eng
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
1868-8969
2018-08-13
12:1
12:16
10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2018.12
article
Communication Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium with Small Support
Ganor, Anat
1
C. S., Karthik
2
Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel
We define a two-player N x N game called the 2-cycle game, that has a unique pure Nash equilibrium which is also the only correlated equilibrium of the game. In this game, every 1/poly(N)-approximate correlated equilibrium is concentrated on the pure Nash equilibrium. We show that the randomized communication complexity of finding any 1/poly(N)-approximate correlated equilibrium of the game is Omega(N). For small approximation values, our lower bound answers an open question of Babichenko and Rubinstein (STOC 2017).
https://drops.dagstuhl.de/storage/00lipics/lipics-vol116-approx-random2018/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2018.12/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2018.12.pdf
Correlated equilibrium
Nash equilibrium
Communication complexity