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        <identifier>oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:25349</identifier>
        <datestamp>2026-09-05T19:14:05Z</datestamp>
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          <dc:title>Improved Rate for Non-Malleable Codes and Time-Lock Puzzles</dc:title>
          <dc:creator>Freitag, Cody</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Komargodski, Ilan</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Kondapaneni, Manu</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Silbak, Jad</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject>Non-malleable codes</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Time-lock puzzles</dc:subject>
          <dc:description>Non-malleable codes allow a sender to transmit a message to a receiver, while providing a "best-possible" integrity guarantee to ensure that no attacker - who cannot already decode the message - can meaningfully tamper the message in transit. If tampered, the received message should either be invalid or unrelated to the original message. Non-malleable time-lock puzzles (TLPs) are a special case of non-malleable codes for bounded polynomial-depth tampering with very efficient encoding.&#13;
In this work, we give generic techniques for constructing non-malleable codes and non-malleable TLPs with improved rate, which captures the ratio of a message’s length to its encoding length. &#13;
A key contribution of our work is identifying a security notion for non-malleability, which we term "CCA-hiding", sufficient for our compilers. CCA-hiding is a relaxation of CCA-security for encryption or commitments to the fine-grained setting of codes, and requires that the encoded message remains hidden, even given a decoding oracle for any other codeword. Intriguingly, CCA-hiding does not imply non-malleability in the fine-grained setting, as is the case for encryption and commitments. &#13;
Using our new techniques, we give the following constructions:  &#13;
- Rate-1 CCA-hiding TLPs in the plain model. &#13;
- Rate-1 non-malleable codes for bounded polynomial-depth tampering in the auxiliary-input random oracle model (AI-ROM). &#13;
- Rate-(1/2) non-malleable TLPs in the AI-ROM.</dc:description>
          <dc:publisher>Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik</dc:publisher>
          <dc:contributor>Cody Freitag and Ilan Komargodski and Manu Kondapaneni and Jad Silbak</dc:contributor>
          <dc:date>2026</dc:date>
          <dc:relation>Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)</dc:relation>
          <dc:type>InProceedings</dc:type>
          <dc:type>Text</dc:type>
          <dc:type>doc-type:ResearchArticle</dc:type>
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          <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
          <dc:identifier>doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.62</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253490</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.62</dc:identifier>
          <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
          <dc:rights>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode</dc:rights>
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