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Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue Bargaining Gimpel, Henner compact representation of games congestion games local-effect games action-graph gamescomputational markets; auctions; bidding strategiesNegotiatio Game theoretic bargaining models usually assume parties to have exogenously given preferences from the beginning of a negotiation on. Preferences in these models do not depend on the history of offers made during a negotiation. This paper argues that preferences are based on issue-wise reference points changing during the bargaining process as result of the counterpartys offers. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Henner Gimpel 2005 Is Part Of Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5011, Computing and Markets (2005) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.13 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-2038 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.13 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode