eng
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
1868-8969
2018-07-04
146:1
146:14
10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.146
article
Uniform Mixed Equilibria in Network Congestion Games with Link Failures
Bilò, Vittorio
1
Moscardelli, Luca
2
Vinci, Cosimo
3
Department of Mathematics and Physics, University of Salento, Lecce, Italy
Department of Economic Studies, University of Chieti-Pescara, Pescara, Italy
Department of Information Engineering Computer Science and Mathematics, University of L'Aquila, L'Aquila, Italy - Gran Sasso Science Institute, L'Aquila, Italy
Motivated by possible applications in fault-tolerant routing, we introduce the notion of uniform mixed equilibria in network congestion games with adversarial link failures, where players need to route traffic from a source to a destination node. Given an integer rho >= 1, a rho-uniform mixed strategy is a mixed strategy in which a player plays exactly rho edge disjoint paths with uniform probabilities, so that a rho-uniform mixed equilibrium is a tuple of rho-uniform mixed strategies, one for each player, in which no player can lower her cost by deviating to another rho-uniform mixed strategy. For games with weighted players and affine latency functions, we show existence of rho-uniform mixed equilibria and provide a tight characterization of their price of anarchy. For games with unweighted players, instead, we extend the existential guarantee to any class of latency functions and, restricted to games with affine latencies, we derive a tight characterization of both the prices of anarchy and stability.
https://drops.dagstuhl.de/storage/00lipics/lipics-vol107-icalp2018/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.146/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.146.pdf
Network Congestion Games
Fault-Tolerant Routing
Nash Equilibria
Price of Anarchy
Price of Stability