2026-07-23T19:43:06Z https://drops.dagstuhl.de/oai

oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:15701 2024-03-06T10:55:59Z ddc:004 open_access

Interactive Communication in Bilateral Trade Mao, Jieming Paes Leme, Renato Wang, Kangning Bayesian persuasion bilateral trade information design We define a model of interactive communication where two agents with private types can exchange information before a game is played. The model contains Bayesian persuasion as a special case of a one-round communication protocol. We define message complexity corresponding to the minimum number of interactive rounds necessary to achieve the best possible outcome. Our main result is that for bilateral trade, agents don't stop talking until they reach an efficient outcome: Either agents achieve an efficient allocation in finitely many rounds of communication; or the optimal communication protocol has infinite number of rounds. We show an important class of bilateral trade settings where efficient allocation is achievable with a small number of rounds of communication. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Jieming Mao and Renato Paes Leme and Kangning Wang 2022 Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 215, 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.105 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-157014 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.105 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode