2026-07-26T21:31:40Z https://drops.dagstuhl.de/oai

oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:19212 2024-03-06T11:03:41Z ddc:004 open_access

Buying Time: Latency Racing vs. Bidding for Transaction Ordering Mamageishvili, Akaki Kelkar, Mahimna Schlegel, Jan Christoph Felten, Edward W. Transaction ordering First-come-first-serve First-price auctions We design TimeBoost: a practical transaction ordering policy for rollup sequencers that takes into account both transaction timestamps and bids; it works by creating a score from timestamps and bids, and orders transactions based on this score. TimeBoost is transaction-data-independent (i.e., can work with encrypted transactions) and supports low transaction finalization times similar to a first-come first-serve (FCFS or pure-latency) ordering policy. At the same time, it avoids the inefficient latency competition created by an FCFS policy. It further satisfies useful economic properties of first-price auctions that come with a pure-bidding policy. We show through rigorous economic analyses how TimeBoost allows players to compete on arbitrage opportunities in a way that results in better guarantees compared to both pure-latency and pure-bidding approaches. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Akaki Mamageishvili and Mahimna Kelkar and Jan Christoph Schlegel and Edward W. Felten 2023 Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 282, 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.23 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-192120 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.23 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode