s message to Merlin may depend on his input $y$, while this is not allowed in the $\text{OMA}^k$ model.

Combining Theorem 5.20 with Lemma 5.2, which says that $\text{OIP}^2(\text{index}) = O(\log n \log \log n)$, we obtain an exponential separation between $\text{OIP}^2$ and $\text{OMA}^k$ for any constant $k > 0$.

\textbf{Corollary 5.21.} For every constant $k > 0$, we have $\text{OIP}^2 \not\subseteq \text{OMA}^k$.

6 Conclusion

Our primary objects of study in this paper were constant-round interactive protocols for verifying outsourced streaming computations. Our main algorithmic contributions were to give constant-round streaming interactive proofs for a large class of “query” problems. Our protocols are exponentially more efficient than what was believed possible based on prior work, and demonstrate that in the streaming setting, “hidden” coins are exponentially more powerful than public coins.

We also introduced new “online” communication hierarchies, $\text{OIP}_+$ and $\text{OIP}$, which can be seen as restricted variants of the standard Arthur-Merlin communication model. The flow of information in the $\text{OIP}_+$ and $\text{OIP}$ models is severely restricted (neither Bob nor Merlin can speak to Alice), yet $\text{OIP}_+$ is still powerful enough to simulate any streaming interactive proof, and $\text{OIP}$ powerful enough to simulate all known streaming interactive proofs. Our study revealed that the online nature of these communication models leads them to behave very differently from classical interactive proofs, and allowed us to establish strong limitations on the power of existing techniques for developing constant-round SIPs. It also yielded a surprising characterization of the communication complexity class $\text{AM}$ in terms of online communication models (namely, $\text{AM} = \text{OIP}^4 = \text{OIP}_+^4$). We believe this characterization may prove useful in establishing non-trivial $\text{AM}$ lower bounds, a problem that has been identified [23] as an important “first step” toward resolving the $\Pi_2 \neq \Sigma_2$ problem in two-party communication complexity, one of the most important problems left open by Babai et al. [5].
Many questions remain for future work, but here we highlight just one: proving a superlogarithmic lower bound on the $\text{OIP}_2^+$ communication cost of an explicit function. Progress on this question would yield the first superlogarithmic lower bounds on the cost of two-round SIPs. Moreover, we have shown that standard techniques easily establish that $\text{OIP}_2^+$ is a subset of $\text{AM}$, but have been unable to prove any superlogarithmic lower bounds against $\text{OIP}_2^+$ protocols. Proving $\text{OIP}_2^+$ lower bounds therefore represents an important (and potentially tractable) “zeroth step” toward resolving $\Pi_2 \neq \Sigma_2$.

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