2026-07-25T01:58:13Z https://drops.dagstuhl.de/oai

oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:1957 2024-03-06T11:08:30Z ddc:004 open_access

Algebraic Attacks against Linear RFID Authentication Protocols Krause, Matthias Stegemann, Dirk RFID Authentication HB+ CKK CKK2 The limited computational resources available on RFID tags imply a need for specially designed authentication protocols. The light weight authentication protocol $extsf{HB}^+$ proposed by Juels and Weis seems currently secure for several RFID applications, but is too slow for many practical settings. As a possible alternative, authentication protocols based on choosing random elements from $L$ secret linear $n$-dimensional subspaces of $GF(2)^{n+k}$ (so called linear $(n,k,L)$-protocols), have been considered. We show that to a certain extent, these protocols are vulnerable to algebraic attacks. Particularly, our approach allows to break Cicho'{n}, Klonowski and Kutyl owski's $ extsf{CKK}^2$-protocol, a special linear $(n,k,2)$-protocol, for practically recommended parameters in less than a second on a standard PC. Moreover, we show that even unrestricted $(n,k,L)$-protocols can be efficiently broken if $L$ is too small. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Matthias Krause and Dirk Stegemann 2009 Is Part Of Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9031, Symmetric Cryptography (2009) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/DagSemProc.09031.3 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-19576 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09031.3 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode