2026-07-24T09:31:26Z https://drops.dagstuhl.de/oai

oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:20856 2024-12-04T11:38:37Z ddc:004 open_access

HOBBIT: Hashed OBject Based InTegrity Bernad, Matthias Brunthaler, Stefan software security code-reuse attacks language-based security counterfeit-object-oriented programming object integrity compiler security C vulnerabilities usually hold verbatim for C++ programs. The counterfeit-object-oriented programming attack demonstrated that this relation is asymmetric, i.e., it only applies to C++. The problem pinpointed by this COOP attack is that C++ does not validate the integrity of its objects. By injecting malicious objects with manipulated virtual function table pointers, attackers can hijack control-flow of programs. The software security community addressed the COOP-problem in the years following its discovery, but together with the emergence of transient-execution attacks, such as Spectre, researchers also shifted their attention. We present Hobbit, a software-only solution to prevent COOP attacks by validating object integrity for virtual function pointer tables. Hobbit does not require any hardware specific features, scales to multi-million lines of C++ source code, and our LLVM-based implementation offers a configurable performance impact between 121.63% and 2.80% on compute-intensive SPEC CPU C++ benchmarks. Hobbit’s security analysis indicates strong resistance to brute forcing attacks and demonstrates additional benefits of using execute-only memory. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Matthias Bernad and Stefan Brunthaler 2024 Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 313, 38th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2024) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2024.7 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-208566 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2024.7 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode