2026-07-26T00:38:39Z https://drops.dagstuhl.de/oai

oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:15662 2024-03-06T10:55:53Z ddc:004 open_access

Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for All Distributions Essaidi, Meryem Ferreira, Matheus V. X. Weinberg, S. Matthew Credible Auctions Cryptographically Secure Single-Item We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with a single item for sale to multiple buyers with independent and identically distributed valuations. Akbarpour and Li (2020) show that the only optimal, credible, strategyproof auction is the ascending price auction with reserves which has unbounded communication complexity. Recent work of Ferreira and Weinberg (2020) circumvents their impossibility result assuming the existence of cryptographically secure commitment schemes, and designs a two-round credible, strategyproof, optimal auction. However, their auction is only credible when buyers' valuations are MHR or α-strongly regular: they show their auction might not be credible even when there is a single buyer drawn from a non-MHR distribution. In this work, under the same cryptographic assumptions, we identify a new single-item auction that is credible, strategyproof, revenue optimal, and terminates in constant rounds in expectation for all distributions with finite monopoly price. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Meryem Essaidi and Matheus V. X. Ferreira and S. Matthew Weinberg 2022 Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 215, 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.66 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-156621 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.66 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode