eng
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings
1862-4405
2005-11-21
5321
1
12
10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.1
article
05321 – Panel on belief change
Levi, Isaac
Bonanno, Giacomo
Walliser, Bernard
Dubois, Didier
Rott, Hans
Delgrande, James
Lang, Jérôme
This document gathers the panelists' contribution.
https://drops.dagstuhl.de/storage/16dagstuhl-seminar-proceedings/dsp-vol05321/DagSemProc.05321.1/DagSemProc.05321.1.pdf
Belief revision
iterated belief revision
update
merging
dynamic logic
possibility theory
conditionals
social choice
distance
complexity
eng
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings
1862-4405
2005-11-21
5321
1
16
10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.2
article
05321 Abstracts Collection – Belief Change in Rational Agents: Perspectives from Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, and Economics
Delgrande, James
Lang, Jérôme
Rott, Hans
Tallon, Jean-Marc
From 07.08.05 to 12.08.05, the Dagstuhl Seminar 05321 ``Belief Change in Rational Agents: Perspectives from Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, and Economics'' was held in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl.
During the seminar, several participants presented their current
research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of
the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of
seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section
describes the seminar topics and goals in general.
Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.
https://drops.dagstuhl.de/storage/16dagstuhl-seminar-proceedings/dsp-vol05321/DagSemProc.05321.2/DagSemProc.05321.2.pdf
Belief revision
iterated belief revision
update
merging
dynamic logic
possibility theory
conditionals
social choice
distance
complexity
eng
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings
1862-4405
2005-11-21
5321
1
5
10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.3
article
05321 Executive Summary – Belief Change in Rational Agents: Perspectives from Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, and Economics
Delgrande, James
Lang, Jérôme
Rott, Hans
Tallon, Jean-Marc
The area of belief change studies how a rational agent may maintain its beliefs when obtaining or perceiving new information about the environment. This new information could include properties of the actual world, occurrences of events, and, in the case of multiple agents, actions performed by other agents, as well as the beliefs and preferences of other agents. Not surprisingly, this area has been of interest to researchers in different communities.
The initial research in belief change came from the philosophical community, wherein belief change was studied generally from a normative point of view (that is, providing axiomatic foundations about how rational agents should behave with respect to the information flux). Subsequently, computer scientists, especially in the artificial intelligence (AI) and the database (DB) communities, have been building on these results. Belief change, as studied by computer scientists, not only pays attention to behavioural properties characterising evolving databases or knowledge bases, but must also address computational issues such as how to represent beliefs states in a concise way and how to efficiently compute the revision of a belief state. More recently, the economics and game theory community, in particular the emerging field of cognitive economics, has become active in belief change research, adopting a normative point of view, like philosophers, but paying more attention to the ''cognitive plausibility'' or ''fitness'' of the belief change operators.
The goal of the seminar was to bring together researchers from these areas, allowing for the identification and addressing of problems of common interest in this area, as well as providing a means to explore ways in which one area may contribute to another.
https://drops.dagstuhl.de/storage/16dagstuhl-seminar-proceedings/dsp-vol05321/DagSemProc.05321.3/DagSemProc.05321.3.pdf
Belief revision
iterated belief revision
update
merging
dynamic logic
possibility theory
conditionals
social choice
distance
complexity
eng
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings
1862-4405
2005-11-21
5321
1
8
10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.4
article
A simple modal logic for belief revision
Bonanno, Giacomo
I propose a modal logic for belief revision based on three operators representing initial beliefs, information and revised beliefs. Three axioms are put forward that express three simple principles: (1) if the agent is informed of something that he considered possible initially, then he incorporates the information in his revised beliefs, (2) if the information received is not surprising then all previous beliefs are maintained (although new beliefs may be added) and (3) any new belief must be deducible from the initial beliefs and the information received. I show that these three axioms characterize the qualitative content of Bayes' rule. I also construct a logic which is sound and complete with respect to the class of frames that satisfy the qualitative Bayes rule. Some interesting theorems are derived for extensions of this logic, for example that the agent initially believes that he later will believe A if and only if he already believes A to start with. I then extend the framework to deal with iterated belief revision and the iterated version of Bayes rule.
https://drops.dagstuhl.de/storage/16dagstuhl-seminar-proceedings/dsp-vol05321/DagSemProc.05321.4/DagSemProc.05321.4.pdf
Belief revision
information
Bayes' rule
iterated revision
eng
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings
1862-4405
2005-11-21
5321
1
25
10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.5
article
Actions and Belief Revision : A Computational Approach
Jin, Yi
Thielscher, Michael
The classic AGM theory studies mathematically idealized models of
belief revision in two aspects: the properties (i.e., the AGM postulates)
a rational revision operator should satisfy; and how to mathematically
construct concrete revision operators. In scenarios where new
information arrives in sequence, rational revision operators should
also respect postulates for iterated revision (e.g., the DP postulates).
