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        <identifier>oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:199</identifier>
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          <dc:title>Selfish Routing of Splittable Flow with Respect to Maximum Congestion</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Feldmann, Rainer</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>selfish routing</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>coordination ratio</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>We study the problem of selfishly routing&#13;
  splittable traffic with respect to maximum congestion through a shared&#13;
  network.&#13;
  Our model naturally combines features of the two best studied &#13;
  models in the context of selfish routing: The KP-model \cite{KP99} and the &#13;
  Wardrop-model \cite{War52}.&#13;
&#13;
  We are given a network with source nodes $s_i$, sink&#13;
  nodes $t_i$, $1 \leq i \leq k$, $m$ edges, &#13;
  and a latency function for each edge. Traffics of rate &#13;
  $r_i$ are destined from $s_i$ to $t_i$. &#13;
  Traffics are splittable and each piece of traffic tries to route in&#13;
  such a way that it minimizes its private latency.&#13;
  In the absence of a central regulation, Nash Equilibria represent&#13;
  stable states of such a system. In a Nash Equilibrium, no&#13;
  piece of traffic can decrease its private latency by &#13;
  unilaterally changing its route. The increased social cost due to&#13;
  the lack of central regulation is defined in terms of the&#13;
  coordination ratio, i.e. the worst&#13;
  possible ratio of the social cost of a traffic flow at Nash&#13;
  Equilibrium and the social cost of a global optimal traffic flow.&#13;
&#13;
  In this paper, &#13;
  we show that in the above model pure Nash Equilibria always exist.&#13;
  Then, we analyze the coordination ratio of single-commodity networks with &#13;
  linear latency functions.&#13;
  Our main result is a tight upper bound of $\frac{4}{3} m$, where $m$&#13;
  is the number of edges of the network, for the coordination ratio of&#13;
  single-commodity networks with linear latency functions. &#13;
  On our way to our main result we analyze the coordination ratio of &#13;
  single-hop networks and show a tight upper bound of &#13;
  $m+\Theta(\sqrt{m})$. A more sophisticated analysis yields an upper&#13;
  bound of $\frac{4}{3}m$ for the coordination ratio of multi-hop networks,&#13;
  which is then used to derive the main result for arbitrary &#13;
  single-commodity linear networks.</dc:description>
          <dc:publisher>Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik</dc:publisher>
          <dc:contributor>Rainer Feldmann</dc:contributor>
          <dc:date>2005</dc:date>
          <dc:relation>Is Part Of Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5011, Computing and Markets (2005)</dc:relation>
          <dc:type>InProceedings</dc:type>
          <dc:type>Text</dc:type>
          <dc:type>doc-type:ResearchArticle</dc:type>
          <dc:type>publishedVersion</dc:type>
          <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
          <dc:identifier>doi:10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.15</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-1991</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.15</dc:identifier>
          <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
          <dc:rights>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode</dc:rights>
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