<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd">
  <responseDate>2026-08-03T14:36:09Z</responseDate>
  <request identifier="18338" metadataPrefix="oai_dc" verb="GetRecord">https://drops.dagstuhl.de/oai</request>
  <GetRecord>
    <record>
      <header>
        <identifier>oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:18338</identifier>
        <datestamp>2024-03-06T11:01:42Z</datestamp>
        <setSpec>ddc:004</setSpec>
        <setSpec>open_access</setSpec>
      </header>
      <metadata>
        <oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
          <dc:title>Distributed Shuffling in Adversarial Environments</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Larsen, Kasper Green</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Obremski, Maciej</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Simkin, Mark</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Distributed Computing</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Shuffling</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>We study mix-nets in the context of cryptocurrencies. Here we have many computationally weak shufflers that speak one after another and want to joinlty shuffle a list of ciphertexts (c₁, … , c_n). Each shuffler can only permute k &lt;&lt; n ciphertexts at a time. An adversary A can track some of the ciphertexts and adaptively corrupt some of the shufflers.&#13;
We present a simple protocol for shuffling the list of ciphertexts efficiently. The main technical contribution of this work is to prove that our simple shuffling strategy does indeed provide good anonymity guarantees and at the same time terminates quickly.&#13;
Our shuffling algorithm provides a strict improvement over the current shuffling strategy in Ethereum’s block proposer elections. Our algorithm is secure against a stronger adversary, provides provable security guarantees, and is comparably in efficiency to the current approach.</dc:description>
          <dc:publisher>Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik</dc:publisher>
          <dc:contributor>Kasper Green Larsen and Maciej Obremski and Mark Simkin</dc:contributor>
          <dc:date>2023</dc:date>
          <dc:relation>Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 267, 4th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2023)</dc:relation>
          <dc:type>InProceedings</dc:type>
          <dc:type>Text</dc:type>
          <dc:type>doc-type:ResearchArticle</dc:type>
          <dc:type>publishedVersion</dc:type>
          <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
          <dc:identifier>doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2023.10</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-183385</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2023.10</dc:identifier>
          <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
          <dc:rights>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode</dc:rights>
        </oai_dc:dc>
      </metadata>
    </record>
  </GetRecord>
</OAI-PMH>