When applications are concerned, the idealization of the AGM theory has
to be lifted, in particular, beliefs of an agent should be represented by
a finite belief base. In this talk, we present a computational base
revision operator, which satisfies the AGM postulates and some nice
postulates for iterated revision. We will also give a formal assessment
of the base revision operator in terms of its computational complexity
and degree of syntax irrelevance.
https://drops.dagstuhl.de/storage/16dagstuhl-seminar-proceedings/dsp-vol05321/DagSemProc.05321.5/DagSemProc.05321.5.pdf
Iterated Belief Revision
Belief Base Revision
Computational Complexity
eng
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings
1862-4405
2005-11-21
5321
1
0
10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.6
article
Belief change and dynamic logic
van Ditmarsch, Hans
In this paper we compare standard ways to perform belief change with attempts to model such change with dynamic modal operators. We address both belief expansion, belief contraction, belief revision, and update. Public announcement logic is an implementation of a belief expansion operator in a dynamic epistemic setting. The postulates of success and minimal change cannot be satisfied in their original AGM formulation. Dynamic doxastic logic provides various implementations of a belief revision operator in a dynamic epistemic setting. We provide an example of the application of such a dynamic doxastic semantics, which can also be seen as a realization of a proposal by Spohn.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of different approaches to dynamic logics for belief change, including some of our own contributions to the area, in a way that is accessible to an interdisciplinary audience. It does not contain new technical results not published elsewhere. However, the comparison of different approaches provides, we hope, new insights not seen before. A final version of this paper may include new technical results.
https://drops.dagstuhl.de/storage/16dagstuhl-seminar-proceedings/dsp-vol05321/DagSemProc.05321.6/DagSemProc.05321.6.pdf
Belief revision
dynamic epistemic logic
eng
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings
1862-4405
2005-11-21
5321
1
6
10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.7
article
Belief Change with Noisy Sensing and Introspection
Shapiro, Steven
In this paper, we generalize the framework of Shapiro et al. [2000], where belief change due to sensing was combined with belief introspection in the situation calculus. In that framework, sensing was assumed to be infallible and the plausibilities of alternate situations (i.e., possible worlds) were fixed in the initial state, never to be updated. Here, we relax both assumptions. That is, we model noisy sensors whose readings may stray from reality and may return different values in subsequent readings. We also allow the plausibilities of situations to change over time, bringing the framework more in line with traditional models of belief change. We give some properties of our axiomatization and show that it does not suffer from the problems with combining sensing, introspection, and plausibility update described in Shapiro et al. [2000].
https://drops.dagstuhl.de/storage/16dagstuhl-seminar-proceedings/dsp-vol05321/DagSemProc.05321.7/DagSemProc.05321.7.pdf
Belief change
noisy sensing
theories of action
situation calculus.
eng
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings
1862-4405
2005-11-21
5321
1
14
10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.8
article
Belief merging, judgment aggregation and some links with social choice theory
Eckert, Daniel
Pigozzi, Gabriella
In this paper we explore the relation between three areas: judgment
aggregation, belief merging and social choice theory. Judgment aggregation
studies how to aggregate individual judgments on logically interconnected
propositions into a collective decision on the same propositions. When
majority voting is applied to some propositions (the premises) it may however
give a different outcome than majority voting applied to another set of
propositions (the conclusion). Starting from this so-called doctrinal paradox,
the paper surveys the literature on judgment aggregation (and its relation to
preference aggregation), and shows that the application of a well known belief
merging operator can dissolve the paradox. Finally, the use of distances is
shown to establish a link between belief merging and preference aggregation in
social choice theory.
