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        <identifier>oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:15653</identifier>
        <datestamp>2024-03-06T10:55:52Z</datestamp>
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          <dc:title>Interaction-Preserving Compilers for Secure Computation</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Döttling, Nico</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Goyal, Vipul</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Malavolta, Giulio</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Raizes, Justin</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Multiparty Computation</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Communication Complexity</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Fully Homomorphic Encryption</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>In this work we consider the following question: What is the cost of security for multi-party protocols? Specifically, given an insecure protocol where parties exchange (in the worst case) Γ bits in N rounds, is it possible to design a secure protocol with communication complexity close to Γ and N rounds? We systematically study this problem in a variety of settings and we propose solutions based on the intractability of different cryptographic problems.&#13;
For the case of two parties we design an interaction-preserving compiler where the number of bits exchanged in the secure protocol approaches Γ and the number of rounds is exactly N, assuming the hardness of standard problems over lattices. For the more general multi-party case, we obtain the same result assuming either (i) an additional round of interaction or (ii) the existence of extractable witness encryption and succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge. As a contribution of independent interest, we construct the first multi-key fully homomorphic encryption scheme with message-to-ciphertext ratio (i.e., rate) of 1 - o(1), assuming the hardness of the learning with errors (LWE) problem.&#13;
We view our work as a support for the claim that, as far as interaction and communication are concerned, one does not need to pay a significant price for security in multi-party protocols.</dc:description>
          <dc:publisher>Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik</dc:publisher>
          <dc:contributor>Nico Döttling and Vipul Goyal and Giulio Malavolta and Justin Raizes</dc:contributor>
          <dc:date>2022</dc:date>
          <dc:relation>Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 215, 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022)</dc:relation>
          <dc:type>InProceedings</dc:type>
          <dc:type>Text</dc:type>
          <dc:type>doc-type:ResearchArticle</dc:type>
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          <dc:identifier>doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.57</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-156534</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.57</dc:identifier>
          <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
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