2026-07-23T21:17:24Z https://drops.dagstuhl.de/oai

oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:22676 2026-04-17T05:32:11Z ddc:004 open_access

Robust Restaking Networks Durvasula, Naveen Roughgarden, Tim Proof of stake Restaking Staking Risks We study the risks of validator reuse across multiple services in a restaking protocol. We characterize the robust security of a restaking network as a function of the buffer between the costs and profits from attacks. For example, our results imply that if attack costs always exceed attack profits by 10%, then a sudden loss of .1% of the overall stake (e.g., due to a software error) cannot result in the ultimate loss of more than 1.1% of the overall stake. We also provide local analogs of these overcollateralization conditions and robust security guarantees that apply specifically for a target service or coalition of services. All of our bounds on worst-case stake loss are the best possible. Finally, we bound the maximum-possible length of a cascade of attacks. Our results suggest measures of robustness that could be exposed to the participants in a restaking protocol. We also suggest polynomial-time computable sufficient conditions that can proxy for these measures. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Naveen Durvasula and Tim Roughgarden 2025 Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 325, 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.48 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-226769 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.48 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode