2026-07-24T11:52:21Z https://drops.dagstuhl.de/oai

oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:20145 2024-07-02T07:52:48Z ddc:004 open_access

Group Fairness: Multiwinner Voting and Beyond (Invited Talk) Elkind, Edith multiwinner voting participatory budgeting justified representation In multiwinner voting with approval ballots the agents are presented with a set of alternatives, each agent indicates which of these alternatives they approve, and the goal is to select a fixed-size subset of the alternatives, in a way that reflects the voters' preferences. This framework captures a variety of group decision-making scenarios, from choosing a list of speakers for an event to appointing a set of validators in a proof-of-stake blockchain. An important concern in many of these scenarios is group fairness: every sufficiently large group of agents with similar preferences should be represented in the winning set of alternatives. In this talk, we discuss how to formalise this idea and whether the resulting axioms can be satisfied by efficiently computable voting rules. We also discuss extensions of our framework to the more expressive setting of participatory budgeting, where the agents are presented with a slate of projects (which may have different costs) and the goal is to select a subset of projects subject to a budget constraint. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Edith Elkind 2024 Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 297, 51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.2 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-201459 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.2 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode