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Using Options with Set Exercise Prices to Reduce Bidder Exposure in Sequential Auctions Mous, Lonneke Robu, Valentin La Poutre, Han Options sequential auctions multi-agent systems exposure problem bidding strategies mechanism design leveled commitment The exposure problem appears whenever an agent with complementary valuations bids to acquire a bundle of items sold sequentially, in separate auctions. In this talk, we review a possible solution that can help solve this problem, which involves selling options for the items, instead of the items themselves. We provide a brief overview of the state of the art in this field and discuss, based on our recent results, under which conditions using option mechanisms would be desirable for both buyers and sellers, by comparison to direct auctioning of items. We conclude with a brief discussion of further research directions in this field, as well as the relation to other techniques proposed to address the problem, such as leveled commitment mechanisms. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Lonneke Mous and Valentin Robu and Han La Poutre 2009 Is Part Of Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 8461, Planning in Multiagent Systems (2009) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/DagSemProc.08461.5 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-18724 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.08461.5 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode