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        <datestamp>2024-03-06T10:56:14Z</datestamp>
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          <dc:title>Differential Secrecy for Distributed Data and Applications to Robust Differentially Secure Vector Summation</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Talwar, Kunal</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Zero Knowledge</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Secure Summation</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Differential Privacy</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>Computing the noisy sum of real-valued vectors is an important primitive in differentially private learning and statistics. In private federated learning applications, these vectors are held by client devices, leading to a distributed summation problem. Standard Secure Multiparty Computation protocols for this problem are susceptible to poisoning attacks, where a client may have a large influence on the sum, without being detected.&#13;
In this work, we propose a poisoning-robust private summation protocol in the multiple-server setting, recently studied in PRIO [Henry Corrigan-Gibbs and Dan Boneh, 2017]. We present a protocol for vector summation that verifies that the Euclidean norm of each contribution is approximately bounded. We show that by relaxing the security constraint in SMC to a differential privacy like guarantee, one can improve over PRIO in terms of communication requirements as well as the client-side computation. Unlike SMC algorithms that inevitably cast integers to elements of a large finite field, our algorithms work over integers/reals, which may allow for additional efficiencies.</dc:description>
          <dc:publisher>Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik</dc:publisher>
          <dc:contributor>Kunal Talwar</dc:contributor>
          <dc:date>2022</dc:date>
          <dc:relation>Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 218, 3rd Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2022)</dc:relation>
          <dc:type>InProceedings</dc:type>
          <dc:type>Text</dc:type>
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          <dc:identifier>doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2022.7</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-165302</dc:identifier>
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          <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
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