https://drops.dagstuhl.de/storage/16dagstuhl-seminar-proceedings/dsp-vol05321/DagSemProc.05321.8/DagSemProc.05321.8.pdf
Judgment aggregation
belief merging
preference aggregation
social choice theory
eng
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings
1862-4405
2005-11-21
5321
1
17
10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.9
article
Beyond the Rational Explanation
Booth, Richard
Nittka, Alexander
In recent work, we proposed a method of reconstructing an agent's epistemic state from observations of its revision history. These observations contained information of what the agent believed after receiving which input. In this presentation we intend to illustrate an extension of the work - allowing the observations to contain additional information of what the agent did *not* believe after a revision step. We will show that the BR-framework we assumed is only partially satisfactory for handling the extended observations.
https://drops.dagstuhl.de/storage/16dagstuhl-seminar-proceedings/dsp-vol05321/DagSemProc.05321.9/DagSemProc.05321.9.pdf
Belief revision
iterated revision
non-prioritised revision
non-monotonic reasoning
rational closure
rational explanation
eng
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings
1862-4405
2005-11-21
5321
1
35
10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.10
article
Degrees of Belief
Levi, Isaac
A discussion of three kinds of degree of belief: subjective (credal) probability, degree of belief in the maximizing sense (expected epistemic utility) and degree of belief in the satisficing sense (Shackle type degrees of belief). The relations between these concepts and full belief (absolute certainty) and other qualitative assessments of belief (mere belief or plain belief) will be considered.
https://drops.dagstuhl.de/storage/16dagstuhl-seminar-proceedings/dsp-vol05321/DagSemProc.05321.10/DagSemProc.05321.10.pdf
Inductive expansion
credal probability
maximizing and satisficing
full belief.
eng
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings
1862-4405
2005-11-21
5321
1
16
10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.11
article
Iterated Belief Change and the Levi Identity
Nayak, Abhaya
Goebel, Randy
Orgun, Mehmet
Pham, Tam
Most works on iterated belief change have focussed on iterated belief revision, namely, on how to compute (K star x) star y. However, historically, belief revision has been defined in terms of belief expansion and belief contraction that have been viewed as primary operations. Accordingly, what we should be looking at are constructions like: (K+x)+y, (K-x)+y, (K-x)+y and (K-x)-y. The first two constructions are relatively innocuous. The last two are, however, more problematic. We look at these sequential operations. In the process, we use the Levi Identity as the guiding principle behind state changes (as opposed to belief set changes).
https://drops.dagstuhl.de/storage/16dagstuhl-seminar-proceedings/dsp-vol05321/DagSemProc.05321.11/DagSemProc.05321.11.pdf
Iterated belief change
iterated belief contraction
Levi Identity
eng
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings
1862-4405
2005-11-21
5321
1
10
10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.12
article
On updates with integrity constraints
Herzig, Andreas
In his paper ``Making Counterfactual Assumptions'' Frank Veltman has proposed a new semantics for counterfactual conditionals. It is based on a particular update operation, and we show that it provides a new and interesting way of updating logical databases under integrity constraints which generalizes in particular Winslett's PMA.
https://drops.dagstuhl.de/storage/16dagstuhl-seminar-proceedings/dsp-vol05321/DagSemProc.05321.12/DagSemProc.05321.12.pdf
Updates
PMA
prime implicants
eng
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings
1862-4405
2005-11-21
5321
1
8
10.4230/DagSemProc.05321.13
article
Probabilistic Abduction Without Priors
Dubois, Didier
Gilio, Angelo
Kern-Isberner, Gabriele
This paper considers the simple problem of abduction in the
framework of Bayes theorem, i.e. computing a posterior probability of an hypothesis when its prior probability is not available, either because there are no statistical data on which to rely on, or simply because a human
expert is reluctant to provide a subjective assessment of this
prior probability. The problem remains an open issue since a
simple sensitivity analysis on the value of the unknown prior
yields empty results. This paper tries to survey and comment on
various solutions to this problem: the use of likelihood functions
(as in classical statistics), the use of information principles
like maximal entropy, Shapley value, maximum likelihood. We also
study the problem in the setting of de Finetti coherence approach,
which does not exclude conditioning on contingent events with zero
probability. We show that the ad hoc likelihood function method,
that can be reinterpreted in terms of possibility theory, is
consistent with most other formal approaches. However, the maximal
entropy solution is significantly different.
https://drops.dagstuhl.de/storage/16dagstuhl-seminar-proceedings/dsp-vol05321/DagSemProc.05321.13/DagSemProc.05321.13.pdf
Conditional probability
Bayes Theorem
imprecise probability
entropy
possibility theory
maximum likelihood