2026-07-26T16:58:41Z https://drops.dagstuhl.de/oai

oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:19219 2024-03-06T11:03:42Z ddc:004 open_access

Time Is Money: Strategic Timing Games in Proof-Of-Stake Protocols Schwarz-Schilling, Caspar Saleh, Fahad Thiery, Thomas Pan, Jennifer Shah, Nihar Monnot, Barnabé blockchain proof-of-stake game theory maximal extractable value We propose a model suggesting that rational consensus participants may play timing games, and strategically delay their block proposal to optimize MEV capture, while still ensuring the proposal’s inclusion in the canonical chain. In this context, ensuring economic fairness among consensus participants is critical to preserving decentralization. We contend that a model grounded in rational consensus participation provides a more accurate portrayal of behavior in economically incentivized systems such as blockchain protocols. We empirically investigate timing games on the Ethereum network and demonstrate that while timing games are worth playing, they are not currently being exploited by consensus participants. By quantifying the marginal value of time, we uncover strong evidence pointing towards their future potential, despite the limited exploitation of MEV capture observed at present. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Caspar Schwarz-Schilling and Fahad Saleh and Thomas Thiery and Jennifer Pan and Nihar Shah and Barnabé Monnot 2023 Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 282, 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.30 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-192193 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.30 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode