2026-07-20T10:52:08Z https://drops.dagstuhl.de/oai

oai:drops-oai.dagstuhl.de:25352 2026-03-19T13:03:54Z ddc:004 open_access

Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms Ganesh, Aadityan Thomas, Clayton Weinberg, S. Matthew Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Off-Chain Influence Proofness Blockchain Decentralized Finance Simple Auctions Roughgarden [Roughgarden, 2020] initiates the study of Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs), and posits that the on-chain game of a "good" TFM should be on-chain simple (OnC-S), i.e., incentive compatible for both the users and the miner. Recent work of Ganesh, Thomas an Weinberg [Ganesh et al., 2024] posit that they should additionally be Off-Chain Influence-Proof (OffC-IP), which means that the miner cannot achieve any additional revenue by separately conducting an off-chain auction to determine on-chain inclusion. They observe that a cryptographic second-price auction satisfies both properties, but leave open the question of whether other mechanisms (such as those not dependent on cryptography) satisfy these properties. In this paper, we characterize OffC-IP TFMs: They are those satisfying a burn identity relating the burn rule to the allocation rule. In particular, we show that auction is OffC-IP if and only if its (induced direct-revelation) allocation rule X̄(⋅) and burn rule B̅(⋅) (both of which take as input users' values v₁, … , v_n) are truthful when viewing (X̄(⋅), B̅(⋅)) as the allocation and pricing rule of a multi-item auction for a single additive buyer with values (φ(v₁),…, φ(v_n)) equal to the users' virtual values. Building on this burn identity, we characterize OffC-IP and OnC-S TFMs that are deterministic and do not use cryptography: They are posted-price mechanisms with specially-tuned burns. As a corollary, we show that such TFMs can only exist with infinite supply and prior-dependence. However, we show that for randomized TFMs, there are additional OnC-S and OffC-IP auctions that do not use cryptography (even when there is {finite} supply, under prior-dependence with a bounded prior distribution). Holistically, our results show that while OffC-IP is a fairly stringent requirement, families of OffC-IP mechanisms can be found for a variety of settings. Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik Aadityan Ganesh and Clayton Thomas and S. Matthew Weinberg 2026 Is Part Of LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026) InProceedings Text doc-type:ResearchArticle publishedVersion application/pdf doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.65 urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253527 https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.65 eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode