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        <identifier>oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:1892</identifier>
        <datestamp>2024-03-06T11:08:27Z</datestamp>
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          <dc:title>Public-Key Cryptosystems from the Worst-Case Shortest Vector Problem</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Peikert, Chris</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Lattice-based cryptography</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>learning with errors</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>quantum computation</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>We construct public-key cryptosystems that are secure assuming the&#13;
*worst-case* hardness of approximating the shortest vector problem on&#13;
lattices.  Prior cryptosystems with worst-case connections (e.g., the&#13;
Ajtai-Dwork system) were based either on a *special case* of the&#13;
shortest vector problem, or on the conjectured hardness of lattice&#13;
problems for *quantum* algorithms.&#13;
&#13;
Our main technical innovation is a reduction from certain variants of&#13;
the shortest vector problem to corresponding versions of the "learning&#13;
with errors" (LWE) problem; previously, only a quantum reduction of&#13;
this kind was known.  In addition, we construct new cryptosystems&#13;
based on LWE, including a very natural chosen ciphertext-secure system&#13;
that has a much simpler description and tighter underlying worst-case&#13;
approximation factor than prior constructions.&#13;
&#13;
(Duration: 30 minutes, on or before Wednesday.)</dc:description>
          <dc:publisher>Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik</dc:publisher>
          <dc:contributor>Chris Peikert</dc:contributor>
          <dc:date>2009</dc:date>
          <dc:relation>Is Part Of Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 8491, Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security (2009)</dc:relation>
          <dc:type>InProceedings</dc:type>
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          <dc:identifier>doi:10.4230/DagSemProc.08491.4</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-18922</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.08491.4</dc:identifier>
          <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
          <dc:rights>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode</dc:rights>
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