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        <identifier>oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:1581</identifier>
        <datestamp>2024-03-06T10:28:33Z</datestamp>
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          <dc:title>Robust Line Planning under Unknown Incentives and Elasticity of Frequencies</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Kontogiannis, Spyros</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Zaroliagis, Christos</dc:creator>
          <dc:description>The problem of robust line planning requests for a set of&#13;
origin-destination paths (lines) along with their traffic rates (frequencies)&#13;
in an underlying railway network infrastructure, which are robust to&#13;
fluctuations of real-time parameters of the solution.&#13;
In this work, we investigate a variant of robust line planning stemming&#13;
from recent regulations in the railway sector that introduce competition&#13;
and free railway markets, and set up a new application scenario: there is&#13;
a (potentially large) number of line operators that have their lines fixed&#13;
and operate as competing entities struggling to exploit the underlying&#13;
network infrastructure via frequency requests, while the management of&#13;
the infrastructure itself remains the responsibility of a single (typically&#13;
governmental) entity, the network operator.&#13;
The line operators are typically unwilling to reveal their true incentives.&#13;
Nevertheless, the network operator would like to ensure a fair (or, socially&#13;
optimal) usage of the infrastructure, e.g., by maximizing the (unknown to&#13;
him) aggregate incentives of the line operators. We show that this can be&#13;
accomplished in certain situations via a (possibly anonymous) incentive-&#13;
compatible pricing scheme for the usage of the shared resources, that is&#13;
robust against the unknown incentives and the changes in the demands&#13;
of the entities. This brings up a new notion of robustness, which we&#13;
call incentive-compatible robustness, that considers as robustness of the&#13;
system its tolerance to the entities' unknown incentives and elasticity&#13;
of demands, aiming at an eventual stabilization to an equilibrium point&#13;
that is as close as possible to the social optimum.</dc:description>
          <dc:publisher>Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik</dc:publisher>
          <dc:contributor>Spyros Kontogiannis and Christos Zaroliagis</dc:contributor>
          <dc:date>2008</dc:date>
          <dc:relation>Is Part Of OASIcs, Volume 9, 8th Workshop on Algorithmic Approaches for Transportation Modeling, Optimization, and Systems (ATMOS'08) (2008)</dc:relation>
          <dc:type>InProceedings</dc:type>
          <dc:type>Text</dc:type>
          <dc:type>doc-type:ResearchArticle</dc:type>
          <dc:type>publishedVersion</dc:type>
          <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
          <dc:identifier>doi:10.4230/OASIcs.ATMOS.2008.1581</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-15813</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.ATMOS.2008.1581</dc:identifier>
          <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
          <dc:rights>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/legalcode</dc:rights>
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