Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5011,

• Daniel Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, and Tuomas Sandholm 05011 Abstracts Collection – Computing and Markets 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.1
• Daniel Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, and Tuomas Sandholm 05011 Executive Summary – Computing and Markets 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.2
• Edward Anderson, Frank Kelly, and Richard Steinberg A Contract and Balancing Mechanism for Sharing Capacity in a Communication Network 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.3
• Rudolf Müller, Andres Perea, and Sascha Wolf A Network Approach to Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatible Mechanisms 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.4
• Tuomas Sandholm Automated Mechanism Design 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.5
• Kevin Leyton-Brown and Navin A.R. Bhat Computing Nash Equilibria of Action-Graph Games 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.6
• Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, and Moshe Tennenholtz Congestion games with failures 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.7
• Hongwei Gui, Rudolf Müller, and Rakesh V. Vohra Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.8
• Robert Day and S. Raghavan Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.9
• Kazuo Murota Fundamentals in Discrete Convex Analysis 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.10
• Kevin Leyton-Brown and Moshe Tennenholtz Local-Effect Games 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.11
• Rann Smordinsky and Moshe Tennenholtz Overcoming Free Riding in Multi-Party Computations 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.12
• Henner Gimpel Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue Bargaining 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.13
• Anna Osepayshvili, Michael Wellman, Daniel Reeves, and Jeffrey MacKie-Mason Self-Confirming Price Prediction for Bidding in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.14
• Rainer Feldmann Selfish Routing of Splittable Flow with Respect to Maximum Congestion 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.15
• Tuomas Sandholm and Andrew Gilpin Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.16
• Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, and Yoav Shoham Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.17
• Alon Altman The PageRank Axioms 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.18
• Martin Gairing, Thomas Lücking, Marios Mavronicolas, and Burkhard Monien The Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Social Cost 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.19
• Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, and Moshe Tennenholtz The Value of Correlation in Strategic Form Games 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.20