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        <datestamp>2025-10-02T12:56:13Z</datestamp>
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          <dc:title>The Long Arm of Nashian Allocation in Online p-Mean Welfare Maximization</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Huang, Zhiyi</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Lee, Chui Shan</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Shu, Xinkai</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Wang, Zhaozi</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Online Algorithms</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Fair Division</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Nash Welfare</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>We study the online allocation of divisible items to n agents with additive valuations for p-mean welfare maximization, a problem introduced by Barman, Khan, and Maiti (2022). Our algorithmic and hardness results characterize the optimal competitive ratios for the entire spectrum of -∞ ≤ p ≤ 1. Surprisingly, our improved algorithms for all p ≤ (1)/(log n) are simply the greedy algorithm for the Nash welfare, supplemented with two auxiliary components to ensure all agents have non-zero utilities and to help a small number of agents with low utilities. In this sense, the long arm of Nashian allocation achieves near-optimal competitive ratios not only for Nash welfare but also all the way to egalitarian welfare.</dc:description>
          <dc:publisher>Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik</dc:publisher>
          <dc:contributor>Zhiyi Huang and Chui Shan Lee and Xinkai Shu and Zhaozi Wang</dc:contributor>
          <dc:date>2025</dc:date>
          <dc:relation>Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)</dc:relation>
          <dc:type>InProceedings</dc:type>
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          <dc:identifier>doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.98</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-234754</dc:identifier>
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          <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
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