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Allocation of Divisible Goods Under Lexicographic Preferences

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Abstract

We present a simple and natural non-pricing mechanism for allocating divisible goods among strategic agents having lexicographic preferences. Our mechanism has favorable properties of strategy-proofness (incentive compatibility). In addition (and even when extended to the case of Leontief bundles) it enjoys Pareto efficiency, envy-freeness, and time efficiency.

BibTeX - Entry

@InProceedings{schulman_et_al:LIPIcs:2015:5627,
  author =	{Leonard J. Schulman and Vijay V. Vazirani},
  title =	{{Allocation of Divisible Goods Under Lexicographic Preferences}},
  booktitle =	{35th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2015)},
  pages =	{543--559},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-97-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2015},
  volume =	{45},
  editor =	{Prahladh Harsha and G. Ramalingam},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2015/5627},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-56279},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2015.543},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism design, lexicographic preferences, strategyproof, Pareto optimal, incentive compatible}
}

Keywords: Mechanism design, lexicographic preferences, strategyproof, Pareto optimal, incentive compatible
Seminar: 35th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2015)
Issue date: 2015
Date of publication: 2015


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