2026-07-22T16:11:51Z https://drops.dagstuhl.de/oai

oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:15905 2024-03-06T10:31:38Z ddc:004 open_access

Optimal Design of Tokenized Markets Lee, Michael Junho Martin, Antoine Townsend, Robert M. Tokenization programmability settlement uncertainty asymmetric information Trades in today’s financial system are inherently subject to settlement uncertainty. This paper explores tokenization as a potential technological solution. A token system, by enabling programmability of assets, can be designed to eradicate settlement uncertainty. We study the allocations achieved in a decentralized market with either the legacy settlement system or a token system. Tokenization can improve efficiency in markets subject to a limited commitment problem. However, it also materially alters the information environment, which in turn aggravates a hold-up problem. This limits potential gains from resolving settlement uncertainty, particularly for markets that depend on intermediaries. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Michael Junho Lee and Antoine Martin and Robert M. Townsend 2022 Is Part Of OASIcs, Volume 97, 3rd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2021) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.8 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-159051 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.8 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode