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Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations Grigorieva, Elena Herings, P. Jean-Jacques Müller, Rudolf Vermeulen, Dries Query auctions ex post equilibrium efficiency We show that, when bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium in an ex post individually rational query auction can only be ex post efficient when the running time of the auction is infinite for almost all realizations of valuations of the bidders. In contrast we show that, when we allow for inefficient allocations with arbitrarily small probability, there is a query auction (to be more specific, a bisection auction) that attains this level of approximate efficiency in equilibrium, while additionally the running time of the auction in equilibrium is finite for all realizations of valuations. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Elena Grigorieva and P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Rudolf Müller and Dries Vermeulen 2007 Is Part Of Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.7 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11616 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.7 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode