2026-07-23T16:33:54Z https://drops.dagstuhl.de/oai

oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:20947 2024-09-16T10:19:09Z ddc:004 open_access

Bribe & Fork: Cheap PCN Bribing Attacks via Forking Threat Avarikioti, Zeta Kędzior, Paweł Lizurej, Tomasz Michalak, Tomasz Blockchain Payment Channels Networks Timelock Bribing Feather Forking In this work, we reexamine the vulnerability of Payment Channel Networks (PCNs) to bribing attacks, where an adversary incentivizes blockchain miners to deliberately ignore a specific transaction to undermine the punishment mechanism of PCNs. While previous studies have posited a prohibitive cost for such attacks, we show that this cost can be dramatically reduced (to approximately $125), thereby increasing the likelihood of these attacks. To this end, we introduce Bribe & Fork, a modified bribing attack that leverages the threat of a so-called feather fork which we analyze with a novel formal model for the mining game with forking. We empirically analyze historical data of some real-world blockchain implementations to evaluate the scale of this cost reduction. Our findings shed more light on the potential vulnerability of PCNs and highlight the need for robust solutions. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Zeta Avarikioti and Paweł Kędzior and Tomasz Lizurej and Tomasz Michalak 2024 Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.11 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209473 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.11 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode