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        <identifier>oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:1890</identifier>
        <datestamp>2024-03-06T11:08:27Z</datestamp>
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          <dc:title>Modeling Computational Security in Long-Lived Systems</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Canetti, Ran</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Cheung, Ling</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Kaynar, Dilsun</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Lynch, Nancy</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Pereira, Olivier</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Long lived security; universally composable security;</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>For many cryptographic protocols, security relies on the assumption&#13;
that adversarial entities have limited computational power.  &#13;
This type of security degrades progressively over the lifetime of a protocol.&#13;
However, some cryptographic services, such as timestamping services or&#13;
digital archives, are emph{long-lived} in nature; they are expected to be&#13;
secure and operational for a very long time (ie super-polynomial).&#13;
In such cases, security cannot be guaranteed in the traditional sense:&#13;
a computationally secure protocol may become insecure if the attacker&#13;
has a super-polynomial number of interactions with the protocol. &#13;
&#13;
This paper proposes a new paradigm for the analysis of long-lived&#13;
security protocols.  &#13;
We allow entities to be active for a potentially unbounded amount of&#13;
real time, provided they perform only a polynomial amount of work emph{per&#13;
unit of real time}.  &#13;
Moreover, the space used by these entities is allocated dynamically and must be&#13;
polynomially bounded.  &#13;
We propose a new notion of emph{long-term implementation}, which is an&#13;
adaptation of computational indistinguishability to the long-lived&#13;
setting.  &#13;
We show that long-term implementation is preserved under polynomial parallel&#13;
composition and exponential sequential composition. &#13;
We illustrate the use of this new paradigm by analyzing some security&#13;
properties of the long-lived timestamping protocol of Haber and Kamat.</dc:description>
          <dc:publisher>Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik</dc:publisher>
          <dc:contributor>Ran Canetti and Ling Cheung and Dilsun Kaynar and Nancy Lynch and Olivier Pereira</dc:contributor>
          <dc:date>2009</dc:date>
          <dc:relation>Is Part Of Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 8491, Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security (2009)</dc:relation>
          <dc:type>InProceedings</dc:type>
          <dc:type>Text</dc:type>
          <dc:type>doc-type:ResearchArticle</dc:type>
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          <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
          <dc:identifier>doi:10.4230/DagSemProc.08491.3</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-18908</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.08491.3</dc:identifier>
          <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
          <dc:rights>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode</dc:rights>
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