2026-07-20T05:59:44Z https://drops.dagstuhl.de/oai

oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:24745 2026-01-21T09:56:25Z ddc:004 open_access

Measuring CEX-DEX Extracted Value and Searcher Profitability: The Darkest of the MEV Dark Forest Wu, Fei Sui, Danning Thiery, Thomas Pai, Mallesh Decentralized Finance Maximal Extractable Value CEX-DEX arbitrages This paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the economics and dynamics behind arbitrages between centralized and decentralized exchanges (CEX-DEX) on Ethereum. We refine heuristics to identify arbitrage transactions from on-chain data and introduce a robust empirical framework to estimate arbitrage revenue without knowing traders' actual behaviors on CEX. Leveraging an extensive dataset spanning 19 months from August 2023 to March 2025, we estimate a total of 233.8M USD extracted by 19 major CEX-DEX searchers from 7,203,560 identified CEX-DEX arbitrages. Our analysis reveals increasing centralization trends as three searchers captured three-quarters of both volume and extracted value. We also demonstrate that searchers' profitability is tied to their integration level with block builders and uncover exclusive searcher-builder relationships and their market impact. Finally, we correct the previously underestimated profitability of block builders who vertically integrate with a searcher. These insights illuminate the darkest corner of the MEV landscape and highlight the critical implications for Ethereum’s decentralization. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Fei Wu and Danning Sui and Thomas Thiery and Mallesh Pai 2025 Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.26 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247450 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.26 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode