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        <identifier>oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:10739</identifier>
        <datestamp>2024-03-06T10:46:35Z</datestamp>
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          <dc:title>Control-Flow Integrity for Real-Time Embedded Systems</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Walls, Robert J.</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Brown, Nicholas F.</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Le Baron, Thomas</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Shue, Craig A.</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Okhravi, Hamed</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Ward, Bryan C.</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Control-flow integrity</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>Attacks on real-time embedded systems can endanger lives and critical infrastructure. Despite this, techniques for securing embedded systems software have not been widely studied. Many existing security techniques for general-purpose computers rely on assumptions that do not hold in the embedded case. This paper focuses on one such technique, control-flow integrity (CFI), that has been vetted as an effective countermeasure against control-flow hijacking attacks on general-purpose computing systems. Without the process isolation and fine-grained memory protections provided by a general-purpose computer with a rich operating system, CFI cannot provide any security guarantees. This work proposes RECFISH, a system for providing CFI guarantees on ARM Cortex-R devices running minimal real-time operating systems. We provide techniques for protecting runtime structures, isolating processes, and instrumenting compiled ARM binaries with CFI protection. We empirically evaluate RECFISH and its performance implications for real-time systems. Our results suggest RECFISH can be directly applied to binaries without compromising real-time performance; in a test of over six million realistic task systems running FreeRTOS, 85% were still schedulable after adding RECFISH.</dc:description>
          <dc:publisher>Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik</dc:publisher>
          <dc:contributor>Robert J. Walls and Nicholas F. Brown and Thomas Le Baron and Craig A. Shue and Hamed Okhravi and Bryan C. Ward</dc:contributor>
          <dc:date>2019</dc:date>
          <dc:relation>Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 133, 31st Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS 2019)</dc:relation>
          <dc:type>InProceedings</dc:type>
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          <dc:identifier>doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2019.2</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-107397</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECRTS.2019.2</dc:identifier>
          <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
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