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        <datestamp>2024-03-06T10:51:58Z</datestamp>
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          <dc:title>Stability-Preserving, Time-Efficient Mechanisms for School Choice in Two Rounds</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Gajulapalli, Karthik</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Liu, James A.</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Mai, Tung</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Vazirani, Vijay V.</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>stable matching</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>mechanism design</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>NP-Hardness</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>We address the following dynamic version of the school choice question: a city, named City, admits students in two temporally-separated rounds, denoted R₁ and R₂. In round R₁, the capacity of each school is fixed and mechanism M₁ finds a student optimal stable matching. In round R₂, certain parameters change, e.g., new students move into the City or the City is happy to allocate extra seats to specific schools. We study a number of Settings of this kind and give polynomial time algorithms for obtaining a stable matching for the new situations. &#13;
It is well established that switching the school of a student midway, unsynchronized with her classmates, can cause traumatic effects. This fact guides us to two types of results: the first simply disallows any re-allocations in round R₂, and the second asks for a stable matching that minimizes the number of re-allocations. For the latter, we prove that the stable matchings which minimize the number of re-allocations form a sublattice of the lattice of stable matchings. Observations about incentive compatibility are woven into these results. We also give a third type of results, namely proofs of NP-hardness for a mechanism for round R₂ under certain settings.</dc:description>
          <dc:publisher>Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik</dc:publisher>
          <dc:contributor>Karthik Gajulapalli and James A. Liu and Tung Mai and Vijay V. Vazirani</dc:contributor>
          <dc:date>2020</dc:date>
          <dc:relation>Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 182, 40th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2020)</dc:relation>
          <dc:type>InProceedings</dc:type>
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          <dc:identifier>doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2020.21</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-132626</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2020.21</dc:identifier>
          <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
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