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Better Ways to Cut a Cake - Revisited Brams, Steven J. Jones, Michael A. Klamler, Christian Fair division cake-cutting envy-freeness strategy-proofness Procedures to divide a cake among n people with n-1 cuts (the minimum number) are analyzed and compared. For 2 persons, cut-and-choose, while envy-free and efficient, limits the cutter to exactly 50% if he or she is ignorant of the chooser's preferences, whereas the chooser can generally obtain more. By comparison, a new 2-person surplus procedure (SP'), which induces the players to be truthful in order to maximize their minimum allocations, leads to a proportionally equitable division of the surplus - the part that remains after each player receives 50% - by giving each person a certain proportion of the surplus as he or she values it. For n geq 3 persons, a new equitable procedure (EP) yields a maximally equitable division of a cake. This division gives all players the highest common value that they can achieve and induces truthfulness, but it may not be envy-free. The applicability of SP' and EP to the fair division of a heterogeneous, divisible good, like land, is briefly discussed. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Steven J. Brams and Michael A. Jones and Christian Klamler 2007 Is Part Of Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7261, Fair Division (2007) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.5 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12278 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.5 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode